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1.

CHAPTER I
THS SOCIOLOGY OF

h,O'iLEDG~

The subject matter of this
systems of rtimitive peoples.

Its

st~dy

~ain

is the thought

emphasis is not on

the thought alone but in the way that these thought systems
are related to the social structure of the various societies
from which they originate.
Although very little work has been done directly
in the field of primitive thought as such, a notable amount
of information has been accumulated about the relationship
between

~estern

thought and

~estern

society.

In the main,

scholars dealing with this relationship have been sociolofists
or historians.
ologists of

~ith

time they have become

knOlffi

as the soci

their studies referred to as the

1L~owledge;

scciology of knowledge.
So before delving into the field of primitive
thought, it seems prudent to spend a little time examining
how, and to \mat extent these sociologists of

~nowled~e

have

dealt with thought, and then using the knowledge gained as a
frame of
itself.

refere~ce

to

exa~ine

the field of primitive thought

2.

Although the sociology of knowledge 1s a specialized
field, it does share a common theoretical basis with sociology
as a whole.

All sociologists, regardless of the individual

character of their several areas of study, have a similar per
spective, or

~oint

of view.

Most central to the sociological

approach 1s the concept of the "na tur-e L system. III

The term

"nat.ureL system" was used most effectively by Redcliffe-Brown.

According to him, a "natural system" 1s an aspect of

phenomenological reality.

In analyzing phenomenel reality,

one is able to isolate those portions capable of isolation,
1.e., natural system, from the rest of the universe.
I'We perform a dichotomy:

He says,

we have a system, and the rest of

the universe becomes its environment; one cannot have or.e
without the other.,,2

A natural system, then, is a conceptually

isolated portion of phenomenal reality, and it consists of a
set of aspects in such relation to one another as to
naturally cohering unity.

m~~e

a

The constituent aspect may be events,

or themselves systems of events.

"A'natural law' is a state

ment of the characteristics possessed by a certain definite
lA. R. Radcliffe Brown, A Natural Science of Society
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1948), p. 19.
2 I bld., p , 19.

3.

class of natural systems in the universe .113
The problem of all science 1s to describe natural

systems in terms of " n atural law".

A falling body 1s an ex

ample of such a natural system, and the law of falling bodies

1s the natural law in this instance.

Presumably the natural

law will hold true for all systems (falling bodles) if we have
~ade

our classification correctly.

That Is, if correctly

classified, all systems within the class will have the same
characteristics.
The distinction between a "class" and a "sy s t em" must

be stressed.

The relationships of members of a class are re

latlonshlps of s1ml1arles, but the relationships

bet~~en

the

elements of a natural system are those of interdependence.
Radcliffe-Brown makes an important distinction be
tween a system and a class which should be mentioned here.

He

states:
liTo make clear the distinction between
classes and systems, I should like to pre
sent a little drawing. (The drawing shows
two thick figures chasing two glasses of
beer.) I am going to sugge s t that we have
in these men the members of a class, and
here a class of glasses of beer. There is
a very important Similarity between this
group of men and this group of glasses of
beer. The similarity is that there are two
of each. The term two is the name of a class
of which this class of men is one member,
and this class of glasses of beer is another
~ember; and it is also the n~me of every
3 A• R. Radcliffe Brown, A Natural Science of Society
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Fres Press, 1946J, p. 20.

other instance of a diad. The type of re
lationship that exists between all instances
of the two members, Which we may designate
as "r " relationships of similarity.
Now let us suppose that you have two real men
and two real glasses of beer. You then have
something quite different -- a system of men
drinking -- in which there are specific re
lations of interconnectedness of type URI!.
(The relationships would still be real, but
quite different, if you had two men and one
glass of beer.)
You cannot distinguish between relationships
"r " those of classes and relationships IIR II
those of systems, on the basis that the
latter are real; both exist in phenomenal
reality. You distinguish them as that the
first are relations of similarity and the
relations of sy~tems are complex inter
relationships. II
The distinctions between a system and a class are
illustrated in the following list of their respective
characteristics:

CLASS

SYSTEM

relations simple

relations complex

relations of similarity

relations of inter con
ne c te dne s e

mathematical relations

spatio-temporal relations

without fonn

characteristic form

no quality of integration
coordination by similarity

integrated - co
ordinated by inter
dependence

may be separated
without violation to them

~embers

units violated in
separation

4A• R. Radcliffe Brown, A Natural Science of Society
(Glencoe, Illincis: The Free "Tess, 1948), p. 22.

no cohesion between members of a
class

unita cohere and there
by isolate the system
from the rest of the
universe

no functional relationship be
tween members

functional consistency

in aggregate

a genuine whole, having
a structure

the sum of its parts (members)

organic unity; not the
sum of its constituent
units 5

To summarize, each of the elements of a social system
presumably perform same function which is vital and necessary
for the continuance of the system as a whole.

Each element

of the system is presumably connected with every other element
in the system.

Thus a system might be analogous to very tight

ly bound knots; but knots in which the individual strands
could not be separated.

A system is a unit in which no single

element may be understood except in relation to all the other
elements or in relation to the system as a whole.

~ikewlse,

no element may be removed or altered without destroying or
changing the total system.
Of course, the importance of all this is that social
groupings are natural systems and may be treated accordingly.
In a social system the aspects are individual human beings in

5A• E. Radcliffe Brown, A Natural Science of Society
(Glencoe, Illinois: The !ree Press, 1948), p. 22.

6.

certain relationships to each other.

The individuals are

units in and of themselves, but they also act as aggregates,
or groups.

The relationships between individuals are soclal

relationships of which the social system 1s composed.

These

relationships and the systems of which they are constituent
parts are parts of phenomenal reality.

That ls, they may be

observed and studied.
To say all elements in a soclal sjs t.eu

~re

:::lter

related 1s not to say that all elements are of equal importance.
So~e

general aspects of a soclal system, such as the economic,

for example, are of crucial importance in any soclal system.
Others, like

~ecreatlonal

activities carry much less weight.

Indeed the relative importance of an element differs ac
cording to the society and even
time to time.

~dthin

the same society from

Law, for example, was presumably more important

in Roman society than in Greek society.

Furthermore,

relig~on

in the middle ages ostensibly held a more important place in
the social scheme of things than it does now.

~owever.

re

gardless of the relative importance of an element, it is
still interconnected with the rest.

Thus it is theoretically

possible to begin with a discussion of any element and.
through it, bring in the whole system.
In view of the interconnected nature of a social
system, the end, ideally, of any sociological analysis is to

7.

11scover all of the relationships between all of the elements

of a social system.

In practice, however, one nust all too

often be satisfied with the discovery of relationships between
two areas of socla1 phenomena only, and in fact, that 1s what
~ost

sociologists attempt.

In summary, regardless of what particular elenent
one 1s interested ln, sociological analysis involves always
the same three or four problems.

Mainly:

1.

Isolation of the soclal system.

2.

Analysis of the soclal system into its com
ponent parts.

3.

Discovery of the relationships between these
elements, and their position in regard to the
system as a whole.

It 1s of vital significance to realize that a soclal
system (which according to Radcliffe-Brown 1s a "natur-e),
system") contains within it elements which themselves are not
"natural".

That is. the members of a eo c La L system possess

certain social usages which together form. what is commonly
called culture, and which, as I shall point out, is not it
self a part of "phen omena L reality. 1\

Culture we may define

3.S

those learned and shared patterns that characterize a group,
or a society.

Analysis of that which can be both learned and

shared would, I believe, lead to the conclusion that such
phenomena must be ideational.

Murdock has indeed made this

very explicit in an article on the "Cross Cultural Survey".

In this article Y!urdock makes the following points which night
be summarized as follows:
1.

Culture is learned.

Culture is not instinctive, or innate,
or transmitted biologically, but is
composed of habits, i.e., learned
tendencies to react, acquired by each
individual through his own life ex
periences after birth.

2.

Culture is inculcated.

3.

Culture is social.

4.

Culture is ideational.

All animals are capable of learning,
but man alone seems able, in any
considerable measure, to pass on
his acquired habits to his off
spring.

Habits of the Cultural order are not
only inculcated and thus transmitted
over time; they are also social, that
is, shared by human beings living in
or~anized aggregates or societies and
kept relatively uniform by social
pressure.

liTo a considerable extent, the group habits of which
culture consists are conceptualized or verbalized as ideal
norms or patterns of behavior.

There are

exce~tions

of course;

grammatical rules, for example, though they represent col
lective linguistic habits are thus cultural and are only in
small per-t consciously formulated. 116

In short, culture is

ideational (symbolic) and thus any cultural

~attern

forms a

theoretical system (as distinct from a natural system) and
6George Peter Murdock, liThe Cross Ou Ltural SUrvey",
Sociological Analysis, Lo~an Wilson and William Kolb (New
York: Harcourt & Brace, 1949), p. 67.

yet -- this is what is important to
theoretical

syste~s

elements of a

reco~nize

-- these

as cultural patterns are aspects or

~atural

social system, i.e., some group of

human be ings •
If we take a total society as the social system for
consideration, the most common way of analyzing it is in terms
of 'What anthropologists call the "umver-sa t culture pattern.

II

According to the universal culture pattern every society is
composed of the following kinds of organizations, or activi
ties, or ideational factors:

economic. political, social

(s-treatification,) religious, recreational, educational, kin
ship, artistic, etc.

This is certainly the way most ethno

graphic monographs treat

t~e

material.

The position of these ideational factors in relation
to the "ne tur aL'' elements needs some elaboration.

When we

speak of a "natural" element -- a group organized for economic
p~rposes

who are

for example -- we are first of all speaking of people

i~volved

in some economic activity or performing some

economic function.

In order to reach their desired goals, they

are organized in some way, presumably in the way Which will
best aid them in achieving their goals.

This organization and

the activities which go along with it are carried on in ac
cor dance with some idea or plan in mind, for it seems incon
ceivable that they could act in a coordinated manner in a

10.

~ental

void.

In any soc1al institution this triad between

organization, activities, and ideas exists.
element, for

exa~ple,

The religious

in any society 1s a soc1al organization

in that it has a hlerachy, or eclesla, or priesthood; there
are religious activities, such as rites, ceremonies, etc

a

Then there 1s the theology, an idea system which guides the
whole.

Thus any single institution must be considered as a

tl~tly

knit pattern including activities, organization and

ideas.

Ideational factors do not have an existence separate

from their context.

It is only for analytical purposes that

they may be isolated at all.
completely.

In no case can they be isolated

Thus, in a discussion of thought some aspects of

the organization and certain activities are bound to creep into
the discussion.
In the writings of the sociologists of knowledge,

one often encounters the phrase "social structure It.
an

i~portant

understood.

phrase and one which is

This is

cO~Bonly ~isused

and mis

In general, what is meant by social structure

might better be temed "social stratification".

This is a

generalization, and one which is not always applicable.

In

general, the term "social stratification" may be thought of in
terms of a system of rewards.

A society, as we have seen, is

composed of different elements, each of which fulfills 80me
need.

In order to encourage the performance of approved

11.

activities, and orientate persons toward desired goals, the
society distributes the rewards of wealth, power and prestige.
The manner in which these rewards are distributed may be oon
sldered as a basis for social structuring.

In explanation,

these rewards are not distributed equally.

Usually there 1s

a small group at the top of any social structure who receive
a disproportionately large amount of all three rewards.
There 1s a group in the middle which receives an
amount.

Inter~edlate

Then there 1s a greater number of people on the bottom

of the social ladder who receive ver:)" little reward.

These

groups are usually alluded to as upper, middle and lower
classes, respectively.

All together these classes form a

socla1 structure.
The social class of a particular person is relative.
There are no absolute criteria which apply in every case.
The importance of one class is dependent on the subordination
of another and vice versa.
~ould

If there were no serfs I there

be no kingj and without slaves, no slaveholder.
With this in mind, I think we are in ,osition to

discuss the sociology of knowledge itself.
is the sociology of knowledge?
characteristics?
aims?

Just what exactly

What are its distinguishing

How is it defined?

What are its goals and

How do sociologists approach the analysis of

thoug~t?

These

- any

What do these sociologists define a tLoUt;:.t?

utL5r que s t Lon s must be answered before we can profitably

12.

undertake the application of this point of view to primitive
thougbt.
The answers to all of these questions are
c~t.

~ot

clear

In truth, they have not even been discussed adequately.

One sociologists, Karl- Mannhelm, has written a Dook called
Ideology and Utopia, a classic in the field of the sociology
of knowledge, and which contains one of the best discussions
of the field along ylth its point of view, scope, methods
problems.

a~d

So in giving a brief survey of the sociology of

knowledge, I will depend on Mannhelm a great deal.

First of

all, it should be understood that Mannhelm makes no pretense
of giving all the answers, but in fact his work 1s more de
finitive and inclusive than most.
Though quite vague, Mannhetmls definition of the
sociology of knowledge is important because it provides a
basis for reference.

Of the sociology of knowledge he says,

liThe sociology of knowledge is one of the youngest branches of
sociology; as theory it seeks to analyze the relationship be
tween knowledge and existence; as historical-sociologial re
search it seeks to trace the form which this relationship has
taken in the intellectual development of mankind. 117

To me the

crucial phrase is "relationship between kno ej.e dge and
7 Ka r l Nannhe Lm , Ideolo~y and Utopia, ·trans. Louis
Edward
Shils (New York, Harcourt 3race and Company,
Worth and
1936), p , 265.

13.

e xi.s t.ence",

This chr-as e poses three important questions.

Firstly, what is knowledge?
existence?

Secondly, what does he meen by

And lastly, how are the two related?
Let's take the first question first.

knowledge?

What 1s

What types of ideas are of interest to the sociol

ogist according to Mannheim?

Do they all have equal value for

him, or are some ideas of more sociological import than others?
Mannheim, as far as I can discover, never attempts to answer
this question, but he does make a few comments which have some
bearing on this question.
One remark which I consider important 15 the fo1
lowing, "PhdLo acphez-a have too long concerned themselves with

their own thinking.

When they wrote of thought, they had in

mind primarily their own history, the history of philosophy,
or quite special fields of knowledge, such as mathematics or
physics • • • •

Meanwhile, acting men have, for better or for

worse proceeded to develop a variety of methods for the ex
perential and intellectual penetration of the world in which
they live, which have never been analyzed with the same pre
cislon as the so called exact modes of knowledge • • • • it is
the most essential task of this book to work out a suitable
method for the description of analysis of this type of thought
,,8
and its changes
•

•

4

•

8Kar l Mannhetm, Ideology and Utopia, tranSft Louis
and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company,
1936), p. 1
~orth

14.

Regrettably, Mannhelm does not say explicitly in
just what thoughts he 1s interested.
vague IIthis type of thought!'.

They are defined by the

He does not say what llthis type

of 'thought." 1s or .mat its characteristics are, but I think

we can infer from what he says that knowledge to him 1s not
primarily

phl1oso~hlcal,

nor scientific, nor 1s it concerned

with a more advanced type of thought.

Therefore, knowledge

1s not fact which has logically developed according to a
rational scheme, but rather the more spontaneous type of
thought by which men actually live -- whatever it may be.
It is possible that Mannheim defines thought as it

concerns the sociology of knowledge more in terms of the
originator -- the thinker

than the thought itself.

In

the beginning of his book he makes it quite clear that the
type of thought of concern to the sociology of knowledge is
group thought and not the thought of certain individuals as
is the case in philosophy, where the main emphasis 1s on the
thought systems of particular individuals.

In this regard he

comme n't s , "tnus . it is not men in general -sho think, or even
isolated individuals who do the thinking, but men in certain
groups who have developed a

particular~yle

of thought in an

endless series of responses to certain typical situations
characterizing their common position."9

9 Ibid •• p , 3.

15.

This attitude seems to be shared in great part by
all of the sociologists of knowledge with whom I am familiar.
The thought of individuals is rarely discussed and when these
sociologists do mention a particular person. their interest in

him 1s as a spokesman for a particular group, or as he ex
presses the spirit of his times, rather than as an individual
thinker.

On this note of unity all similarity between the
various sociologists ceases.

I am sure that there 1s no one

definition on which all the sociologists would agree.

The

term "knowledge II must be interpreted very broadly because

studies in this area have dealt with almost all types of
mental "pr-oduc t.s ",

As Merton says, "e tuc t e s in this area

('the sociology of knowledge

l

)

have dealt with virtually the

entire gamut of cultural products (ideas, ideologies,

juristic

and ethical beliefs, philosophy, science, technology. ),,10
However, it is possible that regardless of their
particular emphasis, most of the sociologists of knowledge
are interested in what is known as "Ldeo Lcgy";

Indeed these

sociologists have emphasized "ideology" to such an extent
that Wilson and Kolb in their book Sociological Analysis
define "ideology" as the prime subject matter of the sociology
of knowledge.

They say, "and in the ao c Lo Logy of knowledge

the inquiry centers on the social roots of particular

10

Robert K. jjer-t.on , "Phe So cLo Lqgy of Knowledge 'II
Twer..tieth Century Sociology, George Ourvi tch and ~i11bert E.
Xoore (Kew York: The ?hilosophical Library, 1945), p. 366.

16.

cultural systems, especially those called ideologies. till
This is a misleading exaggeration.
q~ite

rheoretically, it is

clear that many types of thoughts, if not almost all,

are the proper realm of the sociology of knowledge.

Yet it

is interesting to note that so much emphasis has been placed
on ideology, and so much space devoted to it, that even such
eminent sociologists as Wilson and Kolb should define the
problem of ideology as the main focal point of interest for
the sociology of knowledge.
in the main with Marx.

The term "ideologyll is associated

Although Marx was not the first one to

invent the term, he was the first to use it in the way that
has become associated with the sociology of knowledge.
Marx, an ideology was very narrowly ,onceived.

To

Marx's theory

revolves around the concept of class interest and struggle.
In this picture "ideology had a very important place.

Ac

cording to Marx. an ideology might be defined as a tool in
class warfare -- as a tool in the hands of the upper class
for the exploitation of the lower classes.
Mannheim, as most of the other sociologists of
knowledge, is not interested Darticularly in ideology as a
tool in class warfare, but he does give credence to the
llWilson Kolb. Sociological Analysis (New !ork:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 844.
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existence of such ideas.

In Ideology and Utopia

~an~~eim

distinguishes between the "particular" conception of
<:;.:.1j

the "total" conoe p t t.on ,

~fuat

is the one under discussion here.

idt:o.ioe;~"

he calls the "par-t.t cu Lar-"
~e

iefines this conception

in the following paragraph:
The particular conception of ideology is
implied whsn the term denotes that ~ are
sceptical of the ideas and representations
advanced by our opponents. They are re
garded as more or less conscious disguises
of the real nature of a situation, the true
recognition of which would not be in accord
with his interests. These distortions
range all the way from conscious lies to
half-conscious and unwitting disguises;
from calculated atf~mpts to dupe others
to self-deception.
In short, I am sure that Mannheim and the other sociologists
of knowledge would agree that an ideology in this sense might
best be considered as a convenient falsehood rather than a
conscious deliberate atte»pt to deceive.
In Mannheim's terms, the function of ideology in
this "particular" sense is to "reinforce established »at te rue",
Now

when Mannheim and the rest of the sociologists of knowledge

speak of a "pattern" what they really are referring to is the
patterning of social classes into an overall societal struc
ture.

As has been previously explained, the class system is

set up to benefit the so called "upper" class especially.
12Karl Mannhelm, Ideology and Utopia (New York:
Harcourt and Brace and Company, 1936), p. 55.

18.

Marx and some of the other revolutionaries tend to think of
ideology in terms of this one class.
More or less, other sociologists think of ideology
in somewhat broader

te~s.

When they think of "e st.ab l t sne c patterns II, they are

referring to the class

~Tstem

as a whole.

Though an ideology

may start with the upper class, it 1s diffused throughout the
whole society, and as such 1s effective in coordinating and
unifying the whole.

Though an ideology may benet! t one group

more than others, it 1s effective only to the extent that it
includes the whole soc1al system.

It reinforces all in

stitutions, organizations, and activities on all different
levels.

An ideology 1s not conceived in terms of one class,

but the system as a whole.

In short, an ideology is a set of

"fictions" used to stabilize the social order to the benefit
of a fev.
It is for the other. the broader, conception of word
"Lde o Logy " that Mannheim displays enthusiasm.
calls the ntotal conception of ideology".

This Mannbeim

This "total con

ception of ideology" refers to any ideology of an age or a
concrete historico-social group_

Mannhe1m seems to equate with

wha t he calls "mode of t.hougb t " for in places he uses the two
terms interchangeably.

At no time does Mannheim define ex

plici tly what a "mode of thought" is, but from the way in

19.

which the term 1s used, it appears to refer to a particular
frame of reference, a way of looking at the world, a point of
view.

Perhaps the Ger!!lan words of

might be substituted for it.
does Mannheim discuss?

"ve Lt.ans chauung"

or IIZeltgelst"

What specific modes of thoughts

In his article on the utopian Men

tallty he lists the types of utopian mentalities as:

the

liberal mentality, the conservative mentality, soclallst
communist mentality, orgiastic chl11asrn. 13

Each of these

types of mental! ty 1s what he would call a "mode of thought".

Each of these four "mode s of t.hougn-t " might be

described as that of a particular political party.

They are

very different from ideologies in the "par-t t.cu Lar-" sense.

Mannheim 1s interested in them, not so much as attempted dis
tortions due to deliberate effort to deveive, as with the
varying ways in which objects present themselves to the sub
ject according to the differences in social setting.

In this

regard he says, ItThus mental structures are inevitably dif
ferently formed in different social and historical settings"
and it is this interpretation that fascinates him.

Its main

problem or interest is to discover what kinds of mental
structures are resultant with which historical-social periods.
It should be pointed out that the social base is of
as much interest to the sociologist of knowledge as is the
13 Karl Mannheim, Ideolog~ and Utopia (New York:
Harcourt and Brace and Company, 193 ), Chapter IV, 'IThe
Utopian Mentality", p , 192.

20.

thought.

With this we will concern ourselves presently.

To discuss one of these nodes of thought at this
time would take too much time, for they are most complex and
explained in great detail.
~lves

Another sociologist, Max Scheler,

a paradigm which might be regarded as an outline of

what Mannheim calls a "mode of -t nough t ",

Scheler 1s interested in characterizing the idea
systems or "modes of thought II of the upper and lower classes

of French society in the eighteenth century.

This paradigm 1s

as follows:
LOWER CLASS

UPPER CLASS

1,

'tendency to look forward

tendency to look backward

2.

Smphasls on becoming

smphasis on being

3.

mechanistic conception of the

~81eological

world

of the world

4.

realism in philosophy; the
wo r Ld as resistance

idealism in philosOph7;
the world as a realm of
ideas

5.

materialism

spiritualism

6.

induction, emp Lr Lc Lem

a priori knowledge,
rationalism

7.

or-agma t Lsm

intellectualism

8.

optimism with regard to the

future; the past as the bad
old days

pessimism with regard to
future; the past as the
good old days

a dial ctical mode of thinking;
search for contradiction

h ar-racn Le s

9.
10.

emphasis on environmental
influence s

conception

search for identies and
emphasis on heredity and
trad1t1on. 14

14~arner Stark, The Sociology oT Knowledge (Glencoe,
Illi~ois: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 77-78.
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Much coald be said in detailed criticism of this
~urpose.

scheme, but criticism 1s not oar

The important point
Mannhel~

1s that this paradigm represents an outline of what

would call a "mode of thought" -- that '.ihlch all sociologists
are interested in obtaining.
According to Mannheim
the

word

In

"Ld e o Logy",

the

the~,

"total

there are two meanings to

conce-rt t on of

Lde o Logv "

we

speak of an ideology of an ageor of a concrete hlstorico

social group. p , 56.

It 1s upon this conception of Lde o Log.

tna t our- attention will be focused.

ce p t j on of: ideology tmp Lt e s ar.
deceive another.

"Tlle 'partic

con

111er"

8.:.L

Ideas regarded in this light are

~ore

or less

conscious disguises of the real nature of the situation, the
true recogLition of
interests. 1I 1 5
class

wr~ich

would Dot be in accord with one's

This later conception of thought 1s related to

i~terests,

and is generally thought of as

prod~ct

of a certain class which has its

s~eci31

interests in mind.

O~

bei~g

welfare

the
~nd

This is ideology in the Marxian

sense of the word.
In all of this discussion,
Quite clear that

t~ere

is no explicit

I have tried to
st2te~ent

~ake

it

anywhere as to

what tyJe of mental constructs these sociologists are defining
15Ka r l ~annheim, Ideolosy and Utopia (New York:

Brace and Company. 1936). p. 55. .

Harco~rt

as

k~owledge.

Eowe ve r-,

Theoretically all thoughts can be included.

there are some geCleralizations that one Can make

about thought as the sociologist of
and these might be
1.

su~marized

HJ~~ver

knowled~e

conceive of it,

by the follo'ffing outline:

these sociologists conceive of

knowled~e,

we mav be sure that they are not pr-Lma.r LLy interested in
uh LLo s oph Lca'l or scientific thought -- although the se t:.. pes

of thoughts are not excluded.

They are more interested in

those ideas which are closest to human behavior; and those by
which men actually live.
2.
~roup

Sociologists are interested in thought as a

or social or historical phenomena, and not as the product

of' an individual rnLnd ,

It is the thought s tem-n Ing from 'What

:·!annheim calls "social historical s t t.ue t Lons";
~.

Sociologists seem to show particular interest in

ideology in its narrowest political sense; i.e., as a method or
tool by which one group exploits or takes advantage of another.
4.

Generally speaking, knos Ledge may be defined as

an outlook on the world, or a weltanschauung, through which
one perceives the vor-Ld ,

This is wh a't

~lannheim t

erms "mode

of t.hc ugh t ",
5.

Knowledge as it is used in this sense is, I

believe, a misnomer, and as a result, is misleading.
has the implications of validity or truth.

KnDwl~dge

These types of'

thoughts covered by the term knowledge are certainly

~ot

true

in the objective sense.
It is possible to say that the sociologist of
knowledge are interested in what could be called subjective
knowledge, or perhaps belief might be a better term for it?
In a general sense, this is so.

agree.

I believe Mannbeim would

Yet there are other sociological studies, as we shall

see, which deal with what is known as scientific thought and
so it cannot be said that this is so absolutely.
~iha teverthe

central orientation of "knowledge ",

the central orientation of this study remains the samei its
primary concern is with the relation between knowledge and
what Mannheim calls "existence".

This definition is vague but

a more specific statement is imnossible, for it would not in
clude all the diverse approaches which have been developed.
Having discussed the term knowledge, let us now per
sue the SUbject of the existential base.
What does l1annhe1m mean by the term "ext.e tencevt
Mannheim never defines this term, but he does shed some light
on its meaning.

In relating thought to what he calls

~ex-

Ls tence ", he says, IIThis means that opinions, statements,
propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their
face value but are interpreted in the light of the 1ife
situation of the one who expresses them.

It signifies further

that the specific character and life situation of the subject
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influences his opinions, perceptions and interpretations. 16
The key term here is "Ltre-e t tue t ton" and this includes all
experience.

Almost everyone would agree that experience in

fluences thought or that thought

ste~s

in part from experience,

but what we want to know is what part of experience, or the
life-situation, is most intimately connected wita thought.
The answer to this question Mannheim does not provide.

In

other words, this definition, if one can call it that, is so
broad as to be almost meaningless.

Certainly no sociologist

of knowledge attempts to relate thought to' .a Ll, of e xpe r Lence
of the total life-experience.

Instead he singles out one

aspect which seems significant to

hi~,

elevates it to the

position uppermost in importance and attempts to relate to it
the ideas in which he is interested.
~ot

only does Mannheim not define the term existence,

neither does he give any good explanation of what social
factors are most crucial in influencing thought.

Thus in ex

plaining the term "existence", Mannheim is of :Little or no
help in that he does not give a general definition of the
term.
we must

So in order to obtain some unde r-s tand Lng of the ter::n,
beco~e ~ore

specific and describe in some detail the

work that has been done in the field.
To mention all the sociologists of knowledge for a
moment, there seem to be about seven basic points of view as
to what social factors they consider as the social roots of

16 Karl Mannheim, IdeOlO,Y and Utopia (New York;

Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936 , p.

56.

25.

thought.

These have been listed by -rarner Stark in The

Sociology of KnOWledge.

First of all, it Beems to me that

the term 1s used not only by people to cover

t~e

social factors

rrhlch have a bearing on thought, such as religious, economic,

political, but others as well, of which the most important 1s
envlI1onmental.
The first school of thought that I would like to

take uo 1s what Warner Stark calls geographical

determlnis~.

""Existence II according to this approach 1s defined In t.e r-as of
geo~raphy

and

p~~slcal

environment.

Thinkers of this school

maintain that in the last analysis, what man think depends on
his physical

envlro~~ent.

This principle of derivation of thought can be seen
in Buckle's attempt to explain the predomlnence of democratic
ideas in the northern parts of Europe.

In short, Buckle

maintains that persons living in cold climates need a high
carbon content in their food; therefore they must eat animal
meat; therefore they are obliged to hunt; thus they become
self-reliant people who will

~ot

stand for authoritarian

methods of govern~e~t.17This 1s an over-simplification and
one which makes Buckle's analysis look rather ridiculous.

I

would like to assure the reader that although many legitimate
cri tic isms could :Je made of Buckle I S analysis, he is by no
means as naive as my paraphrasing of his idea might make him
appear to be.

gowever, as brief as this description might be,

I think that one cen get Some idea of what

t~e

so called

l7Warner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (Glencoe,
Illinois, The Free Press, 1958), p. 217.
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"geogr-aph t ca). determiuistic ach o oL" 19 attempting.
seekl~g

A second theory

t.er-nt n Lng man I s mind 1s

to explain the factors de

t:-.. e "technological doctrine II.

Thought, according to tt.ls a opr oach , depends upon man IS
artlflcts and his techniques and tools.

In his Social Worlds

of Knowledge, Gordon Chl1de gives one example of haw thinking
may stem from technology.

He wrl tes that Ita conception of

celestial mechanics was impossible to a society that d1d not

use and make rotary machines

~ore

elaborate and

co~pllcated

thG.ll 'tr;e '))8 -drill t the La the, and the potter I s wheel.

II

A little while later he points out that, "From the seventeenth

century t2e leisured philosophers who have been formulating
the world-view of European and American societies have been
familiar with machines, operated by impersonal forces of
water, wind, steam and electricity rather than mules or
human slaves

....

Their speculation has been directed to

producing a

~odel

or reality based on the machine as they

see it.lt~

vt s Lozi,c eludes me, and certainly see:ns a bit

far-fetched, but nevertheless, Childe's comments are repre
sentative of a serious point of view.
In sunm tug up, Childe asserts t.ha t , "the historical
worlds of knowledge

~ust

each have been, and be, conditioned

18Warner Starl,The Sociology of Knowledge (Glencoe,
Illinois, The Free Press, 1958), p. 218.
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by the whole of the society's

c~lture

and particularly its

technology" •

A third approach to determining
cerns physiological factors.

manls

mind coo

This scr.ool 1s predominently

European, as such theories are discredited in the United
States.

The basic theory of this school 1s that the thought

processes of different races or stocks are different by
virtue of that fact alone.

There has been much written on

this subject, and perhaps one of the most widely known, if
nat the most perferted theory of the twentieth century, 1s
the Nazi doctrine concerning the

Je\~.

This notion that the

Jews were an inferior species stemmed from, and perhaps was the
end result of, a whole school of thought.

The Nazis were not

scientific in any degree in their assertions. but their al
legations

~re

derived from a European school of long ex

t s t enoe ,
Of far more importance has been a fourth school of
thought which asserts that man's mind is determined by a set
of drives.

Friedrich Nietzsche I s concept of the "will to

power" is an example of this ap pr-oach ,
be elaborated UDonw

The key to everything. according to

Nietzsche, is the "will to power It .19
a dr1ve-a

tende~cv
l~

Per-haps this should

He interprets this as

of the will -- which is directed toward a

~~arner Stark, The Sociolog( of Knowledge (Glencoe,
Illinois, The Free Press, 195e), pw 219.
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specific end.

This can become the basis not only for human

action, but for human thought as well.

Neltzsche, is innate 1n mana

This drive, says

In the strong this drive

manifests itself 1n an open, natural form, and produces the
best and proudest of human types, the warrior.

In the weak,

however, who are incapable of attaining the power which all
humans crave, the drive appears in a "watered-down" or per

verted form, and produces such characters as the demagogue
and the minister.
the

~asses

It is they who produce ideas to captivate

in an indirect attempt to gain power.

Neltzsche, then, the employment of ideas, rather

To
tha~

overt

action, is a substitute for the "will to power" by those who

are too weak to gain their ends openly.20
Nietzsche's prime object of derision is Christianity
with its value placed on suffering, meekness and equality of
all human beings.

This is to Nietzsche a typical "s Lave

philoso ohy", and hence, reprehensible.
In any case, and this is the important point, the
ideas put forwarding, according to Nietzsche, are

e~llcable

in the light of the underlying "will to power".
The most significant approach has been that of ex
plaining
20

~ental

phenomena in terms of self-interest:

Ibid •• p , 220.

the
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terms interest always denoting selfish interests and usually
the interests of a class.
Many eminent sociologists have taken this view
either completely or in some modified form.
Max Weber, Emile Durkhleim, and Max

AQong them are:

Scheler~

Certainly

this approach is implied in Mannhelm's idea of ideology in
its "partlcular"21 sense.

Much of the writing by people

taking this approach has concerned eighteenth and nineteenth
century economic theory.

The point made generally 1s that

what 1s known as "c La.ss Lca.L economic 'the o ry " advanced the lz:

terests of t.he newly rising "capI tallstlc II class.
Erich Roll in his History of Economic 'f:louFL t applies
this approach to the "classical economist". 22

A few quota

tions will suffice to show how he went about the task.
"Misselde:z:'s l.rnmediate motive for theorizing", he writes,
"was to provide a background for policies designed to foster
the interests of the class he represented. II

Another quote,

by the author, tilt has often bee:z: said that Adam Smith
represented the interests of a single class.

This is un

douotedly true not only in an historical sense, but even
21Xa r 1 vlannhe Lm , Ideology and Utopia (New "York:
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1936), p. 56.
22yarner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (Gle:z:coe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p , 221
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subjectively. u

In speak Lng of' Ricardo, he say s , "he was

forced by the same social purpose which was inherent in the
~ealth

of Nations to

~ply

the nroductlvlty of capital, he

was also determined far more than Smith to represent the
claims of landed property as economically unjustified.

The

resulting theory of rent reflects these two capitalists in
terests. 2 3

And still another -- "Mal thus was a reactionary

characterized by "advocacy of pre-capltallst::lnterest r in an
already ca.')1ta.l1st society."

I am not going to
to say here.

~.

70.

atte~pt

15~.

185. 213

(1~50)

to criticize what Roll has

That would only be a waste of

tl~e.

These

q.uo t.e s by Roll were intended as an expre s s fon of a certain

point of view, and not as an object for criticism.
The sixth and seventh approaches are of most in
terest to us.

Both of these maintain that it is social

life which determines and explains human thought. but where
one singles out some specific Bocial factor or factors, the
other maintains that society as a totality (all social re
lationships) 15 the force in shaping
s~~e

~an'B

mind.

For the

of simplicity let us call the latter the total-causative

theory and the former the single-causative theory.
Both Durkheim and Scheler are adherents of the
23 Ibid., p. 221
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single-causative school.
~erton

Concer~l~g

Durkhelm, Robert K.

has done such an excellent job of characterizing his

TNhole approach that I can do not better than to quote him.
In speaking of. Durkhelm, Merton, in his Social Theory and
Social Structure says (,. 2e6, 1~~3) "In an early study with

Mauss of primitive forms of classification, he maintained
that the genesis of the categories of thought 1s to be
found in group structure and group relations, and that they
vary "Iflth changes in the social organization.

In ee e'xIng

to account for the social origins of categories, Durkhelm
postulated that individuals are more directly and inclusive

ly oriented toward the groups in which they live than they
are toward nature.

Scientific experiences are mediated

through social relationships, which leave their impress on
the character of thought and knowledge.

ThUS, in his study

of primitive forms of thought, Durkheim deals with the
periodic recurrence of social activities (ceremonies, feasts,
rites), the clan structure, and the spatial configuration of
group meetings as among the existential bases of thought.
And, applying Durkheim's formulations to ancient Chinese
thought, "or-abe-t attributes their typical conception of
time and space to such bases as the feudal organization
and the rhythmic alternations of concentrated and dispersed

32.

group life 1124

So much for Durkhe Ln ,

Scheler's theory 16 a bit more confusing.

Scheler

thinks in terms of an ontology which distinguishes between
different spheres of reality which are organized into a
hierarchy.

For Scheler, the most fundamental of these

spheres 16 the WB.

The

~

precedes both nature

a~d

the

1,

both subjectively and objectively, as a matter of experience.

He also speakes of the law of primacy of existence of the
social structure over all other structures of existence.
It 1s clear from this that Scheler sees soclal reality as
the sub-structure of thought. 25
I realize that I have hurried thrOUgh the explana

tion of the first six schools of thought concerning the
nature of the "existential basis of t.hough t";

I do not

want to spend much time with them, for it is not crucial.
My single intention is that the reader have a general idea

as to what the adherents of each school maintain.
The seventh approach to the basis of thought is, in
my opinion, the most significant, and with it, I would like

to deal at length.

The seventh school, which includes what

I have called the proponents of the "single-causative t.he or-y ",
24Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Struc
~ (Glencoe; Illinois:
The Free Press, 1951), p. 120.
25Yarner Stark. The SoCiology of Knowledge (Glencoe,
The Free Fress. 1958). p. 224.

Illinois:
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in contrast to the total causative theory, emphasize the
importance of only a few social factors.

The most prom

inent adherents of this school of thought are:
R. H. Tawney, and C. F. Calverton.

Max Weber,

Of course, I cannot ex

amine all of the works of these three men at this time,
but I would like to give enough so that the reader has a
fairly good understanding of their particular point of view.
~lthln

the confines of this seventh approach -- this so-called

single-causative theory -- the most important work of the
sociology of knowledge has been done.

I think the whole

concept of this area of study, along with its problems,
methods, scope and conclusions can best be comnunlcated by
an analysis of the work of these three men who have con
tributed so much to the field of the sociology of knowledge.
One of the many projects that

~eber

undertakes is the attempt

to trace the effect of occupational activity upon religious
thought.

The three groups in whose thought he 1s interested

he calls artisans, peasants and proletarians.
Weber

~ses

the potter as the

~odel

of the artisan,

If the potter wishes to make a vessel, he first conceives
the shape for it in his mind and then fashions that shape by
forcing bis will upon the clay which resists the efforts of
his gUiding hands.

~~us,

~eber

concludes, he undergoes, in

his daily work, an experience which can become the inspiration

of a religious philosophy:

namely, that the human urge to

create can become the model of a devine "denaur-ge ";

A

deimurge may oe defined as a supernatural being imagined
as creating or fashioning the world in suoordination to
the supreme being.

Weber felt that such a conception of

the diety would naturally be acceptable to a society of
artisans for it would fit in with their whole lives and ex
periences.
The peasant has a very different life-experience,
and from it comes a substantially different brand of re
ligious thought.

Wnile the craftsman is the master in that

he controls the production of his product, the peasant is
the master of nothing and in fact is the slave of unfore
seeable,
a~t

a~d

uncontrollable forces.

His crops are depend

u;on factors over which he has no control whatsoever,

and economic ruin is an ever present danger.

Consequently,

his God will not be a rational, or even personal, creator,
but

~ore

likely a mysterious treacherous, unpredictable

power who can never be controlled but only propitiated.
This is the second religious outlook.
rhe industrial proletariat will feel differently
again about religion.

According to

~leber,

the proletariat

will be very prona to atheism because there is little in
fiis activity to stimulate religious feeling.

In the ·Naste

land of tee factory the worker does not experience personal

35.

creativity, and so he does not conveive of the diety as a
personal creator.

He is not apt tc believe in irrational

forces, because he bas experienced only the well organized
factory routine.

This is the third type of thought in which
Weber is interested. 26
As I look back over my paraphrasing of Weber's work,
I realize that I have made his ideas look somewhat simpler
and less reasonable than they are in reality.

I would like

to assure the reader that Weber does a very complete study
of these different types of thoughts from occupation.
It should be pointed out that Weber is

elevati~g

occupation to the status of prime casual agent to the exelusion of all other factors.

~ith

this, let us go on to

Tawney.
Tawney is another who has contributed especially to
the sociology of knowledge.

Though Tawney, I am sure,

would classify himself as an historian and not as a sociolo
gist of knowledge, his book Religion and the Rise of Capital
~

definitely takes the point of view associated with the

sociology of knowledge.

In this book Tawney discusses the

relationship between religious thought and certain economic
elements in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Tawney first describes the histor.ical

develop~ent

26Warner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (Glencoe,
Illinois: The FTee Press, 1958). p. 223.

35.

of modern European society.

He begins with a discussion of

the latter part of the Middle Ages.
dominated by a rural outlook.

The Middle Ages were

The great majority of the

people earned their livelihood through agriculture.

The

feudal system, with its strict class system, indenture
system, and inflexible point of view, was the dominant social
form of the day.

Oi ties were in their infancy, and trade,

manufacturing, and other features associated with cities
were undeveloped and relatively unimportant.

Urban life

was generally unknown in most of the population and was
rather foreign, and hence, evil to them.
Ideologically,
anti-economic emphasis.

~~e

Middle Ages were marked by an

Man was t"ought of as primarily

a spiritual being who must indulge in the mundane affairs of
th4.s world in order to survive and achieve salvation.
~aintenance

The

of existing standards of economic well-being

liaS

thought to be necessary, but the acquisition of material
500ds for themselves was thought to be spiritually suspect,
if not downright evil.
~hose
~uch

Accordingly, trade, manufacture and

who took part in these activities, were not rendered
respect.

Poverty ,{(is considered a virtue.

Usury,

avarice, and the like were thopght to be sins meriting
pun.i.sbme n t • 27

27 R• H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitolism
(New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1926), p. 39, chap.
1, Part II.
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In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as the feudal
syste~

disintegrated, new soclal forces rose to prominence.

Cities expanded and commerce 1n general evolved and pros
pered.

A new soclal system arose; one dominated by the
28
middle class and its entrepreneurs ~~d capitalists.
While the old economic values and attitudes hung on until
well into the slzteenth century they were never adequate for

the new middle class, for the middle class was intimately
involved in all of those activities which were condemmed
by the medieval philosophy.

The new middle class could not

accept the idea that money and moneymaking were evil; to do
so would be to condemn onels self and this 1s never easy.
Yet the middle class had no replacement for this philosophy.
In short, the new middle class was left in an ideological
vacuum.

Into this void, says Tawney, stepped Calvinism.

Calvinism was just made for the middle cla8s. 29

Though

CalVin did not set out to deliberately form an ideology for
the newly proninent bourgeoise, his teaching filled a great
need, as can be seen by the great number of adherents that
he obtained from t:'1.is class.

To say that Calvinism was a

middle class movement would be no exaggeration.
Of all of CalVin's ideas. the doctrines of pre
:estination and the emphasis on moral duty are the most
28 I b1d., p. 77, 78.

29lE.!£•• p. 92.
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important for our purposes.

Basically, predestination 1s

the idea that everything, including manls fate, has been
prearranged by God.

Calvin taught that there are those, the

elect, who are God's favorites, who will automatically be
granted salvation.

The remainder of mankind will be con

signed to an eternal hell, though this punishment is through
no fault of their own.

Virtue and merit have nothing to do

with the jUdgment of God.

This is just the nature of the

universe -- some are chosen and others are not.

T~'lOse

who

are the chosen lot benefit not only in the next world but in
this one as well, in that they receive the material benefits
of this world.

Therefore, according to the doctrine of

Calfln, the possession of lrealth 1s a pretty good indication
that one is of the chosen few.

It is scarse wonder that

Calvinism appealed to the newly righ middle class.

It made

them feel that the possession of wealth was God's will and
their possession and acquisition of this wealth not only
inevitable but their God-given right.
In Tawney I s own words; lithe doctrine of predestina
tion satisfied the saTIe hunger for assuralice that the forces
of the universe are on the side of the elect • • • • he
(Calvin) taught them to feel that

t~ey

were the chosen

people, made them conscious of their great destiny in the
providential plan and resolute to realize it." 30

-

30 I b 1d •• p. 31.
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~nereas

the doctrine of predestination reinforced

economic activities only indirectly during the period in
which Calvin lived, as time went on Calvinism grew more and
more along the lines which naturally recommended itself to
a community of businessmen.

Far example. PuTitianism,

vn Lch was a later English offshoot of Calvinism, made the

acquisition of wealth a positive virtue. 3l

Tawney says that

the puritians believed that man was put on earth for a :mr
pose, and that purpose was to glorify God.

God of the

T~e

puritialis could not be pacified by words or good
tne se we r e not enough.

inte~tions

It was only through work could one

prove one's spiritual worth.

Tawney quotes a puritian

Divine as saying that "God doth call every man and woman to
32
serve hin for 'the i.r own and the common good. 11
Thus, work
became not merely a means of sustenance, which was to be
laid aside at the earliest possible moment, but a spiritual
end to be carried on even after there was no need.
ing this line of logic, idleness a:c.a slot!l
against God.

Virtues such as thrift,

~rere

Follow

made sins

dilise~ce,

patience

and en t e r-pr-Lse wh Lch resulted in economic gain ostensibly
for the sreater glory of God,
eenc t t.on s ,

31~ .• p. 199.
32 I b1d . , p. 200.

",~re

invested with supernatural
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which t.r-anaf cr-me d e-.e ac::rJ.isi tion of we aj t.f f'r-on a
lruagery or a temptation into a mcral
of lions.
~raotioal

It was not

t~at

d~ty

~~s

religion

was the

~ilk

expelled from the

life, but that re1i 6ion itself gave it a founda

tion of granite.'133
To say that Talmey related religion
economic factors,
~ut
~3.in

!la~ely

incioient

capitalis~,

to stop at this point would be to leave
contribution.

Kore

t~an

a~1J

certain
is true,

undisc~szed

just relate the two,

his

T2..·~ey

showed hov they fused; how r e Lt s Lon became economics, and
how 'the o Lo gy be came e canom Lo theory.
The third and final point of view I am

goin~

to dis

cuss is that of C. F. Calverton as expressed in his essay
~odern

Anthropology and the Theory of Cultural

Co~pulsives.

The essay deals, in the main, with 'the history of modern
anthropology in which we are not much interested.

But

Calverton's essay is significant from the viewpoint of ~hat
he has to say about the role of anthropological thought in
the intellectual life cf the latter ?Brt of the nineteenth
oentury.

His basic point is that even

is ostensibly scientific, is

anthr8~ology,

esse~tially

time and therefore subject to tne

sa~e

the

~roduct

which
of a

pressures as any other

tyDe of thought:
Calverton begins his essay by saying that the bibical

do c t.r Lne , which he says has been the f ound a t Lon of ves t.er-n

33 Ibid., ?

210.
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thought up to that time, was reulaced by the doctrine of
evolution in the latter part of the nineteenth century.3 4
According to Calverton, the reason for this fundamental
change and the

im~ediate

acceptance of evolution by nestern

civiliz-ation is to be found in the great "emotional and in
tellectual needs'135 which this doctrine supplied.
The crux of Darwin's doctrine, says
the theory of natural selection.

0alverto~,

1s

All life, Darwin states,

"is a struggle for the survival of the fi t t e a t ", 36 and t.ha t.
WDich survived was, by that fact alone, superior.
Following this line of logic into the realm of
social thought,

~ester~

civilization has survivec verr suc

cessfully. and consequently it follows that it represents
the high point on the evolutionary scale.

Accordingly,

the values and social organization of nestern society were
thought of as being the most advanced- in the history of
the human race.

"Private property, the monogamous family,

democracy, individualism, capitalism, had survived and con
sequently ty that very fact, the best that could possibly
be."
were

So certain factions in the late nineteenth century
'wa~t

to think.

Calverton then goes on to conclude, "Ln other words,
3 4 V• F •. Calverton, "Moder::J. Anthropology and the
Theory of Cultural compu.Ls Lve s", The Making of Man, (New

York:

Rend om Rouse, 1931, Modern Libraries}, p. 2, 3.
35 I b1 d •• p , 3.

36 I bi d . , p , 3.
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the Darwinian theory of evolution

~roffered

the best just-

Iflcation of the status quo of the nineteenth century Europe
that had appe ar-e d in generations. ,,37

Calverton then goes on to say that the nineteenth

century was split down the middle between the conservatives,
who are usually alluded to as Victorians, and the radicals,

who are

~ow

called Marxists.

Both of these groups accepted

the doctrine of evolution, but they utilized it to different
ends.

The conservatives

thou~~t

of it as a buttress for the

existing social order, while the radicals used it to under

mine that same social order.

The Marxists reasoned that

evolution was a continuing process and that Victorian
society

~NaS

just one stage in the historical development of

the society and not the culmination of civilization as the
conservatives wished to think.
As for the institutions of nineteenth century society,
they were not permanent either, according to the Marxists.
"The radicals reasoned these institutions of Victorian
society were destined to disappear with the next advance in
the social process. 11 3"~
The prospect of having eve r-yth Lng

t

ae y held so dear

disappearing, so frightened the conservatives J says
Calverton, that they began to search for "ab sc Iu t e d " which

would uphold the permanency of the current social system.
To this end private property was declared an instinct com
mo~

to all men, religion was defined as

innately a part of the
the basic form of

hu~an

~arriage.

makeup.

i~~ulse,

~onogomy

and as such

was declared

Through the invention of these

and similar concepts, the conservatives countered the radical
blow.

Now they felt that regardless of how the evolutionary

process went, the essentials of Victorian society would be
safe.
The radicals, not to be outdone,

be~an

to reinforce

their theories with scientific evidence which was primarily
anthropological in nature.

The argument that raged over the

matter of the family might be interesting to explore in
greater detail.

On the matter of the family, they used

Morgan, one of the
their cause.

~oneer

anthropologists, as spokesman for

The radicals

~re

anxious to prove that the

family, like every other social institution, had evolved
and was still in the process of changing, and Morgan served
their purpose nicely.

In a

n~t

shell, Morgan believed that

the faQily had passed through certain definite stages, be
ginning with sexual

com~unis~,

which changed into group

marriage, and finally ended up with monogomy.39

The radicals

took this to prove their thesis that all forms of marriage
39Ib1d., p. 5.
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were flexible and that certainly nOJue form of marriage
was innately human.
The conservatives, anxious to back up their con

tentlon that monogamy was the only natural form of marriage,
and the most advanced form at that, elevated Edward
~estermarck

to the position of scientific authority for

their faction.

Westermarck's theory, in brief, 1s that

monogamy 1s the rightful and natural form of marriage for

belngs~40 He even went so far as to say that mouogony

human

was an instinct, and that any other form of marriage was a
perversion.

Westermarck spared no effort in search of

evidence for his theory.

Calverton uses very strong language

in describing Westermarck's

t~eory.
t~eory

slnuate that Westerrnarck's

He does more than In

came first and the evidence

for later warped to fit the theory, instead of drawing the
theory out of the evidence.

Much of Westermarck1s evidence

;43S taken from studies of primates.
ifester

r-2.rck

Calverton shows how

twisted around his evidence to come up with the

conclusion that apes

~~re

monogamous.

Carrying this con-

elusion a little further, he reasoned that if primates were
monogonous 7 then the monogamous instinct must surely have
been

tra~sferred

to human beings.

40 Ibid., n. 7.

Thus was monogamy made

ao absolute.
Wester~arck's

It was just what they
~estermarckJ

conclusion
w~ted.

~leased

the conservatives.

Taking their clue from

the conservatives reasened that if monogomy

was instinctive, then neither evolution nor revolution cculd
alter it.
After this discussion, Calverton then goes eo to
make the following s t.a t e-aerrt , of such importance, that I
q~ote

it in its entirety:
"In both cases (y.organ and \~;'estermarck) we
have made a clear illustration of a cultural
compulsive. Class factors ~~re clearly at
wor-k here as an obvious de t.r-Ltne n t , 'xe s tcr-mar-cx
was so uncritically accepted by the ~iddle
class intellectual because his work supplied
the dynamite for the fortification of t~e
proletariat position. ~orsan was so un
critically accepted by the-radical in
tellectuals, Engles, Ka~tsky, ~lechanov,
because his work supplied the dynamite for the
fortification of the proletarian position.
Once accepted thus, Westermarck and Morgan
beca~e i~ediately authorities for the classes
whose logic they defended. The work of eact
nan became a cultural compuLs Lve -- the
cultural compulsive bein~ determined by the
class factors involved.'t 1

In regard to Calverton himself, it is interesting to notice
his

O~

e~phasis

functions tDat

on class factors.

t~ese

O~

ideas cOUld have

all the
~layed

society, Calverton stresses class factors.
'Ithe class logic here is obvious l l • 42

~ossible

in Victorian
In his insistence

41 I b i d., p , 25.

4'~V. T. Calverton, The :·faking of Man (::ew York:
Random House library, 1931), p.

8.
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Calverton is following the line of
of

k~owledge.

to say that

~a~y

of the sociologists

I don't believe it would be an exaggeration

~ost

of the major sociologists of knowledge

~re

interested in thought as it relates to social class.
me~tion

The various approaches are too numerous to
here, and

T~

have at hand two exanples.
exa~ples

Calverton are excellent

Both Tawney and

of this class approach.

Tawney is interested in religious thought as it involved
the economic fortunes of the
stressed that

scie~tific

~iddle

class, and Calverton

thought could serve class purposes.

A further analysis of this problem would not serve our in
terests at this time.
knowledge

~aintain

In general most sociologists of

that one of the

~ost

important functions

of thought is to buttress and reinforce the existing soc1al
order which of course is set up to benefit the elite most.
In regards to class, various sociologists, too
~u~erous

to mention, have suggested the following

of thought.

~e

must remember that a sociologist is always

interested in functions.
as follows:

~unctlons

These functions might be listed

to maintain power, promote stability, orienta

tion, exploitation, obscure actual social relationships,
provide motivation, channel behavior, divert criticism,
deflect hostility, coordinate social relationships.
nith a moment's thought, I think the reader can see

how each of these functions imputed to thought could uphold
the position of the rUling class.
Now

if there is anyone lesson to be learned from

this, it is that the sociologists of knowledge believe that
social class has a great deal to do with thought.
get to the field of primitive thought, this
worth exploring.

~ight

When we
be well

Of course, primitive peoples do not have

the same type of class relationship as we in our civiliza
tion. nor do they think tbe same thoughts.
time it would be foolish to

atte~~t

Thus, at this

to predict exactly what

influence class relationships might have upon their thought.
However, would it be

~ossible

to say that if social class

is important in influencing thought, then might there be
so~e

major cleft between those societies which

developed thought

syste~s

h~ve

and those which do not?

clearly
Perhaps

so, but weill have to wait and see.
In summary, then, the sociology of knowledge is in
an interesting position.

It is defined as being concerned

with the relationship between knowledge and existence, and
yet, as I have tried to

de~onstrate,

there is as yet no

general agreement as to the definition of either term.
There are, however, three important similarities
in the works of all the sociologists who have been mentioned
to date.
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CONTENT

~ID

CATEGORISS

To understand the first similarity we must mention
one distinction which Mannheim makes in Ideology and UtoDla.
Mannhelm distinguishes repeatedly between the llcontenttl43 of

thought and the "categorical structure ll 44 of thought.
Though Mannhelc never really defines
their meanings are not difficult to

elthe~

d19cer~.

term,

The term

"content II 1s fairly straight-forward, and means the ideas or

the thoughts themselves.

It refers to what 1s thought.

The

term " c ategories of thought" refers to the conceptual frame

work, or the way in which ideas are conueived,
of thinking.

It 1s perhaps how one thinks.

It 1s a way

vanr~elm

infers

that both the "con t e n t" and the "cate g cr-Le s of thought" dlf

fer from socio-historical groupings.

This is important as

far as dealing with primitive thought i6 concerned.

Primi

tives do not only think different thoughts, but their method
of thinking differs from ours a6 well.
The essential point is tha t all of the sociologists

we have discussed so far emphasize the "con te nt " of thought
to the total exclusion of the "categories 01' thought II.

This

can be seen in many ways, but none more clearly than in the
dia~ram

that Warner Stark presents in his book The Soclology

43 Kar l Mannheirn, Ideolog~ and Utopia (~ew York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company) p.2, 267.

44 I b1d •• p. 82, 86, 187. 188.

of Knowledge.
The subject

a!ld
his
approach

The diagram is as follows:
The Categorial layer of the Mind
The Physical Auparatus of Perception
The concern
The Axiological Layer of the Mind of the socio

logy of

The
Objective
World

knovj.e dge ,
The Objects of Knowledge
The Materials of Knowledge

45

This 1s a scheme of the elements involved in the
process of cognition.

Tbis scheme designates as the area

of concern of the sociology of knowledge the connection be

tween (1) the Objects of Knowledge (2) the Axiological Layer
of the

~ind.

BasicallYJ this comes down to an emphasis on

,.mat Hannhe Lm calls "c on t en t ", (what is 'though t l ,

It in-

valves preoccupation ,ntb minor changes in emphasis due to
different historical circumstances.
o~

thought in different historical

The emphasis is still
situatio~s.

the word "Lmage " and says, in essence, tha t
with a cnange of situatioTIe

O'JI

Stark uses
images change

Be uses as an example of an

axiological change the following:
"Tne historian of 1650, when he speaks of the
causes of a war, is apt to concentrate on
feudal titles, marriage contract. fa~ily
trees end other things of that order; the
historian of 1950 J confronted with the
45Warner 5tark J The Sociology of Knowledge (Glencoe,
Illinois; The Free Press), 3J. 108.

50.

sa~e

theme, 1s more likely to talk at

length about raw materials, outlets to
the sea, the cont~ol of markets and
similar factors. ,. 6
Stark then goes on to say that these changes in
outlook have c one about "not so much because cur- t.hj.nk Lng

haB changed

. . . but

to tall ty ";

In other words, our manne r of thought has re

~alned

sa~e,

the

because life has changed

i~

but our new historical situation

its

de~ands

a

different emphasis.
Still speaking of this

most dn te r-e s t.Lr.g s t a t e-nerrt of

sa~e

all~

in the present context about the

sche~e,

he makes the

"no t h Lng ne e d be s a Ld

far~al

categories of our

lntellect B:!1d the phy s Lc a.L receptors of our body , ,,47

I

8!Il.

not lnterested in the

COLlli'Z2:;.t

c.r.

-'oL..::

"phya Lca L

::.,< be .;;0 a::; far as I am concerned.

But i f

I understand the rest of the statement, he is saying that

the way we categorize ideas and analyze them, is of no con
cer~

to

t~8

sociology of knowledge.

Even if the word

"oa te gor-y " ve r-e used in a very restricted Kantlan sense so

that it weant simply time, space, and causality, it could
still be challenged.
Ass~w.ing

this is the

thst Stark thinks that

s~oh

46 I b1d., ". 107.

~7Ibld., ~. 109.

defi~ition,
thi~gs

the only reason

as time, space, causality

Sl.

concepts can be ignored is because they seem so obviously
constan~

and the same to all human beings.

like to stress is exactly 1fhat is

This I would

challe~ged

by some other

thinkers, as we will see in a later chapter.
The same

e~?hasis

on content can be seen in the

writings of other sociologists of knowledge we have
I have read Tawney's book
~yriad

caref~lly

~entioned.

and although I find a

of references to what specific people thought at one

time, I have yet to pin-point reference to the llaY in
that thought was perceived, or how the

experie~ce

;~ich

of that

person was divided and categorized.
Reber also talks of what people in different situa
tions think.

For example, he says that the peasant thinks

of a God who is treacherous, undependable, capricious, etc.
Again, there is no mention of how the peasant categorizes
experience.
In Calverton, exactly the sane emphasis

ca~

be seen.

In summary, I believe it is correct to say that those
sociologists who have traditionslly been associated with the
sociology of knowledge e~phasize the "content H of thOUght to
the exclusion of the "categ or-Le e of t.ho ugh t

It.

5:2.

r~OU>Hr

BEHAVIOR

~D

One of the most important similarities which all of
these sociologists have in

co~~on

is the idea that behavior

comes before thought and that thought is determined by
behavior.

Behavior, it is presumed, 1s in turn detercined

by wtat Nannhe Lm calls "existential factors", which are
social and environcental influences.
~1ght

be

diagra~ed

exist~ntlal

This whole concept

in the following way:

situation

behavior

thought

This, I maintain, is presupposed by all of these
sociologists we have discussed.

Indeed this would seem to

be the conclusion. dictated by common sense -- the one which
practically everyone would recognize as valid.

As an ex

ample, let us take the wage policy of a large company.

Who

would not recognize that the attitude of various people
toward tfle policy is determined by their position within
the organization.

If the policy is to keep labor costs down

by paying relatively poor wages,

then it would

see~

most

logical that while the workers will not be very pleased,
the manager and president might be well in favor of such a
policy.

This, at least, would seem to be the logical as

sumption to make.
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The sociologists of knowledge are following much the

same line of reasoning but on e more complex scale.
elso. thought stems from behavior.

To them

Actually, thought to

most of these sociologists might best be called a ratlonal
lzatlon.

3acb and everyone of them presupposes that some

form of behavior comes first and then followed by a type of

thought which rationalizes behavior or, perhaps a better
word, reinforces behavior.
In Mannhelm, this belief can be seen in what he has
to say about what he ce tLe the "particular conception of

ideology".

ThiS type of ideology, in which he shows great

interest, is "more or less a cO!lsclous disguise of the real
nature of a situation, the true nature of which wou Ld not be
in accord with his interests". 4,3 p. 55

Though

i t is not

stated, it 1s clear that Mannhelm 1s supposing that the
"e i tuat i on" was primary, and that "d Lagu t se " came later.
would not make sense otherwise.

It

I cannot conceive of one

thinking up a "disguise for a situation" lIhlch did not exist.

Later on, Mannhelm states this principle explicitly.

He

says, "The ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded

as functions of his existence.

This means that opinions,

statements, propositions, and systems ideas are not taken at

4~Karl Mannhelm, Ide010~~ and Utopia (New York:
Harcourt Brace and Company, 193 ,P. 55.

their face value but are interpreted in the light of the
life-situation of the one who expresses them.

It signifies

further that the specific character and life situation of
the subject influence his opinions, perceptions and inter
pre tat ions. tA9

In other words, though he does not say that

"op t nt ona , perceptions and interpretations" stem errt Lr-e Lv
from 1I1ife-situationsl', it is this one-way relationship be
tween thought and "1ife-situationsll which Mannheim stresses.
You will see that in Tawney, this pre-supposition can be
seen very clearly. if you will refer back to our discussion
of Tawney on P. J6

I would like to

ree~phasize

that

Tawney's point is that the old Christian doctrine, which was
anti-economic, was not readily congruent with the interests
of the newly rising middle class.

These people found in

Calvinism a religious philosophy w&ich supported and

ration~

alized their economic position.

For Tawney. then, the

economic interests were primary,

a~d

the religious philosophy

which made those activities commendable was adopted by the
middle class afterwards.

The behavior in Question is eConomic

and the rationalization for them is religious.
Perhaps it is in the writings of Max
idea can be best coraprehe nde d clearly.

~eber

that this

Weber, if you will

recall. was mentioned in regard to his analysis of the re
lationship between occupation and religious thought.

I
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stated that he distinguishes between three different types

of occupations which he says tend to be congruent with
three different tvpe s of r-e Lt g Lous thought:

(1) the

artisan, whose god 1s a dem Lgod , (2) the peasant, who be

lieves in a capricious, treacherous, unpredictable god,
and whose r-e Lfg t on cLe filled wlth su per-s t Lt.Lon , and (3)

the urban proletariat who tends toward atheism.

Again,

the important point 1s that implied in Weber's analysis is
that what religious thoughts a person 1s apt to be most re
ceptive to depends upon his occupation.

Here the behavior

1s occupational in nature and the thought thereby determined
is religious.

Or again, the type of thought that Weber 1s

interested in ls, he implies, determined by oehavlor.
One of the

~ost

interesting characters in all of

the sociology of knowledge is Karl
say

t~at

~arx.

In fact, one might

Marx is the storm center of the sociology of

knowledge, and this is the reason that I have not
him earlier.

me~tioned

His works and contributions are so debatable

that to have a clear picture of Marx in relation to the
sociology
be worth.

0:

knowledge would take

mor~

time than it would

Eowe ve r , in regard to I-!arx's attitude about be

havior and theught there is little doubt that Marx too be
lieved t.Sa t t.hough t stemmed from behavior.

In this regard,

Stark. quoting Barth. says, "I'he r-e is, according to !-1:arx,
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the f'o LLcwd.ng c au s e.L series:

a determined state of

de~ermi~ed i~dustrial

technique --

,roperty systen • •
deterwined social

• --

for~s

forms -- determined

jeter~ined

of

,olitical

s~perstructure

cDnscious~ess w~ich

are character

ised as religious, artistic, or ~hilosoPhical'I.50
In otfier wcrds, thought, as it is here conceived

oy

Nar-x , is u L't Lraat e Ly de t.e r'mLne d by node s of production and

the types of owner-sh j.p involved.

It is interesting to no t ,

ttat none of these sociologists of kLowledge speaks of 1e
havior.

Instead they talk in

for thought and

~ki,

directly

ter~s
fro~

of social backgrounds
these to thoughts.

It

is my contention that in doing this they are jumpinb over
one ste, --

na~ely

that of behavior.

I do not see that it

is ?ossible for certain types of existential situations to
underlie thought directly.
I donlt see how, for example. a person by just the
fact of living in a cold Climate, is forced to think in a
certain way.

An existential situation

ca~,

person to act or behave in a certain wav ,
d e te r-rfne

~~"'b.at

illustration,

the person may thin3::.
t~e

~o

~owever,

'Ih Ls , in turn,

can

continue with this

cold climate way force a person to hunt

for days on end to obtain barely enough food
subsist.

force a

o~

which to

After doing this for several years, he migr.t

55Karl Mannheim, IdeQlO~) and Utopia (New York:
Harcourt 3race and Company, 193 ,P. 56.

co~e
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to the conclusion (as have most
tnat life is a

da~

~eople

in very cold climates)

hard proposition at best.

But to say

the situation alone can form ideas directly does not appear
to be a logical deduction.
In other words,

whet~er t~ese

sociologist give

credence to the idea, or even artifulate the idea, it seems
to me that behavior is a necessary logical intermediary step
be twe en the "existential situation", which they all talk of
in one form or another, and "thought".
Perha~s

it is not

~uite

fair to say that all sociolo

gists do not recognize the tmpor-t ance of behavior in their
scheme of things.
do not spend

They do, but it is fair to say that they

ade~uate

time on the subject.

In Warner Stark's

book, The Sociology of Knowledge,51 a hundred and fifty pages
is devoted to the

proble~

of social determinism, which Stark

identifies as one of the major

proble~s

of the sociology of

£nowledge, and in all of this, no mention is made of be
havior as su cn ,
In

su~mary, ~annhe1m

£nowledge as

defines the sociology of

"an analysis of the relationship between

know Le dge and existence. 1152 According to Mannheim and all of
the other sociologists of £nowledge

~entioned

so far, the re

lationship betlreen the two is primarily a unilateral one
~~th

knowledge determined by behavior.

51narner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 222.

52 I b1d., chap. 6, p. 245.
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SUPER-IMPOSITION OF TEOUGHT
The third point I would like to stress is that when
these sociologists analyze a society, they are doing so in
their own terms.

In other words, these sociologists we have

spoken of are not interested in determining what the peo,le
of the social system

thl~k

of their situation

the ideas which they themselves classify.

the~selves

or

They do this in

the course of events, but their major emphasis is in the

super-1TD.posltlon of their own ideas and categories upon the
peoples they are studying.

What I mean by this can be seen

in a few examples.
It was Marx's idea to classify as either a member of
the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, and then, reacting to his
own classification, be continued his analysis from that point.
Nar x was not interested in discovering how the people
classified themselves.
~icture

Whether the people involved would

themselves as either bourgeoise or proletariat or

even recognize tre validity of such a classification was of
no interest to Marx.
own

The distinction is a product of Marx's

~ind.

The same thing can be said of all the others.
Calverton, for example, distinguishes between the "r-ad t ca.Ls"
and the "vi c tor-i ens",

59.

This again 1s his own way of viewing the soc1al

syste~.

It

1s to be doubted if any middle class person of the age would
refer to himself as "vt c t.cr-aan",

Again, no attempt is made

to discover how the people themselves

vie~d

it.

Weber also distinguishes between three different
groups and excluded all others.
and worker.
system.

They are artisans, peasant

This 1s Weber's way of analyzing the soc1al

The classification 1s a product of Weber's own mind

and not that of those involved.

Then Weber, after making

this point, goes on to Bay that these people 1n these various
situations should think acc0rding to the way in which he has
classified them.

I think there 1s much 1n what he has to say.

But the important point 1s that Weber 1s not simply report
ing what he has observed.

He has "cr-e a te d" three different

religious thought systems which he thinks should exist on
the basis of his particular classification.

Weber is not an

ethnographer, who simply reports what he has observed about
different societies, but more of an inventor -- OLe who takes
facts and puts them into a different pattern which even those
involved in the activities would not recognize.
~he

same criticism can be made of Tawney.

He was

not interested primarily in delving into what the people of
the day recognized as true or valid, and describing it, but
in synthesizing ideas in which perhaps even the people
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involved were

~ot

aware.

One could say that Tawney has

taken the religious attitudes and the economic attitudes of
the

ti~e,

added sQuthing to both, and then stated some

thing completely different as a result; specifically the
demonstration that certain protestant religious ideas fused
~Jlth

certain economic ideas until the two became almost one.

This 1s a significant contribution and I am not trying to
disparage it.

The

gists mentioned.

Ba~e

can be said of all 8f those sociolo

I am, however. calling attention to the

general approach and orientation of these sociologists.
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CE-:L\P'!''SF. II
'!'O·'1.~?:J

Ai:

n!TERP~STA'!'IO~;-

In Chapter I,

~~

-':U:U:'IV3 THOUGHT

C?

discussed the sociolcgy of krrcw

ledge and the contributions of some sociologists.
learned that a social
gro~p

of elements

syste~

~1ich

·"e

is usually cor.sidered

are functionally

~s

a

i~terdependent,

and that one of these e Le rae n t s is thought.

I stressed t ca t

tl::.e sociology of knowledge seemed un Lkke other branches of

sociclogy

i~

that it focused especially on those aspects of

ou Lt ur-e of pa r-t Lcu Lar- social sv s te s s , e s ue cLa L'Ly those
c~lled ideolo~ies.
so~e

of the work

tha~

had oeeL done by

of these sociologists was discussed with a view

giving

so~e

t01~rd

idea of the field along witn its scope, method,

and cor.tributions.
~~at

So~e

scrmet~ing

The purpose was to discover

of

these sociologists had done in order to facilitate an

aLalysis of

~rl~itive thou~ht.

which is the abject of this

paper.
Regretably, during all J:1:y s tu dy of the sociologists
of kJowledge, I did not discover any central core, or specific
set of theories, or method of analysis which was
~ll.

co~~o~

to

I came to the conclusion that the sociology of know

ledge as a field was in

8.

la'J8ntable state of confusion.

"oweve r , my s t.cdy of the sociologists of kn ov'Le dg e
gave ue several ideas

3.'3

to

l:O~f

the pr-o b Lem of

~)ril!!i t

Lve

tho~g~t

should be

3~proached.

mlat these ideas were and

what they lead to we shall explore

prese~tly.

The whole object of this paper is to discover what
part thought played in primitive societies.

Or to use the

sociological term, what is the function of thought in prim
itive societies.
Before

r

could discuss the social implications of

primitive thought, first I had to learn to isolate thought.
Isolation of a
task.

~rimitive

thought

syste~

proved to be no easy

In fact, it proved to be the major task and greatest

obstacle I had to
I

oi~t

overco~e.

as well confess that I still

to how this is to be done

co~pletely

a~

confused as

and accurately.

To be

sure, I know more about the problem than when I began, but
my knowledge is still minute in view of the tremendous scope
of the problem at hand.
How does one isolate a thought system?
the

~roblem,

T~is

was

and it is one to which the older sociologists

of knowledge give no clue, for in a sense,

t~ey

were not

faced with the same problem to the same degree.

For them,

it was no trouble to discover what thought was.

They are

interested primarily in the thought of Western civilization
and this has been described quite well by many historians.
Their main problem was to reorganize the material so that
the particular social im?lications in which they were

63.

interested became clear.
For

exa~ple,

take Tawney's analysis of the relatlon

shlu between protestantism and capitalism.
protestantism as it related

to

To discuss

capltalls~. Ta'~ey

did not

first have to figure out what the religious thought of the
period was, nor did he have to spend much time doing basic
research on the nature of capitalism.

Oertainly he fills in

a few details, but he did not have to concern himself with
such basic questions such as lIdid capitalism ever e xt s t " or
"how does 1 t work bas t ca Lj y",

by a whole

~lrlad

This basic wor-k had been done

of scholars and Tawney s1mply borrowed

fr om th 8I;l.

Unfortunately no such basic work has been done where
prl~ltlve

peoples are concerned.

'There 1a descriptive

material in the form of ethnographies, but the information
they give is incomplete and disorganized at best.

There is,

for example, no chanter in any of these books describing
the thought system of the particular people in question.
Chapters are devoted to everything from art to kinship, but
only rarely are ideas as such mentioned.

Although I did not

know it at the time, there is good reason why the thought
systems of primitives remain obscure.

Modern scholars, who

incidently have just scratched the surface of the field, have
discovered that primitives think in such vastly different
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terms that it 1s by no means completely clear, even at this
time, if the basic principles of their thought can be under
stood by persons speaking only Indo-european languages, or

if their ideas can adequately be translated into our
languages.

Apparently the method of primitive people in

approaching basic reality 1s so different that it may not
be comprehensible to us at all.

The main barrier 1s linguistic

in nature as we shall see in a later chapter.
I did not know this when I began this projecta

Of

course I realized that I would have to discover what prim
itives thought before I could do anything else, but I did
not see the difficulties involved.
I began my exploration of primitive thought by ex
ploring a clue which

Ma~~heim

had given

~e.

If you will re

call, Mannheim and many other sociologists of knowledge
seemed quite interested in the problem of ideology, and es
pecially ideology in which Mannhe1m calls the "par t t cuLar
sense".

This seemed to have some special importance or in

terest for all of them, and so I resolved to begin my
analysis of primitive thought by seeing whether Or not prim
i tives had anything comparable to "ideology" in this sense.
This proved to be a blind alley of sorts, for almost
imnediately I saw that primitives had nothing even approach
ing "ideology" according to Mannheimls definition.

Xannhe Ltn ,

if you will recall, defines this type of ideology as "mor-e

or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation,
the true recognition of which would be in accord with his
interests lf • 53

This definition presupposes several con

ditions which are generally not present in primitive
societies.

First of all, it is presumed that the societ]" is

divided into factions which are in ccnflict with each other.
These factions are generally classes.

Furthermore, it is

presumed that one group uses thought as a weapon against
the other faction, and that the former is at least con
sciously aware of the use it is making of ideology.
These two factors are universally mentioned in all
discussions of ideology.
two seem most crucial.

There may be others, but these
Erich

From~

makes the following

state~ent

in connection with the transformation of what he

calls

ideal into ideology.

t~e

"How could the ideal of freedom remain alive
those who had to submit to the
denand s of the few who had power 'over them?
Yet people could not live without faith in
these ideals, and without the hope that in
time they could become realized. The
priests and the kings who ca~e after the
prophets made use of this need. They ap
propriated the ideals, systematized the~,
transformed them into rituals, and used
them to control and manipulate the ~ajority.
Thus t~e ideal was transformed into an
amo~g

5~arl Mannheim, Ideolo~) and utopia Oiew York:
Harcourt Br-ace and Company, 193 ,P. 55.

...
66.

idealogy. The words re~a1n the same, yet
they have beco~e rituals, and are no longer
living words. The idea becomes alienated;
it ceases to be tlle Ilvl~gJ suthentlc ex
perience cf man. and becc~es instead an
1dol outside of n t n , whLch he wcr-sh Lp s , to
wh Lch he subm i t s , and whLch he a.Ls o uses

in order to cover up and rationallze his
irrational and Im~oral acts~54

~ost

In this e t.e-tenent of

~O!nE!l1 s

the erapha s t s on 'ihe se two

factors can clearly be seen.
In general, both of
in primitive

com~unltles.

t~ese

conditions are not fcund

First of all, primitive com

-aunt t.t es arc very well integrated.

Their culture con

flguratlcn and pattern fit together so closely that it 1s
so~et1mes

difficult to distinguish between them even for

purposes of analysis.

The distinctions we draw

betwee~

the

economic, the political, the artistic, etc. are not drawn
by primitives.

In these societies, though classes do exist,

there is almost invariably a unity which is so
it is emphasized over and over again by
There is a unanimity of opinion
those of us in the

?~st.

Certainly,

Equally certain,

benefit a group at

t~e

~ri~itive

t)P of

t~e

~o

ttat

an~hrcpologists.

a~d ~ttitude ~nknown

ately invents an idea system which it
benefit.

str~king

to

one group deliber

~9ni?ulates

to its

social systems do

social ladder more than

"those at the bottom, and there are Lde a s which t.e cd to

York:

54Erich Fromm, May Man Prevail (Garden City, New
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961), p. 123, 124.
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reinforce the status quo.

They are not deliberately con

trived for purposes of explol t a t t on , for in general they

are accepted by the

~eople

of all classes.

taken in by them as 1s the

~uch

~en

The chief 1s as

co-~moner.

exploitation does occur, it takes place without

the aid of anything which could remotely be called an ide
oLo gy

6

In all human groups, it would seem, there are the

shysters, the clever ones who are not above taking advantage
of others.
al~ost
~ifts

Ability has not been distributed equally, and

without exception, there are those who use their
for their

o~~

selfish ends.

be made concerning this

~olnt,

If a generalization can

it would be that those of

this case of mind find their way into trade of medlcine
man, priest, shaman, or what have you.

It is true that these

people manipulate ideas and in so doing serve their own in
terests, but to call the ideas which they utilize by the
~erm

ideology would be stretching a point.

a few examples.

~~ong

the Eskimo, one of the simplest

peoples on the face of the earth,
II

Angekok II. 55

his

infor~al

Let me give you

th~

sha~an

is called tne

Though the Angekok wields Ii ttle formal power,
influence is considerable.

Angekok is derived from the belief

t~at

The power of the
he (the Angekok) is

55 Knud Rasmussen, "Intellectual Culture ot tbe
Igluli,k Eskim.o. rt • Reports of the' Flr"th' "T!1I.11e 'Expedition
1921~1924, ·Vo1.

7 (1929), p. 131-140.

able to manipulate the spirit forces to hiw own ends by the
possession of magical trinkets.
for all it is wurth.

Certain Angekoks work this

Some charge outrageous fees for their

services, and a favorite trick is to direct women clients
to have intercourse with them on the pretext that the
magic will not work otherwise. 56
Among the Trobriand Islanders and the Bathonga of
Africa, which are fairly well advanced tribes, the shamen
hire themselves out to a chief or a king.

These shamens

have one duty; to kill magically the enemies of their em
ployer.

In return they are paid handsomely by the chief or

king as the Case may be. 51
In both cases, I suppose, the thoughts involved
function as an ideology.

They aid in gaining and maintain

ing political and economic power (in the case of the Angekok
the pattern is only incipiently developed), but to place an
idea about the magical potency of a charm, or magical
formula in the same category as an ideology, as we think of
it, is rather far-fetched.
Among the tribes which I have investigated is one
in which a primitive people might well be said to have
sonething closely approximating an ideology.

The tribe of

which I am speaking are the Aztec of central Mexico.

56~•• p. 13[-140
51Bronislaw Malinowski, Coral }ardens and Their
MagiC: A StUdy of the Methods of Tilling the Soil and of
ricultural Rites in the Trobrland Islands (New York
1935 , p. 175-17 •
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To illustrate my point, a short abrevlated history
of the Aztec 1s necessary.

There 1s almost no doubt in the

minds of the most distinguished Aztec scholars that the Aztec
tribe began as a small warlike tribe that migrated down boto
the central plains of Mexico from the north.

Somewhere

around 1168 they gave up their nomadic ways, took up agri
cUlture, sfid settled down in Central Mexico permanently.5 2
They never did lose their warlike habits, however, and by
a

~rocess

of gradual conquest, they managed to put almost all

of what is present day Mexico under their control. 59
At first, they simply conquered small neighboring
tribes, looting and retreating and repeating the process
periodically.

After a time they simply occupied the ter

ritory which they conqu9red and extracted loot from their
victims in the form of an annual tax.

It is interesting to

note that the Aztecs never attempted to incorporate their
victims into their own system; they never forced their own
religion and language on them, nor did
the internal political structure of the

t~ey

attempt to alter

con~uered

tribes.

Their only interest was tribute, without which the Aztec
civilization could not have e xt s te d ,

60

As long as the

58Victor W. Von Hagen, The Aztec: Man and Tribe
The New American Library of World Literature
Inc., 1958), p.24.
(~ew York:

59 I b 1d., p. 143
60 I b1d., p. 174-178.

of these ca)tiv2 tribes

c~iefs
~~s

~aid,

were left ;retty

t~ey

sure that the tribute

n~de
~uch

alone.

Needless to

say, should they fail in pay in; t.he taxes, the Aztec would
SHOOP down and force it

f'z-om h

Lm ,

compare the taxation

~rofitably

In short, one could
of

s:ste~

t~e

Aztec to a

]!'otection racket.
In tine the Aztec
society
t~eir

a

fJll-fled~ed ~ilita!'~

it has bsen said, was

a~d t~is,

dOlmfall.

b~ca~e

Apparently, as tims

t~e

we~t

~a~or

on,

t~e

cause ot'
Aztscs

diverted more and acr-e of their t-sc--cve ; e nd r-e s our-ce e f'r-ou
agricUlture to policing the c ap tur-e d tribes.
,rere no longer aDle to S:lpfort
a~~1o:l1tural ef~orts,

their ve r-y existence.
Aztec

ar~y,

3yste~ ca~e

t~e

but

t~e8selves

depe~ded u~on

Thus t::e Aztecs

through their

o,~

the trioute for

Y.Gell the Spaniards defeated tile

ca~tive tri~es

revolted and the whale

crashing down.

~nat

is of baBic interest to us is that

t~e

~ztec

ur-g e to t"J.ild this empire cane ba s Lca L'Ly .rr cm an "Lde oLogv "

':'f!dc:: wa s -na LnLy religious in nature.
l~lich

;'er~eated

Aat.c 0 re Lt gLon ,

every asnect of Aztec life, did not stim

uLa te d Lre c t.Ly the bu LLd.Lnz of an e n oar e , but Lnd Lr-e c t Ly ,
s t LrauLe t Ln g

It 1s

~.,ar
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importa~t

to note that this religious thoug::t

or theology was completely under the control of a

61

Ib1d., p. 169

71.

priesthood, and that this priesthood
ow~

ideas to their

ends.

Montezu~a ~ept

there is

~ore

religious

Xoreover, the priesthood was in

the employ of tGe emperor.
quest

~anipulated

At the time of the Spanish Con

aver 280 priests.

kl0ng the Aztecs

than a hine of an unholy alliznce

~etween

the

emperor and the priests.
The Aztecs held the idea that their Gods
sacrifices if they were not to cause trouble. 6 2

de~anded

It is

interesting tc note, however, that around 700 A.D. when
Aztec history began, their Gods were
littlea A few bags of
do nicelya

As time

~rai~

~~nt

~3tisfied

with very

or a couple of chickens would

on the Gods acquired a liking for

hunan blood which becaoe so strong tha: l
Aztec era, nothing else would

s~fficea

at the end of the
Indeed, at the time

of the Spanish conquest of Mexico, the Aztec priesthood
demanded 20,000 sacrificial victims a year, according to
Prescott. 63
Now it is impossible to expect the Aztecs to offer
themselves in endless lines for

im~Jlition.

The only pos

sible way to get so many sacrificial victims was through
cJnquesta

For this reason, the Aztecs instigated numerous

religious wars.

62 William H. Prescott, History of the Conguest of
Mexico (Boston, Mass: ?hilips, Saopson and Company, 1857),
Vol. t., p. 75-85.

63 I b1d., p. 79
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Of course, after their armies had conquered a cer
tain territory and taken the necessary victims, they kept
the terri tory under subjugation in order to extract both
taxes and

~ore

victims in the future.

Needless to say, the

loot they took accrued to the Emperor.

Thus the

1'1aIS,

which

were ostensibly for religious purposes, resalted in a great
deal of wealth for the Emperor. 64
Certain other religious ideas also

see~

to have been

conceived with the benefit of the Emperor in mind.

One such

notion concerns the way in which the Emperor was defined.
In early Aztec history the Aztec chief apparently was
t~ought

to be superior to other men, but still a human

being.

As time went on the status of chief was slowly re

defined.

He became associated with the diety first and then

as time went on he was declared a god.

According to Aztec

dogma, the highest god was called quetzalcoctl, who ruled
the whole universe. 6 5 Under him were a whole myriad of
other lesser gods who were arranged in a

hierarch~·.

Each of

these gods controlled matters in a specific part of the
uni verse.66
One of the se gods was the sun god. One of the

64 Victor W. Von Hagen, The Aztec: Man and Tribe
(New York: The New American Library of World Literature,
ruc ,; 1958), p , 64.
65Yilliam H. Prescott, History of the Conguest of
Xexico (Boston, Mass.: Philips, Sampson and Company, 1857),
Vol. 1.. p , 59.

66~., p. 57.
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sons of the sun god was sent to earth to rule over

Needless to say this was the Aztec emperor.

~atters.

Thus the em

peror was incorporated into the hierarchy of gods.

The

manner in which this redefinition tended to reinforce his

power can well be imagined.

Who would dare to go contrary

to the wishes of one of the diety?

Can it be said that these Aztec religious thoughts
constitute what could be called an ideology in the "pa'r t Lcu La'r "

sense?

In my opinion, it comes closer than any other in

stance I know of, off hand.

Both of what I believe are the

important cr1 ter1a are present.

They are:

(1) Aztec re

ligious thought definitely worked to the advantage of the

Dolitical rulers, (2) it was definitely manipulated with
this in mind.
primitives.

The latter is a very unusual event among
Ordinarily, thought springs up purely spontan

eously, and while it may work to someone's benefit, it is
not designed usually with that in mind.
The question that arose in my mind was how

t~e

priesthood viewed their own religious theory in comparison
to the people at the bottom of the social ladder.

It seemed

quite plain that the priesthood manipulated the theology for
their own benefit, but how did they view it?

This was the

important question, and this not one of the texts on the
Aztecs examined into.
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At any rate) it seemed to me that there were three
apparent POB81bl1ities

(1) The priesthood could have cold

ly and deliberately concocted their theology with the man
ipulation of the lower classes in mind, while remaining un
committed, and uninvolved in it.

(2)

They could have ac

cepted it implicitly, as d1d the people whom they duped.

(3)

They CQuld have accepted it, but in a different manner

than the masses.

Of these three possibilities, the third seemed the
most logical, by a process of elimination if by no other
method.

The first d1d not seem plausible because there 1s

much evidence pointing to the fact that the priests were the
most fanatical adherents to theor own theology.

It seemB

impossible that the priesthood would undergo some of the
tortures they devised for themselves had they not a strong
belief.

Moreover, few human beings are able to cheat others

openly for a long period of
psychologically impossible.

t~e.

This

see~s

to be

Usually such activities are

disguised by some sort of ratlonalizatioli.
tort and recognize it as extortion

see~s

To openly ex

to be impossible.

Number two seems equally improbable.

It seems high

Iv unlikely to me that one who deliberately set out to dupe
others would fall into his

o~~

trap.

In other words, it

seems to me that we are presented with a dilemma.

It does

not seem likely that the priesthood could have completely
divorced themselves

e~otionally

completely manipulated ty it.

from their theology, nor be

Obviously, there

~ust

be some

third alternative.
It occurred to me that it was possitle for the
?riesthood to believe their own theology if, having invented
it for their own ends, they
same light as those in the

~ust

not have looked at it in the

lo~r

class.

The situatior.

~~fht

Lave been analogous to that which exists in the Roman Catholoc
Church today.

B~th

priest and

peasa~t

believe and it is hard

to say wh Lch is mor-e devout; but certainly tl:ey do not ";)er
celve the church ar.d all its paraphanalia in the sane light.
It appears that there is some evidence to support
'th Ls con j ec t.ur-e ,
It would appear that religion, to tr.e Aztec ?riest
intermixed with a sort of pseudo-science, some of

~~Od,

~~s

~hich

was extremely accurate scientifically.

:~clr

re

ligious dogmas concerning the stars, etc. prompted then to
study the
t!.c:~,r

move~ents

of

t~e

celestial bo1ies.

Gained a knowledge of astronomy

wh Lch wes

equalled ever, in Europe at 't.aa t 't Lme ;"e7
hood

~aS

also involved in a great

"ry
~;Victor

de~l

With

t~e.

par-haps un

The Aztec priest
of esoteric

W. Von Hagen , The Aztec: Man and :ribe
(:::e,,- vor s s The New .aner-t can Library of :iorld Literature,
Inc , , 1958), n- 155-153.
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:nysticism, whd.ch , vrr.Li2.e mostly voz-th Le s s from our point of

view.

~ust

me.s te r ,

have taken a certain 2ucunt of intelligence to

Cer t a LnLy it took a Long tirne. 6 3
T~e

knowledge gained

t~us

in

t~e

priestly schcols was

apparently filtered down to the populace in
-ay t h s ,

storie s

,

supe r-s

t

I

't

Lon s

,

There

1

s

t~2

also

form of

muoh

e

vt cence

to the effect that, in the outlying areas, the peasants
ne ve r- did give up their own tribal beliefs c orapLe t e Ly in

:avor of the state ordained religion.

0:

t Le pr Le s tho cd

isting beliefs,

Instead, the theolcgy

was s Imp Ly suy er-Lmpo se d upon a Lr-e ady ex

a~d

both were altered in the process.

The tmpcr-t.an t point is that while the Aztec religious

oellefs were essentially the same throughout the society, the
terms bv which t he different social classes understood these
religious beliefs must have differed considerably.

This

would seem to be the case, but this is only conjecture.
thing did seem certain.

One

It did seem that one could make a

case for the existence of an ideology among the Aztec.
30th

elements seem to be preseLt:

(1 )

A thought system

which benefits a social class, and (2) definite manipulation
of that thuught system by this class.
tainly

a~pears

Therefore, it oer

that the Aztec have an ideology.

began to speculate, how did I know this was so?
Aztecs really have an ideology or is it

68I b1d., p. 74, 163.

tha~

But then I
Did the

by our own
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study.we can interpret certain actions ideologically?
~t

Did

really exist or 1s it a product of our interpretations?

Did the Aztecs really think these things 11:1 an ideological
way?

The important question 1s not

they tnought.

How do

~hat ~

think but what

we know what the Aztecs

t~ought?

The

Aztecs may have had an ideology, but were they aware of it
as such?

Did these Aztec thoughts work ideologically or

was it, as I had begun to suspect, that we had just in
terpreted them that way?

Did an ideology really exist

here, or 1s it that Aztec scholars have only been invented
to make them fit an ideological pattern?

Certainly one can

make a case for an Aztec religious ideology, but whether

such an interpretation is valid or not 1s another question.
These questions seemed important to me and. in com
parison. the problem of ideology looked petty indeed.
The question was no longer one of how could

r- .Lnt.e r-pr-e t

Aztec thought. but how did the Aztecs interpret it?

How did

they see things?

How did

How did the world appear to them?

the world appear to any primitive1
These questions seemed So

funda~ental

to spend some time trying to answer them.

that r resolved

As things turned

out. I spent the rest of my time attempting to answer such
questions.
Basically. the problem is this.

Can we interpret
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primitive ideas in the light of our way of

lookln~

at the

auJl.

world, in view ofAWaltanschaung, or do they make sense
only within the context of the

~lnds

whlct conceived them?

Can ideas be :lfted froTI one culture and
the language of another adequately.

tra~slated

into

Or are basic ways of

perceiving the world so different that an idea cannot be
understood separately from the point of view in which it
was conceived?

The more I looked into the situation, the

more certain I became that no primitive idea could be 1n
terp~eted

properly according to our own set of values and

Can we, for example. ever understand black magic?

ideas.

It 1s obvious that we cannot see it in the same light as

Oile from a society in which there 1s a strong belief in
black

magic~

But how does a person from one of these tribes

perceive black magic?
~~?

This question has

Is be just innately more stupid than
bee~

well argued and the conclusion

seems to be that thoughts, and the way they are accepted, is
a matter of culture rather than merely intelligence.
this, I am sure the reader is well

aware~

Of

The question,

then, is what culture forces are likely to produce what
outlook?

These are not easy

quest1ons~

about answering these questi0ns we
what these primitives

tbink~

~ust

Before we can go
figure out exactly

We must, in Short, learn to

isolate primitive thought, and this is a major task in
itself •

How do

YOU

go about isolating pr1!;litive thought?
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This was now the primary problem.

I decided that the best

way of getting at thought was to see what had already been
done in the field and then try to a,ply what I learned to
other thought systems.
So I began to hunt through anthropological litera
ture to find out who had

atte~pted

to analyze

thought and how they went about it.

~rlmltlve

The results were very

disappointing.

From what I could discover, there were few

anthropol~glsts

who had attempted to analyze thought as I

now conceive it, and these few did not give any

~int

as to

how they accomplished this feat.
Ta be sure, there were many who talked about prim
itive thought as it appears to us in the West, but virtually
no one who had attempted to get behind the obvious to the
primitive point of view, in the way in which they really saw
the world.
Two anthropologists whom I discovered at this time
were Adamson Hoebel and Clyde Kluckholn, both of whom have
attempted to outline the philoso:hies of specific tribes.
Kluckhohn, I believe, especially has done a very fine job
in this field, and is considered a forecost expert in the
field of

pri~itive

thousht.

Xeither Kluckholn nor
pri~itive

~oebel

attenpts to analyze

thought in general, as did some of the earlier

anthropologists, for it is

co~only

recognized that all

:::0.

primitives do net think alike, but have different systems of
t~ought

according to cUltural differences.

Accordingly,

Kluckhohn and Hoebel restrict tteir discussion to a few
s pe c Lf'Lc tribes.
Curiously enough, neither Kluckhohn nor Hoebel gives
a long detailed description cf any
although they obviously YJlOW a
stead both express the

prioitiv~

~reat

thou~hts

ttougbt system,

deal about

the~e

In

of these tribes in the form

of short abreviated outlines, which might profitably be re
peated here e
Hoebel is interested in thought as it bears on the
proble@ of law
It is my

~uess

a~j

he

c~ooses

his material accordinglye

that his outlines do

~ot

represent a well-

rounded description of the complete thought system of tbese
tribes e

Nevertheless, bis outline of the Comache, Kiowa

2nd Cheyenne is as follows:
Postulate Ie

Man is subordinate to supernatural forces
and spiritual beings which are benevole~t
in naturee

Coroll~ry

Individual success a~d tribal well-being
are abetted bv, t.he bene f Lce n t a s s i s tence
o~ the supernaturals.

I.

~

Postulate II.

Corollary Ie
Corollary lIe

The killing of a Cheyenne by 3. fellow Che ye nne
pollutes th~ trioal fetisr.es and also the
murderer
Bad luck will dog the tribe
are purified.

u~til

The murderer ~ust be te8po~a~~ly
from the social bodye

the fetishes
sep~r~tei

Corollary III.

Violent Behavior that may lead to honicide
trite ~ust be avoid3d.

~~thin t~e

Corollary IV.

Killing an e~eIY
tribal fetish is

wr~ile

in the presence of a
to the supernaturals.

im~mlcal

Postulate III.

The authority of the tribal council is de
rived from the su oer-ne tur-e Ls 2.::J.d is supr-e-ne
over all other e Leme n't s II: tr.e eo oa e t-: ,

Postulate IV.

The individual is important aI:d s~all be per
mi tted and e ncour-e ge d t c express 1:io:: -o t an
t1alitie~ -;~tl~ tte greatest ~ossible ireedcrn
cJ~?atiblc with group existence, but at t~€
same time the individual is subordinate to
the ~roup, and all first ctligatior.s are to
t.he aa Ln te nance of t.he we Ll, ce Lng of tl-.e
triba.

Corollary I.

Re hab i Ld tation of the re c c.Lc i. tr2.nt iIJ.di"vidual
a f t e r pund ahme n t is e xt.r e-oe Ly Lmpcr tent.,

Postulate V.

~(ar is necessary to defend t.he interests of
the tribe and to per~it individual self
expression of the male.

Postulate VI.
Postul~te

All

VII.

la~d

is

~ublic

property.

Zxcept for land and the tribal fetishes all
material goods are ~rivate property, but
hO
they should be generously shared with others.~/

KlucY~ohn's

paradigm on the Xavaho is

so~ewhat

shorter and is as follows:
Pr erad se 1.

life is very danserous.

?or!:lula 1.

~aintain
·~ich

Far'"J.ula II.
Po r-nu La III.

?ormula. IV.
For-mu La

V.

3e

orderliness in those sectors of life
are little subject to human control.

~mry

of non-relatives.

Avoid excesses.
wr~en in a new and dangerous situation, do
no t.t.Lng ,

Escape (This is an

alter~ate

for forcula IV)

69 2• Adamson Ho e be L, The Law of ?r1mitive ~an
{Cambridge,. Na s s s r Harvard Unrve r-s Lt y Press, 1954),
p,

142-145

Nat~re

Premise II.
Pre~ise

III.

is more

pDwerf~l

than man

The personality is a whole.

Premise IV.

Respect the integrity of the individual.
3verything exists in t~o parts, the male and the
female, which be Lon as t.og e t.he r and complete each
ather.

Premise V.

Premise VI.

Human

~ature

Q~alities

is :1either good nor evil -- both
are blended i~ all persons from

birth on.
Pre~ise

VII.

Like produces like and the part stands for
the whole.

?re2ise VIII.
Premise IX.

:fuat is seid is to be taken literally.
This life is what counts. 7 0

.~ter

explanation of wha t each e-i t.at j s ,
~lanatlon

lit~

each of these premises, Kluckhohn gives a

I have left out this ex

as too long and irrelevent for our purposes.

enough has been said to demonstrate what these two

~en

3ut
have

accomplished.
These two paradigms delineate what these two
call primitive tr.ought.

~e~

Since tLey were experts in th; field,

I used them as possible models for

~y

C~~

work.

In other

words, I thought the end result of this study was to be
able to produce such a paradigm for

a~y

given sooiety.

This

at least was the goal toward which I was working.
If I was to use these outlines as a goal toward
which I was to work, I thought it important that I
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u~derstand

Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Leighton, The Yavaho
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948)J
~. 223-23::.

so~ethi~g

about

Concerning these paradigms, there

the~.

were two conclusions I cam tJ 2lmos:
1.

1m~ediately.

There was netting, either in the paradigTI or anywhere

else for that matter, to indicate the prJcess that these
two anthropologists had to go through in order to come up
with these results.
2.

However, it is fairly obvious that these preillises are

the end re sul ts of a great deal of digging and that they ar-e
on a fairly high order of abstraction.
are abstracted from

state~ents

This means that t;:ey

of a lower order of ab

stration whioh in turn were taken from more concrete
material and so .cn ,
paradigm, it

see~ed

So in order to come up .,.n th such a
to

~e,

one would have to first get

low order abstractions from concrete data and then, abstract
ing from these, produce the higher order abstractions which
underlie the whole thought system.
And r still think this is how it would have to be
done basically.

Unfortunately, it is a task

~ore

easily

stated than accomplished.
So now the problem resolves itself into the attempt
to uncover

fro~

descriptive data the underlying thoughts

and then abstracting thought from it.

The first problem

with which I was presented was what source of ooncrete
data r was to use.

r could think of at least two sources of nr-Lmd t Lve

84.

thought.

First, there are the expressions of the primitives

themselves in the form of myths and stories.
there are those thoughts of
anthropologists in their

prl~ltives

Secondly,

which are given by

~onographs.

Let us atop here for a moment.

In order to make it

more evident to the reader what 1s going on and also to
better organize the paper, I would like to point out that
in my analysis of thought, I went through at least three

distinct stages which it might be wise to label as such.
First of all, I resolved to attempt to analyze primitive
thought through myths and stories.

Let us call this the

first stage.

r

resolved to

analy~e

these mytr-s

i~

order to get

at thought because these myths and stories seemed to be the

purest expression of primitive thought to which I had access.
Certainly, I thought, such an analysis would lead to more
accurate results than simply taking those thoughts which
had already passed first through the mind of an anthropolo
gist, for these would bear the scars of his own point of
view, interests, and prejudices.
Moreover, the reports of anthropologists are apt to
be colored because of innacurate information.

Primitives

have no philosophers who state explicitly the assumptions
of their particular oUlture.

Even the most persuasive

anthropologists have a difficult time in urging these people
to state their own thoughts in anything other than mythical
or parable

form~

This is made quite clear by Radin in his

book Primitive Man as

Philosopher~

For these reasons, I

thought ths expressions of these anthropologists might be
inaccurate and thus I thought it best to attempt to get at
the

thou~ht

content without relying on what they had to say.

I still think that what they have to say about the
thoughts of these primitives is inaccurate, but as things
turned out, it proved impossible for one in ;ny position to
ignore thee entirely.
At any rate, I began trying to elicit thought from
myths and

stories~

Let us begin by taking a primitive expression and
a~te~pting

to analyze it with a view toward extracting the

"t.ncug h t " it might contain.
The Trobriand Islanders have a chant that will serve

as an adequate introduction.

It has been translated by

Bronislow Malinowski 1n the following way:
nee belly of my q;arden lifts

The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The

belly
belly
belly
belly
belly
belly
belly
belly

of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of

my gr3.den
:r.y graden
my gar-den
TIly garden
my garden
my garden
my garden
"'y garden

rises
reclines
1s a bushhen's nest-in-lifting.
1s an anth1ll
lifts-bends,
is-an-ironwood-tree-in-lifting.
l1es-dOWllt
burgeons ~ 1

71Bronislow ~alinowski, Coral Garde~s aDd their
A Stud of the Methods of Tillin the Smil and of
A'2~icultural Rites in the Trobriand Isl3.nds
Ne w Yo r k ,

Za 10:

1935) Vol. II, p. 635.

56.

How does cne go about ana Ly z Lng such a. poem ,
does 1 t mean'?

·'lhat

',fuat place could such a poem have in Trobrland

The initial atte2pts seemed justified, but it

thought?

was not long before I ran into the Kell-kno;·m brick wall.
All of my lack of

s~ccess

factors, which will be

can be attributed to several

a~~are~t

as we oQilt1ulie our study.

The first problem we are faoed with 1s the cne of

allegory.
v~~ue

Can the

ter~s

used in this chant be taken at

or do they nave meanings other than thJ38

ae r-e ,

~~ce

eApr~sseJ

Is the t e rn "belly of my g ar-den" a symbol for some

thine else, or 1s it a part of the garden, or just what?
I failed co:npletely as far as this problem 1s con
cerned.

In many cases Qyths are undoubtedly allegorical,

and yet just what the terns stand for is not mentioned and
I was in no position to hazara a guess as to the meanings
of the allegory or symbolism.
Consequently, I had no choice but to regard all
~yths,

stories, and Chants, as straight-forward renditions,

which of course they are not.

I recognized that this would

lead to inaccuracies, but I hoped that these would not in
cacacitate me completely.

Unfortunately, such an approach

was not to find fruition, but it did lead to a few interest
ing discoveries.
How does one attempt to interpret a poem in a
straight-forward mariller1

27.

After looking over this poem, it becomes almost im
~ediately

obvious that 1re can do nothing more until we know

mor-e abou-t it.
~arden".

The crucial phrase se ecs to be "be L'Ly of '1Iy

What is a belly of a

Islanders?

~arden

to the TTobriand

Of what importance is it, and why should it bend

and recline, etc.?
After much "grubbing around" in Malinowski's Coral
Gardens and their Magic I discovered that tbe belly of a
garden is believed to be the essence of the garden; the place
~here

the important spiritual forces reside.

This little

poem, I discovered, is a magical chant addressed to the belly
of the garden with a view toward making the garden more
fertile.

It is considered a very powerful and important

chant. 12
Now what does this tell us about Trobriand
Just what can be deduced from it?

thou~ht?

It is a magical chant ·.. .·e

know, so would it be fair to say that from this chant we may
deduce that the Trobriand Islanders are believers in magic?
This would
~}e

see~

to be a fairly safe assumption.

know rur ther t.ha t the chan t is addre ssed to cer

tain spirits who ostensibly dwell in the belly of the garden
72Bronislow Malinowski, Coral Gardens and their
Magic: A St~dy of the Methods of Tilling the Soil and of
ricultural Rites in the Trobriand Islands (New York,
1935 Vol. II, p. 327
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and who are implored to

not conclude

fro~ t~ls

~ake

the garden produce.

I11ght we

that the Trobrland Islanders believe

that fertility 1s controlled by spiritual forces?

It also

seems that the spirits will not band over this food unless
they are

~~l~ulated

by magic.

So can

~re

say from this that

the Trobrlanders believe that magic 1s necessary for the
production of food?

This would seem to be the

~ost

obvious

conclusion we might draw out af this myth.
But are these conclusions accurate?
,mat a Trobrland Islander would say?
have no way of knowing.

Is this really

At this point we really

The fact 1s that these conclusions

are pure speculation, and more important, they are specula
tions from our own point of view.

1ihl1e they

~lght

seem

sensible to us, how do we know that they would seem equally
obvious to a Trobriand Islander?

Vould he recognize these

conclusions as his own working presuppositions?
So the problem is not merely one of

digg1n~

out what

one considers to be the idea implicit in a certain myth or
story, but also of being able in some way to check its ac
curacy.
The only possible check I could devise was one in
volving the element of predictability.

All of the sociolo

gists of knowledge seem to agree that thought is intimately
connected with the social system, and reflects that social

system, and reflects that social system.

Thus, if we know

the thought, then it would seem reasonable that we should be
able to predict something about the social system.

This

could provide a check on the accuracy of our speculations.
That is, if we assumed for the time being that certain
speculations on thought, when valid, and then try to deduce
from them what kind of a social structure should be congruent
~1th

these ideas, some idea of the accuracy should result.

If the deductions were accurate, then we might assume the
thought had been adequately and accurately deduced.

If not,

then this would indicate that the conclusions were inaccurate.
I tried this several times with only partial suc
cess.

At any rate, let's see how it worked.

Let us assume

that our conclusions about Trobriand thought are accurate.
Namely, that they do believe in magic, that the spirits con
trol fertility, and that magic is necessary to manipulate the
spirits to produce good gardens.

Now, what do these con

clusions tell us about their social structure?
First of all, it occurred to me that the object of
the chant concerns gardens, so I think one conclusion might
be that the Trobriand Islanders have gardens and are an
agricultUral society.
We think that the object of the chant is to manipu
late the spirits.

Is it possible that there are specialists

who make a profession of

manipulatin~

the

s~irits

to produce

90.

good results1

If there are a class of priests, then 1s it possible
that the Trobrland Islanders are an acquiescent-passive type
of people who might be easily led1

This 1s usually the case

wnere there 1s a highly developed priesthood.

A priesthood

apparej1tly depends in part upon the gUllibility and ac
quiescence of the population it controls.
If they are a dependent-acquiescent people, then per
haps they would allow, and perhaps need, a strong authoritar
ian ruler.

From this hypothesis can we postulate the ex

lstence cf a powerful political ruler1
Now it just 60 happens teat all of these guesses,

and guesses tney are, are correct, but I don't believe
there 1s anythln s in the myth that indicated it clearly,
nor have these conclusions been logically deduced.

Thus it

does not serve as an authoratative check.~
The flaws in this particular method are almost too
numerous to mention.
that the

~ethod

~~ong

the

~ost

prominent is the fact

involves a type of logic which procedes

alons the lines of thinly veiled guesswork at best, and in
w~ich

the

~argin

of error can be nothihg but tremendous.

In any event, I came to the conolusion that this metbod of
determining thought and of checking its accuracy

~1aS

-91.

leading nowhere and so I dropped the whole approach.

With all of this, I was still no nearer to dis
covering how to analyze
tained in

~yth,

prl~ltive

thought as it was con

and I was at the beginning once again.

I re-evaluated what I had done.

The first thing I

had done was to try to analyze the myth as it existed by
itself.

I simply needed mOTe information than the myth

itself provides.
fl~d

On this particular chant, I happened to

an explanation, and it was meager enough, but I util

ized it, for it was all I had.

Even in
Malinowski.

t~e

beginning, I was dependent upon

I had no 1dea

ab~ut

this myth until I ran

across Malinowski's conclusion that the chant was

desl~Led

to manipulate the garden spirits, and I just took this as an
article of faith and continued.
With this as a first lesson, it was beginning to
look as if the only road to

pr~itive tho~ght

was to accept

what the enthnographer had to say about it without question.
Incidently, there is an anthropologist named Dorothy
Lee who does analyze this same chant, and by looking at
this chant in a completely different vmy, has come up with
a principle upon which she says all TrQbriand thought
~uilt.

ti~e.

~c

I am not going to describe her analysis at this
but suffice it to say that Lee

sugge~ts

a

pri~ciple

92.

vastly different
~atter

tha~

anything I have suggested; aGd as a

of fact, it is so

diff~re~t

that it would not

r'e ad L'ly suggest itself to anyone u t.Ll Lz Lng our particular
brand of logic or common sense.

Indeed it is hard for Us to

conceive of a t.ho ugh t ay s te-r based on this pr t.nc tr-Je ,
At any rate, I tried to aualyze several cha!lts and
stories of this type from several different tribes utilizing,
with due respect, this "by guess and by God " met.hod and gave
it UJ as a poor job.

Although I could get out of

co~sidered

stories what I

to be

t~e

t~ese

thought they contained,

there Has no way of proving, that my interpretation was the
correct one.

After

h~vin~

spent several weeks, I was no

closer to evolving a ....-ay of analyzing primitive 't.hough t
than I was when I began.

The reaSOns are only too

~ain

fully obvious.
First and foremost, my method consisted almost com
oletely of guess work, as I have mentioned.

Moreover, this

whole method is based on the presupposition that there are
principles b2hind these myths and chants, etc.
some evidence that this is not true.
possible that
exist.

~

are hunting for

T~ere

is

I!l other words, it is

6omethin~

that aoes not

I don't think this is true, but even so, one

a~thro90logist

even goes so far as to say that most prim

itive stories and myt:;s are developed for the en te r-t a Lnne n t
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of ch f Ld.r-ea ,

It se ez s to o e t':-:'2.t most ay th s and storles

have been developed

~ust

is not to say that their
the

~rinclples,

~eoples
~,... i Lch

~ith

some ,rinclple in

Inve~tor

ml~d.

This

necessarily is aware of

but I think it 1s a safe assumption that

of different cultures have a s]8clflc cast of mind

1s reflected in vhe t they say and do.

It se eme Irn

possible that people could act and tell storles with no
principles or frame of reference whatsoever.

The

~rlnciples

do exist, I believe, but to uncover them 1s another

~atter.

Having no real luck analyz1ne these ordinary chants,
storles, etc., I began to look around for simpler myths,
stories, and expressions to analyze.
toward

developl~g

I did this with a view

a method of analyzing

pri~itive thcu~ht

-cn Lch then :night be applied to all myths or stories.
Let us take one of these myths which I consider
simple and

~ust

see how I went about analyzing it.

~ore

The

aaa Ly s La of one Ojibway myth stands out as a no t.ab Le e xarn pLe
of ':J.y -t.hough't at this time.

This is the :n,:,-th:

At the time of which my story s eaks people
Trere camping just as we are here. In the
winter time they used bircl2. bark wigwams.
All the animals could then talk together.
TwO girls, who were very foolish, talked
foolishly and were in no respect like the
other girls of their tribe, :nade their bed
out-of-doors, and slept right out under the
stars. Tl2.e very fact t~at they slept out
side during the winter proves how foolish
they were.

One. of these girls asked the other, "With
what star would you like to sleep, the
white one or the red one?" The other girl
answered "r'd like to sleep with the red
star." rl Oh that's all right," said the
first one, fir would like to sleep ¥.-'1 th the
white star. Hels the younger; the red one
is older." Then the two girls fell asleep.
~lhen they awoke, they found themselves in
another world, the star world. There were
four of them there, the two girls and the
two stars who had become men. The white
star was very, very old and was grey-headed,
lmile the younser was red-headed. He was
the red star. The girls stayed a lang time
in this star world, and the one Who had
chosen the white star was very sorry, for
he was 110 old.
There was an old woman up in this world
who Sat over a hole in the sky, and, when
ever she moved, she showed them the hole
and said, "That's where you came from."
They looked down through and saw their
people playing down below. and then the
girls grew very sorry and very homesick.
one evening, near sunset, the old woman
moved a little way from the hole.
The younger girl heard the noise of the
mite"~n down below.
When it was almost
daylight, the old woman sat over the hol~
again and the nolse of the mitewin stopped;
it was her spirit that made the noise.
She was the guardlan of the mltewin.
One morning the old woman told the girls,
"If you want to go down where you came
from, we will let you down, but get to
work and gather roots to make a strlng
~ade rope, twisted.
The two of you make
calls of rope as hlgh as your heads when
you are sitting. Two coils will be
enough." The girls worked for days untl1
they had accomplished this. They made
plenty of rope and tied it to a blg
basket. They then got into the basket

and the people of the star world lowered
them down. They descended right into an
Eagle's nest, but the people above thought
the girls were on the ground and stopped
lowering them. They were obliged to stay
in the ~est, because they could do nothing
to help themselves.
Said one, ":'le 'II have to stay here until
someone comes to get ue ;" Bear passed bv ,
The girls cried out, "Bear, come and get
us. You are going to get married sometime.
Now is your chance. Bear thought, I1They are
not very good-looking women." He pretended
to climb up and then said, "I can I t climb
up any further. II And he went away, for the
The girls didn't suit him. Next came Lynx.
The girls cried out again, "Lynx, come up
and ~et us. You will r.0 after women some
day.
L~nx answered. II can't, for I have
no 2-aws, and he went away. Then an ugly
looking man, ~olverine, passed and the girls
spoke to him, "Hey, wolverine. come and
get us. 'I lfolverine started to climb up, for
he thought it a very fortunate thing to have
these women and was very glad. ·n.hen he
reached them, they placed their hair ribbons
in the nest. Then Wolverine agreed to take
~ne girl at a time, 50 he took the first
one down and went back for the next. Then
Wolverine went away with his two wives and
enJoyed himself greatly, as he was ugly and
nobody else would have him. They went far
into the woods, and then they sat down and
began to talk. "Oh~ II cried one of the girls,
III for§ot my hair ribbon. II
Then ·iolverine
said, 'I will run back for t t ;" And he
started off to get the hair ribbons. Then
the girls hid and told the trees, whenever
Wolverine should c~me back and Whistle for
them, to answer him by whistling. Wolverine
soon returned and began to whistle for his
~ves, and the trees all around him whistled
in answer. Wolverine, realizing that he had
been tricke~4 gave up the search and departed
very angry.
7 4 Smith Thompson, Tales of the North American
Indians (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1929), p. 126-127.

As a work of art, the story is of no interest to
us.

We are concerned with the story only as an axpression

of a certain thought

syste~.

OUr problem is to extend the

thought which is presumably contained in this
How does one go about this task?

~yth.

After much de

liberation, I decided that the only way to accomplish this
was

b~

diving right in, using common sense, and simply ex

press those ideas which seened obvious in meaning.
The following is an exawple of what I did with the
.nv'tb a of thi6 kind.

In the first paragraph it is stated that when these
incidents took place, presumably in the distant past, that
the situation waa ve r-: similar to what it is in the present,
except that Iiall the animals could then talk together".
Ostensibly, all of the animals would converse with each other
and with man also.
What could this mean?
sense?

Is this allegorical in any

Does it mean, for example, that in the ,ast all the

animals and

~an

were much more similar, perhaps comin€ from

a COffiQon ancestor?

Oan we take this to

~ean

that the Ojibtia

believe that as time went on that the animals have become
differentiated and are no longer able to coram ..nicate, but
are still related through some
established Sn
There

t.l;e

co~on

bond which was

rtyth Lca.L past?

see~s

to be some evidence that this is so.
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By checking through all the material on the Ojibwa to which
I had ecce e s I found that the Ojibwa have a 1ihola series of

rites in which the bear and fox and other animals are spoken
of as llBrother ll•

This vcu'l d tend to indicate that the

Ojibwa perhaps do believe that such a bond exists between

themselves and other animals.

This 1s not absolute proof

to be sure, but it does give some credence to the idea.
In the second paragraph, we learned that these girls
~ent

to sleep after

expres61n~

a wish to go to the land of

the stars "and when t.nev woke, they were in the land of the

stars ll •

The most obvious thing, it seemed to me, contained

in this part of the

~yth

is the possibility that the Ojibwa

believe in the existence of another world, to which humans
can journey under the prouer circumstances.

Moreover, if

the myth can be taken literally, it would not seem that this
world is vastlY different from this one.

Notice, that

-ieop Le can still t s Lk to each other, and they seem to
portray the same emotions, etc.
Let's jumP aOrm to the fourth paragraph.

The one

about the old woman who sits on a hole overlooking the
earth.

In this paragraph, we learn that the old woman is

the spirit who controls the

mite~..r1n

on e ar-t.n ,

incidentally is a sort of celebration.

The mi t.ewtn

So it would seem

that the Ojibwa believe that there are certain spirits who
control earthly activities.

This would seem to be a fairly

safe assumption to me, if these myths Can be interpreted
i i t.e r a L'l y ,

These
~e

'~re

the principles which

r

had thought might

contained in this belief.
In

t~e

last part of the story, it is interesting to

note that the Ojibwa appear to place
physical beauty.

This would

given as the motivation which

see~

gre~t e~phasis

on

to be so, for this is

pr~mpted

the girls to becooe

disgusted with both the old white star and the

~olverine.

After I extracted the thought which I believed the
~yth

contained, I did something rather prewature.

to relate these possibile
which they came.

This

thou~hts

see~ed

to the social

I tried
syste~

from

to be the predominant interest

of toe sociologists of knowledge and so I tried to see what
possible functions these principles could have bad for
Ojibwa society.
Assuming that these ideas or principles that I de
rived from this myth have some connection

~nth

the social

order, I then tried to relate the two.
I took the last one first.

I asked myself, what pos

sible place could such an exagerated emphasis on personal
beauty have in the Ojibwa

sche~e

of things?

:1y conjecture was t.ha t such an idea probably spring
from a society in which vou t.h played a pr-omt ne nt, part and
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in which the attributes and characteristics of youth were
I found it hard to believe that such a notion, if

valued.

it did eXist, could come from a society in which the aged
~ave

an important place and are accordingly honored and re

vered.
~laced

It seemed most logical to me that a society which
an emphasis on personal beauty would be a young

society or one in which the characteristics of youth were
emphasized.
There might be something in this guess.

The Ojibwa

are a hunting tribe whose verv survival depends upon the
strengt~

and speed and skill of its hunters.

Hunting is a

very strenuous actiVity and 1s quite naturally the domain of
younger men.

With younger men, the main economic producers,

it might seem logical to assume that they would be the ones

to be revered and admired.

Thus the emphasis on youth.

At

least this is one possibility.
What significance could there be for the Ojibwa tnat
t~ere

is another world to which one could go under the proper

cirCumstances?

first of all, it would seem that going to

another world is desirable in that, while it may be frighten
ing, it does benefit the tribe.

This would seem to be in

dicated in the myth.
Then I asked myself what possible function could
this belief have on social structure?

The only thing I

could think of was that the belief might underlie a
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priesthood or shamanhood.

If there 1s another world which

can be reached by the proper methods, then perhaps someone
could make a specialty in learning these techniques and
thus benefit mankind.
but the logical

The Ojibwa do in fact have shamans,

co~nectlon

between their

po\~r

and this

myth 1s very weak.
What else could this my-th do for Ojib'ra society.

If you add to the knOWledge given in the myth, that these
two girls were supposed to have instituted some important
Ojibwa customs, then another possibility comes to

~lnd.

Possibly this myth acts as a rationalization and justifica
tion for

t~ese

sa~e

institutions.

After all, these girls

did go to the other world, consort with the gods, and return
only to found these institutions.

Might not the fact that

they were known to have consorted with the diety lend their
customs a sort of supernatural sanction?

Perhaps these

customs would not be so revered if it was known that

t~ey

were instituted by ordinary men.
UnfortunatelYt these interpretations are none too
accurate t but I would like to point out that it is myths of
this kind with which one can do something.

Most myths are

so strange to our way of thought, that no amount of guessing
and stretching of the imagination produces any results worth
:nentianing.
There are two major criticisms I can make of this
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type of analysis.
Thou~h

(1)

It relied heavily on guess work.

I tried to get a1faY from guessing, and though I

realized that I was guessing, there did not seem to be any
other choice.
It 1s possible that
my insights were correct.
~y

~y

guesses were accurate and that

Unfortunately, evidence

c~e

to

attention that this was not so, as I shall demonstrate

presently.
~lthout

(2)

having isolated the thought system

adequately I was yet trying to relate the thought to the
soclal

syste~.

because this was the major task of the

sociologists of knowledge.
This may have been the ultimate a1m of such a study
but

~y

atte~pt

was premature.

One obviously could not re

late accurately thought and social structure without first
knowing what the thought was.
Perhaps more important, by attempting to discover
the social roots of

particul~r thou~ts

hibited my analysis of thought.
social implications oriented
which

see~ed

of oener-e ,

~e

at this stage In

Premature emphasis on
to~ard

these stories, etc.,

to have social implications to the exclusion

Myths. like the following of the Eskimo. I have

overlooked completely.
A man was once on the point of spearing a
caribou when it opened its mouth a~d said:
"There is no one dorm !l'::!re, there is no
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kaya~

down here. I am going into the
water. Let me escape being speared.
Your wife this su~~er has )le~ty of deer
fat. Although he tried to stab ill? I
got ashore before he speared we .11 ~

I don't know anything about this myth at all.
see~ed

it.

It

to have no obvious social implications so I ignored
mi~ht

It is an interesting myth, and it

thought.

Had I been less interested in

contain some

im~ediate

pllcatlans, I might have explored such myths.

i~-

social

Ho~~ver,

I

overlooked them completely.
Now I would like to refer back to

~ilmber

1 -- the

~atter

abJut the inaccuracies in guessing.

beca~e

fairly certain that my guesses were inaccurate and I

think I can demonstrate this to you.

I said that I

The only

'~y

in

~~lch

I discovered these inaccuracies was by taking a guess at the
90~sible

meaning of a mytn and then trying to verify it by

c~ecking

with suitable data.

prese~ted

Most of the time very little

itself, but once in a while enough information

was available to come to a conclusion of one sort or another.

::ty guesses »er-e wrong.

In order to demonstrate this, I would like to use my
75Diamond Jeness, Report of the Canadian Artic 3x
Dedition 1913-1918 (Otta",,, F. A. AcLeud Printer to the
King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1926), Vol. 13., p. 74A
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analysis of an Ssk Imo zay t.h ,

I have chosen an Ea.t Lmo myth

because the Eskimo have very short myths

our ne e d s ,

a~d

more

s~lted

to

The myth is:

A white

WQ8an

was constantly changing her

husbands. At last a man said to her, It "ou
are a Lway s wan t Lng to change husbands, v ou
had better marr:! a dog.". She did,
h·~r

a,8

offspring were brown and white bears.
'dhat can be drawn out of

t~is

story1

How is it to

be interpreted '(
First, it s e eme d to me, t ha t wha t. b ap pe ne d to this
woman

,iSS

a bad sort of thing.

This was the first 't hj.ng that

came to my mind and I went on this assumption.

I did not

think that to give birth to a bunch of bears and having a
dog for a husband would be re€arded

oy the

3ski~o

as too

desirable.

These bad
~arried

thln~s

happened to her because she got

to a dog; presumably, I thought, because she

to change husoands or something of the sort.

wa~tEd

The logic of

the suggestion that she should marry a dog escaped me, but
it

see~ed

to be acceptable to the Eskimo ani so I accepted

it at face value.
Thus I

ca~e

up with

t~e

idea that the

~oral

of the

story was that it was wrong tc change mates.
At this time, since I was interested in direct
social implications I began to ask myself what could be the

76 I b1d., p. SGA.
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~ocial
de~

implications of this

~oral?

The story seemed to con-

adultery and divorce; if so, then it seemed logical to

assume that the 3skimos held

mono~omy

in

hi~h

regard.

Unfortunately, nothing of this sort is true.
3skimos, in fact, think nothing of swapping
the

Eski~os

~ates.

changing mates is considered almost a

The
~~ong

ga~e

to

be indulged in by all, and certainly there are no punishments
for what we wo~ld consider adultery.77
The most logical conclusion one could corne to is
that

t~e

myth has been interpreted poorly, and that this

supposed moral tenet condemning adultery did not exist at
all.
This seeming to be the case, I tbought there
a~other

principle behind the

~yth

mi~ht

be

and so I took another tack

to see what could be developed.
It occurred to me that one other possibility

·~s

that the rsy t h might show that all animals stem from t.he
same source -- specifically human beings -- thus proving the
great universality of all liVing things.
a very

com~on

theme

a~ong

to be in evidence here.

This seemed to be

all primitive myths and it seeced

After all, the woman did give rise

to the bears according to the myth.
77 E• Adamson ~oebel, The Law of Primitive Man
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 34.

(Ca~bridge,
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ver e this true, it would elevate the w.Orlan to soae -.

thing closely akin to sainthood in our own culture, and I
'ta

ough

t

t h i s

might

be

t r u e

among

t h e

Eskimo.

So

I

po

s

t u

La-.

ted that the woman was thought to be a beneficlent, good,
kind, mother of all things.
I began to look around a bit and found that nothing
D~

the kind was true at all.

The woman in question 1s

usually referred to as Sedna, and there are many varient
myths concerning her.

There are more than enough references

to her so that her character can be discerned with some ac
curacy.

She 1s a powerful god, and one upon whom the Eskimos

believe they are greatly dependent, but she 1s

~ot

kind.

She 1s in fact, a mean, capricious, unpredictable monster.

78

At any rate, when I discovered this, I realized that

my

~roole

interpretation of the

~yth

was wrong, and this is

important.
So the reader will not get the wrong impression, I
would like to state that I could not interpret most myths
at all.

Guesswork is not a very incisive instrument, and

where most myths were concerned I could
lmy at all.

~ake

almost no head

With some myths, I could make some

atte~pt

at

interpretatiGn; with most of them, even the attempt seemed
fruitless.

~~at

would you do with the following myth, for

examp.Le ?

T Diamond Jeness,

~rt of Canadian Artie 3xpedit~on
1913-1918 (Ottawa:
F. A. ~eland Printer to the Kings Most
3xcellent ~agestYt 1922), Vol. 12., Ohap. 14.
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There once lived a giant who had for his com
panion an extremely small man. The giant
was addicted to oversleeping, so he told
his companion to wake him up if ever he
observed the approach of a bear so big it
obscure~ the sun.
~en the bear appeared,
the small man woke the giant by rapping his
head with a stone, ~mereupon he rose up,
tied the little ~an to the inside of his foot
out of sight, and slew the bear with his
spear. 79
'!(nat ideas are behind this myth?
see was the

mytholo~ical

The only t::ing I could

proof of the existence of giants.

Again, what do you do with the following type of myth?
"A shaman, desiring to bewitch a girl,
eed d r 'Turn into a stone, turn into
a stone.' One of the girls braids
forthrl th turned to stone. She said
to her father:
"One of my two braids
has turned to stone.' So the father
took out a knife and cut 1t off. 1180
I, for one, didn't know what to do with stories of
this kind.
Well I could see that this unorganized method of
analyzing thought was getting me nowhere, So I decided to
concentrate on the stories of a few tribes, and see if I
could not do

somet~ing

by working with only a restricted

number of myths and stories.
Also, another idea occurred to me about this time.
It seemed to me, that if there were principles behind
79 I bi d., Vol. 13, p. 83A
30 I b i d., p. 85A

t~ese
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stories, that the principle would not be restricted to one
myth, but could be found in several myths, stories, etc.
In other words, the same theme, 1f the principle of thought
does 1n fact exist, would be threaded through several myths.
This gave me an idea which I thought
trying.

~lght

be worth

The problem was to get an acourate interpretation

of the ideas which might be contained in these myths.

Now

1f a valid idea could be found 1n several myths, then one
method for checking the validity of an interpretation
~~uld
a~y

be to take a guess at what was between

t~e

lines of

story or myth, and then checking to see whether the same

idea could be found 1n other stories or myths.
be found,

If it could

I would assuoe that the interpretation was cor

rect; if not. I would assume that it was incorreot.
So I continued for a while,

attemptin~

possible interpretation against others.
results here were also disappointing.
there was good reason to suspect that I
sible

~istakes

~uc~ klloh~
~yths.

in interpretation.

to check one

Unfortunately, the
In most
~ad

interpretatio~s

made many pos

Granted, there is not

about the principles behind these stories and

but what little is

conclusions.

kno~~

did not agree at all with my

I see no reason to go into a long explanation

of exactly what was done at

t~is

time.

sa7 that it was more of the

sa~e

and that it didn't work out.

Let it suffice to
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I was aware of some of these errors at the
others I did not see until recently.
numerouS to mention, but
1.

a~on7

The problem of allegory.

even attempt to deal.

ti~e

and

All the flaws are too

the DoSt blatant are:

-'lith this problem I did not

I recognized

i~mediate1y

that I was

not capable of co p Lng with the symbolic ne.tr.r e of primitive
~yths.

They are highly s,mbolic and much of their meaning

is contained in their symbolism.

atte~pt

Consequently, any

to overlook the symbolic nature of myth is bound to lead to
inadequacies.

However. there was nothing I could do to

alleviate the situation.
symbolism underlying

My few excursions into the

~ths

and stories came to nought and so

I did not pursue the subject with the rigor
2.

de~anded.

Ne are assuming that there are ideas contained in these

atories and myths.
~yths

That is to say, that these stories and

are constructed with some presuppositions in

This is a dangerous assumption on two counts.
been mentioned.

One

~ind.
~as

already

I pointed out that one anthropologist has

su gg e s t e d that most primitive mythology is for the amuse
ment of children.

If this is so, then the whole project of

analyzing primitive thought throush myths and stories is
doomed to failure from the c-eg Lnn Lng because one will be
dealing with material that is insignificant in the social

se nss ,
I don't thinkthis is true.

As Malln~wski has

•

pointed out in his essay on I{yth in Primitive Psychology,
-nv th 1s "a direct expression of its subject matter; it 1s

not an explanation in satisfaction of a scientific interest,
~ut

a narrative resurrection of a

~rlmeval

reality, told in

satisfaction of deep religious want, noral craving, soclal
euout s s Lons , assertions, even practical r-equ Lr-e-ren t

,

:·~yth

fUlfilling primitive culture an indispensable function; it
saieguards

a~d

enforces morality; it vouches for the ef

feclency of ritual and contains practical rules for the
guidance of nan.

~yth

huma~

1s thus a vital ingredient of

civilizatioD; it 1s not an idle tale, but a hard-working
active force; it 1s not an intellectual explanation or an
artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith
and moral wf sd om ,

,~l
It-

From this I think we can see that Malinowski be
11eves that myth is a prime container of the social
of a culture.

To get at it is another matter.

thou~ht

~alinowski

himself does a very good job of demonstrating his assertion
about

t~J.e

ua tur e of myth.

However, it is interesting to

note that he is so intent on proving his assertion that
mv t.h is more than an "idle tale II that he neglects to say
just exactly what ideas are contained in these myths and how
one goes about abstracting them.
3~'

The third mistake turned out to be decisive.

the assertion that ideas and principles are

Going on

i~plicit

in

::1
- -z-an.Ls La-..: :aliuDYrski. r·~asic Science and Relip;ion

(8-arden City, l~e';T ::ork:

Dou bLe day and Oo-ncenv , 1954), p , 101.
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myths and stories one must try to extract them.
~ethod

of analysis which I had at

~y

T~e

only

disposal was guesslng4

I c;uld dress it up in mOTe scientific terminology, but
guessing it

re~alns.

bound to lead to

As I have pointed out, conjecture was

~any

inaccuracies.

Moreover, this 1s compounded by the fact
guess 1s from our own point of view.
t~tlon
see~s

Olin

th~t

the

One possible lnterpre

is emphasized and others downgraded according to

l~at

most logical, crucial, and reasonable to one in onels

culture.

:ihen you get right down to realities, it 1s

tte interpretor who 1s speaking and not one of the primitives
~imself.

4.

Then after I got ~mat I supposed was tbo~ght from a

specific myth, etc., I
the social system.

i~~edlately

tried to relate it to

To reiterate. this was a mistake from at

least two points of view:

prematurity, and the fact that it

yeorierrted roe more toward the social
a~alysis

s~rstem

than to the

of thought.

In any event. my whole method seemed to be leading me
nowhere, and was certainly getting me no closer to an ac
curate method by which primitive myths and stories could
be analyzed for their thought content.

So again I atte,pted

to solve my problem by analyZing the works of anthropologists
~~o

had tried to analyze primitive myths and stories.
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One anthropologist, Who had much to say on
subject, was ?aul

Radln~

t~e

His comments on the analysis of

stories and myths were very interesting.

But what he had to

say disappointed me.

In essence, Radin

see~s

to think that

myths 1s a very good way to get at the

a~alyzlng

thou~ht

system of a

people, but he says that this can only be done by one who 1s
very

f~111ar

with the culture in question.

It seemed to me that Radin and I were involved
~~th

the same problem though he approached it

~nowledgeable

and sophisticated point of view.

fro~

a more

The method,

hoee ve r-, did not differ substantially from !J1Y own, in that

taey are the results of intuition, impression, and some guess
wor-k •

Radin himself 1s the first to admit that his 1n
terpretatlons indeed are the result of conjecture.
He says:
"Pe r-hap s it is not necessary to emphasize 'tb.e
dangers besetting the path of anyong ventur
ing to describe and characterize the ideas
and mental working of others, particularly
those of races so different ostensibly from
ourselves as are primitive peoples. Added
to the ordinary risk of misunderstanding,
ethnologists often find it necessary to
give what are simply their own impressions
and interpretations. But to this there can
hardly be objection provided a person who
spent many years among primitive peoples
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must possess a value in a high degree • • •
I ~ust confess myself to have had fre
quent recourse to impressions and in
terpretations which I have then sought A
to illustrate by appropriate exa~ples.1I~'2

Just for purposes of comparison, let us take one
xyth that he analyzed and see how he goes about the task

and what conclusions he 1s able to evolve.
Radin analyzes 1s the

~lnnebago

One myth which
t~lnk

creation myth which I

should be repeated in its entirety.
"In the beginning 'Zarthmaker was 51 ttlng in
space. When he came to consciousness nothing
was there anywhere. He began to think of
what he should do and finally he began to
cry and tears flowed from his eyes and fell
~elow him.
After a while he looked below him
and saw something bright. Th8 bright object
below him represented ~is tears. As they fell
t~ey formed the present waters.
When the
tears flowed below they became the seaS as
they are now. Earthmaker began to think
again. He thought, -It is thus: If I wish
anything it will beco~e as I wish, just as
~y tears have become seas.'
Thus he thoug~t.
so he wished for light and it became light.
Then he thought: 'It is as I thought, t~e
things that I wished for have come into ex
istence as I desired.' Then again he
thought and wished for the earth and t~is
earth came into existence. Eart:~aker
looked at the earth and he liked it; but
it was not quiet. It moved about as do
the waters of the sea. Then he made the
trees and he liked them but they did not
make the earth quiet. T~eil he made some
grass but it likewise did not cause the
earth to become quiet. Then he made the
rooks and stones but still the earth was
not quiet. It was ho"~ver al~ost quiet.
Then he made the four directions and the
four winds. At t~e four corners of the
earth he placed them as sreat and -)ower
ful people, to act as island :reishts. Yet
32 pa u l Radin, ?ri:J.itive. Religion (l{e,; ':ork:
Puo Ldca t Lozis , In c , , 1959)
it. ~

r-

Dover
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still the earta was not quiet. Then fie
made four large beings and threw them
down toward the earth and they ~lerced
through the earth with their heads east
ward. They were snakes. Then the eart~
oecame very still and quiet. Then he
looked at the earth ~~d he liked it.
Then again he thought, of how it was t~at
thln~s ca~e into being just as he desired.
Then for tne first time he pegan to talk
and he said, I As things are just as I
wi sh t.iem ! shall make a be ing in my own
likeness.'
So ~e took a ~lece of clay
and made it like hl~?elf. Then he
talked to what he

~ad

created but it

did not answer. He looked at it and
saw that it had no olnd or taought. So
he made a ta Lnd for it. A2:c.->..ll !.1":: ca Lc e d
,,0 it, but it did not anawe r ,
So he

looked at it a~31n a~d sa~ that it had
no tongue~ Then he made a tongue~ Then
he spoke to it but still it did not
answer~
He looked at it and saw that
it na d no soul. So he trade i t a soul ~
Then he talked to it again and it very
nearly said somet~ing, but it could n~t
make itself intelligible. So Earth~aker
breathed into its mouth ~~d then talked
to it and it answered. II S3
The myth is not so interesting to us
':"!.~2

to s ay about it.

~s

xhgt ?2din

The folloliing is Radin's ovn in

ter:;Jretation:

"Now this is obviously the e xpr-e aa Lon of
craving for a logical co
ordination and integration of eve~ts.
The creation of the earth is ~ictured
as a nhy s Lca L incident.
Once 1:::1 ex
istence. however, the diety infers that
it ca~e i~to b3in~ through his thou~ht
and thereupJn he creates everything else.
3xplanation and progress there ~ust be
and the eX9la~ation ~ust be in termS of
a gradual nrosresslon. In the case of
te~perament
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the shaping of our present world it is
in terms of the evolution from motion
to rest, from instability to stability
and fixity; in the case of the develop
~ent of human consoiousness it is in
terms of a specific endo~ent of newly
created man first with thought, then
with the mechanism for speech, with t8~
saul, and finally with intelligence."
To be sure this interpretation is, as Radin

hi~self

aay s , "his own impressions and interpretations II, but the
i~portant

point is that Radin is entitled, I believe, to

interpret myths and stories in this way.
the world's expert an the
capable of

interpreti~g

~in~eDago India~s

and if he isn't

them correctly, no one ls.

It is to be noted
made casually.

He is probably

t~at

this interpretation was not

'fha t he has done is the re su Lt of having

1iterally steeped himself in Winnebago thought and culture.
It apparently required a great knowledge of the language and
and

~any

years of experience among these Indians.
It is interesting to note that the only anthropolo

gists who have attempted to analyze the thought of
ticular tribe are those who are very
tribe.

fa~iliar

a~v

~ar-

with that

In this class are Walinowski and Radin, who analyzed,

in part, the thought

syste~s

the ¥inebago, respectively.

of the lTobriand Islanders, and
There are two or three others of

wham I shall take note in a later chapter.

They are the

only persons who have attempted this task and it s e e-re d that

their success was due in great part to their familiarity
'..rith the tribes they analyzed.
that

~alinowski

never

atte~pted

It is Ln te r e s t.j ng to note
to analyze any other tribe

but the Trobriand Islanders with whom he was very
and that Rad Ln does his best work with the

fa~iliar,

~"i1nnebago.

If a knowledge of the language and many years experienoe is
prere~uisite

a necessary

to interpreting myths and stories,

then clearly, I was not qualified.
Fearing that this was indeed the case, I

chan~ed

my whole approach.
Before I continue, I would like to s av that ·.. . h ile I
did not succeed in analYzins myths, a successful analysis
of myth would be very valuable.
some

.~y

analyzin~

of

If one was to formulate

primitive myths and stories correctly,

one would have gone a long way toward the
pri~itives.
1~ich

understandin~ o~

As it is, there is no magic key; no tool by

one can unlock the secrets of primitive stories and

the like.

It is just not the type of thing that can be

into a computor.

~ut

The only way to unierstanding is a slow,

torturoUS process of steeping oneself in a

Dri~itive

culture,

during which intuition and insight playa prominent role
One Eskimo myth that interested me greatly was the

"Once there was 2. woman ~.,ho was a'Lvay e
changing her husbands till at last her
father made her marry a dog. Her c~ildren
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were a brown bear, a white bear, human
beings, and dogs. T~e hum~n children
wandered off to different places, some
turning into white me~, otber§ forming
different tribes of Eakdmo s

s "

5

As in many other Eskimo myths, the main principle
behind this myth seems to be that human beings came from the
same source and hence might be considered brothers.
is in fact

t~e

~roper

If this

interpretation, the one the 3skimos

themselves would recognize as their

o~~

-- it might go a

long way toward explaining why they have managed to live in
comparative peace and have, as of late, accepted the ideas
of the -ful te man with such calm and tranquility.

3skimos appear to be very unethnocentrlc.

The

I wonder if their

attitude that all men are basically alike (if they actually
t~ink

this) might not underlie their tolerance.
I suspect that there might be something in this

speculation, for the theme seems to be very prevalent in
~skimo

stories.

I

ca~not

verify this guess in any way and

no Eskimo ethnographer reports such a notion, to my
knowledge.
I could elaborate
which

mi~ht

a~d

prove fruitful.

mention many possibilities
These rossibilities cannot be

easily tested, and so they must linger in a kind of semifactual limbo -- a somewhere between scientific guess and
3SDiamond Jeness, Report of Canadian Arctic ~x
pedition 1913-1918 (Ottawa: F. A. Ac1and Printer to the
Kings Most 3xcellent Majesty, 1922), Vol. 13, p. alA.
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just plain fiction.

Gradually, I came to see this and

dropped the attempt to analyze

prl~ltlve

myths and stories.

Havins come to a dead-end iL my attempt to get at

thought by an analysis of n...th, I 'oe gan anew and looked at
Eoe be L t sand Kl.uckh chn I s wnr-ka even more closely to dis

cover how taey had gone about the Drocess of studying
thought.
Kluckhohn has done a great deal of work on the

Navaho and 1s we Ll. q.uallfied to give an interpretation

He has SDent

concerning them.

~any

years with the

~avaho,

and I felt he probably went about the process of eliciting
thought in
h~S

~uch

the

sa~e

impossible for one in

~anner

~y

as Radin --

lead to so-ie t mng of significance a

following peoples:

th~t

I thought might

Hoe be L, you see, does

not attempt to analyze the philosophy or

Primitive Man, Hoebel

method which

position.

Hoebel, however, gave roe a clue

one tribe, but several.

8.

~natever

of only

In one book called The Law of

o~tlines

Eskimo,

the

thou~ht

Conac~e,

s -ste=s of the

rro~riand

Islanders,

Ifusao, and Ashantia
For Eoebel to know eaC0 of these tribes
is

~ore

than one could eXDect, that is,

so that he could speak -th e Lr- Language a

inti~ately

int~ately

enough

It wou Ld s e em, 'tne n ,

that Hoebe L na s elicited the thought of these pe o p Le s oy
utllizin~

a different method than either

Kluc~hohn

or

Radi~.
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infor~ation

There is only one possible source of
these various tribes.
the~selves.

~onographs

The

thou~ht syste~

I am

~eople

of the

referrin~

on

~onographs

to the

do not adequately express the
;~en

studied.

~onograph

a

does

refer to ideas or oeliafs, they seem to be the odd, bazaar
and unique -- those ideas
our own.
~ental

~hich

stand in stark

All monographs do

sJste~.

contain some mention of the thougnt

How could it be

But all too often, rmat they do contain is frag

mented, incomnlete and
cha~ter

finds a

to

And none give a balanced, accurate report of the

process of the people involved.

avoided?

co~~rast

unorga~ized.

devoted to ideas.

One rarely, if ever,

Thus I believe that it

was impossible for Eoebel to obtain his outlines of

thou~ht

from the description of thought contained in the monograph.
In this, I believe, Kluckhohn is different from most
anthropologists, in that he tries to give a
thorough, very brief description of Navaho

s(ste~atic,
thou~ht.

By far, the greatest bulk of infor=atibn

contai~ed

in the ethnological reports concerns social relationships
and customs, etc.
oernin~

There is no dearth of inforTatiJD con

these.
Si~ce

Roebel did not know these tribes

inti~atel~,

snd sinoe knowledge of their thought systeTs is not oontaine1
in the

ethnosra~hies

in any usable form,

t~en

I thought

t~at

to-er-e

·I'i3.S

~ossibly

only one other source of an rcr-natc.on he could
have used

social r-e Lat.c onsb i . s ,

the

re~orts

concerning customs and

In other vcr-d s , I 'th ough t that Hoe be L

obtained thought from the description of their social re
lationships.
~ew

That is, he may have noticed that

formal social controls in the

they
~i~ht

see~ed ~arkedly

Pl~ins

t~ere ~~re

tribes, and tGat

reluctant to coeroe others, and so he
t~at

have inferred from this that the Comache think

man should be allowed to

"ex~re as

his potentiali t t e s '",

?,6

This was only a gue ss which I could not verify as
oeing either true or untrue.

At any rate, it gave me an

idea which I considered worth trying.

I thought that if

Roebel could obtain thought by analyzing other elements of
the social system. I might possibly be able to do the same.
Theoretically I believe this is possible.

In

chapter one, if you will recall, the social system -raa de
fined as an interconnected, interdependent group of
one of which was thought.

ele~ents

Thought, in other words, is pre

sumably intimately tied up with other aspects of the social
structure sue> that it is merely a reflection of them,

That

is to say, thought is intertwined with every other activity,
both influencing and being influenced by them.
If this is true, would it not be possible to elicit
thou~ht

through a study of some of these other elements in

36

E. Adamson Roebel, The Law of Primitive Man
(Caobridge, ~ass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), P. 143.
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At the time, I did not know whether it

the social system?

would work out, but I resolved to try this approach.
After spending a great deal of time, I came to the

conclusion that this method was leading me far off the traCK.
The basic trouble was that this approach led me to
ele~ents

concentrate on other
exclusion of thought.

of the soc1al system to the

I came up with some very interesting

theories, all of which may have contained an element of

truth, but which had only a passing bearing on thought and
problems of analyzing it.
Let me

ta~e

ing this period.

you through some of the work I did dur

At this time I did a chapter on the

Trobrland Islanders, and in this chapter this over-emphasis
an elements other than thought can be seen clearly.

One

section of this chapter concerns the relationship of the
TTobriand origin myth to the political system.
to relate that section completely.

I would like

Note especially that the

emphasis of this section is on the political rather than the
thought.
At its r-oo t , the "po Lt tical t.he or'y" of the Trobriand
Islander is based on the ideas that people are basically un
equal.

According to Trobriand m7th. this innate difference

has existed since the beginning of time -- when the first
ancestors crawled out of the rocks on the Island of Turna
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to populate the world.

Basically, according to this myth,

the ancestors of the Trobrlanders
Tuma.

Each

~erson

e~erf,ed fro~

a hole on

who emerged that day 1s the traditional

founder of one of the sub-clans.

That is, each sub-clan

traces its lineage to one of these original ancestors. 57
According to this myth, those who

e~erged

first were

the mostpowerfulj they ve r e just innately more valuable
than the rest.

Those who emerged next were slightly less

powerful and so on, each person who

e~erged

less power than those who preceeded

~lm.

having slightly

Ostensibly the degree of -iowe r- ns s been transml tted
hereditarily along clan lines to the
people of sub-clans
the

begin~in~

~Tlch

~resent da~.

That 1s,

were favored with great power in

still retain the same relative degree of

power today; which the descendents of those not so favored,
are in a correspondingly inferior position today.
According to this origin mvtn , human society was
from its inception. and always has been, a rigid hierarchy
in which humans are rated

accordin~

to the amount of pOlrer

the".. have Lnhe r Lt e d from the .nytih Lca L pa s t ,
The notion of natural inequality finds more concrete
expression in the rank

syste~.

Specifically, those of

families of high power -- those that emerged first -- are
37Bronislaw Malinowski, MaPaic Science and Reli~ion
(Garden City, New York:
Doubleday Anchor Company, 195 )
p. 215-233.
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allowed to hold the highest offices. 8S

lful1e those whose

ancestors emerged last have correspondingly low rank, and
are not

~rlvl1eged

to hold any office.

b2tT~en

these two extremes are allowed minor offices.

S~me

of those in

Trobrland Islander might say that there are some who

A
~re

destined to lead, and others were ordained followers.

In reality, this 1s not only the normative model, but
the actual pattern
ships.

dete~lning

political and soclal relatlon

That ls, the origin myth does

line how things should work.
to always.

~ore

than simply out

It 1s actually rigidly adhered

One of a high sub-clan can look

for~wlth

reasonable certainty to becoming a chief; a boy of low rank
has almost no chance to work his way upward.
the rule have

bee~

Exceptions to

noted, as no society can either afford ex

cessive incompetence or the waste of unusual talents.
exce~tions

among the Trobrianders are rare however.

sociological

ter~s.

Trobrians society

mi~ht

Such
In more

be described as

a highly static society and one in which little social
~obility

is allowed.

The origin myth does more than just explain the
orisin of the ?resent system; it also lends itself n1cely
to the exercise of political power.

If we can jUdge by the

BB E• Adamson Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man
(Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 193.
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origin myth, in the mind of the Trobrlanders, it seems only
natural that people of the ranking sUb-clans, by virtue of
their innate superiority also have privileges not accorded

co~~cners.S9 The recognition of higher status is expressed
in a number of ways.

This can be seen most clearly in the

numerous tabus concerning the kind and his personage.
is tabued, for instance,

to

h~ve

It

one's head higher than tae

king's, so when the chief passes everyone must bow down.

Also oue

not say the word for defecation in front of

~ay

An e~alted personage such as a chief cannot

the chief.

tolerate such crudeness.

Of course, one IDay not SWBar at

the chief or argtie with him.

The only emotions

allo1~d

in

the chief's ,resenae are those indicative of deference ani
acquiescence a

One illay not even swear at the chief's pig,

although one is allowed to call his dog e few
All of

thes~

~~bU8

90

ne~es.-

eTe ;uite strictly enforced; the punish

ment dealt out for infraction vary with the rank of the
chief.

Thus is the recognition of the chief's innate

superiority codified into concrete rule.
The more active manifestations of

po~er

of a whole series of right-duty obligations
subject.

On the whole these are reciprocal.

-

c9 I bi d •• p. 195.
90 I b i d . , p. 195-196.

take the form

betn~en

chief and
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.~d so,

thou~h

the chief's position 1s defined as one of

innate superiority, his

~ower

has certain obligations which

One such

obllga~ion

absolute~

1s not
~ust

be

to~,

f~lfl11ed.
~11a~ala,

concerns the

the Trobrland harvest festival.

He,

At the

~11a~alat

which 1s

the

,o~-

to a feast at the chief's ex~ense, and
91
the chief has the duty to provide It.
On the whole, how

ulace has the

rl~ht

ever, the chief has ~anv ~ore r17hts and fewer duties toward

the

,o~ulace

rl~ht

than they have toward him.

to the services of any of his

The chief has the

s~bjects

for a whole

variety of duties which may include anytGing from paddling
the chlef's canoe in a Kula expedition (trading expedition'
to other islands) to fighting the chief's
the Chief
d~ty

de~ands

ene~ies.

~~en

the services of his subjects he has the

to pay them with food he has collected through taxa

ti0n. but his right to their services is

unqu~stiGned, ~~d

his crders are obeyed implicitly.92
The chief. according to the

~~y

his

~ositlon

defined. has other rights which are even more

is

un~cpular.

He has the right to tax, and the taxes are never paid
9lBronislaw ~mlinowski, ~agic Science and Religion
3arden City, New York: Do~b1eday and Company, Inc., 1954),
p. 176-180.
92 E• Adamson Hoebe1. The Law of Primitive Man
Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), ,. 195.
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gladly.
of

The chief has

~hich

~any

agricultural

d~ties

also, one

1s to divide up the land into individual garden

plots,93 for although the land is owned and cleared by the
co~~unlty

as a whole, it 1s worked by individuals on their

own little plots.

se~l-a~~ually

This 1s done

and since it

is impossible to please everyone, the chief's decisions are
inevitably the cause of a good deal of griping.

Ho~rever.

no matter how displeased one may be with the chief on account
of the division of land or the taxes, one never even com
~lains

to the chief.

One

al'~ys

pays the tax and accepts

the garden plot regardless of iOW unhappy one may be.

To

challenge the right of the chief to levy such burdens 1s un
t~lnkable.

In
absolute.

so ingrained 1s the message of the origin myth.
ma~y

affairs the power of the chief is

al~ost

The trobrLanders regard this tyrannical power as

the normal state of affairs; the right of tee chief through
virtue of his rank.

Such

po~r

is established through birth

and the acceptance of this state of affairs is so thoroughly
ingrained as to constitute one of the inviolate truths of
the Trobriand thought system.
~ith

this in mind, I think it is safe to say that in

this one culture the idea that people are
is congruent with

conce~trated

93 Ibid., p. 193

i~ately

political power.

unequal
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There is a theory implicit in all of this, I think.
It is perhaps one whose scope night extend well beyond
Trobrian society.

If this

sa~e

pattern were present in

other systems then it would not be reasonable to expect it
to have quite the

5a~e

twists and peculiar characteristics

as in Trobrland society, but nevertheless, I have reason to
suspect that concentrations of political power in practically
any society will have at their roots similar sorts of ideas.
For the present, let us hypothesize:
1.

To the extent that people are thought basically

unequal, a soc1al hierarchy will exist.
2.

To the extent people are thought basically un

equal, political power

r~ll

be concentrated in the hands of

a few.
Now let's take a look at what has just been done and
said in these last few pages.
First it may all be very true.

I have no doubt that

the origin myth does act as a sort of rationalization or
ideological buttress for the political system.
does it have to do with
Question.

thou~ht?

But what

This is the important

If you will take a careful look at the preceeding

section, you will see that it really has little to do with
thought.

Thought is the subject, but only in a tantengial

sort of way.

The subject was the origin myth and the

127.

~olltical syste~,

but in all of this there 1s no

atte~pt

to get at the underlying ideas behind this myth.
Ell has been said and done, this

dlsc~sslDn

So when

contributed very

little to an understanding of Trobriand thought.
In regard to this one might ask 1s this }mat a
sociologist of knowledge 1s interested in?

The major

problem of the sociology of knowledge as a whole, and of
this paper specifically, concerns the relationship between
thought and other elements in the social system.

With this

in mind, can we say that the study of myth as it relates to
the political system 1s a legitimate object of inquiry?

It

wou Ld ee em to me that s ach a subject should be of prime con

cern.

However, before one can talk about thought, one must
first know what thought is.

This 1s the first task with

wn Lch one mu s t concern oneself.

And in all of this, the

main problem -- the problem of the analysis of thought
~aS

systematically avoided.

STAGS THREE
Alon~
~~s

about this time I became convinced that it

completely fruitless for one in my position to

an analysis of primitive thought completely on my
far as I could see, there

1iaS

atten~t
o~~.

only one other possibility

As

available, only one other way in which to get at primitive
thou3ht, and that was by relyin€ completely on the ethno
gra~her's

inter,retations.

I realized that this was

objectionable on several counts, but I could see no other
choice.
As I have indicated, this was oy no means an e aav
task.

The

et~nogra~hers

do not ;ive a

corn~lete,

balanced

report of the thought system of the tribe, rather the thought
is incomplete, fragmented and references to it are scattered
throughout the text.
minute

fra~~ents

of

Thus the problem of gathering up these
thou~ht

and

organizin~ the~

into S0me

coherent pattern is a major task.
I spent a great deal of time in describing thought
3vstems.

Unfortunately, that is all it was -- description.

Eve n so, at last I had something which I
call thought of a particular tribe.
jections

~hich

thou,;:~t

I could

There are serious

o~

could be raised in regard to Wh2t I did, 2nd

in

f~ct ~uch

~

shall come to later.

of it

~roved

For the present, I think a

s~ort

s~all

however,

descri~tion

I did durins this period misht be useful.
I would like to utilize a

T~is,

to be worthless.

por t.Lc n cf

of what

For this purpose
~'V

"',

of Trobriand beliefs concerning the spirits.

description
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First of all, I would like to take up Trobriand
ideas concerning spirits.

It is important to realize that

the Trobriand beliefs in sDiri ts are Inoo- t.ent only in re
gard to the clan

syste~.

Ideas on SpiTits

o t.cez- 2.::;::'8a5, such a s magical rites, bu t

h~ve

t~:e:/

bearing on

do no t c2.rry

"r-o ar Le.nder-a 0..0 no t :,la:r the vi tal role that they do in the

thought

syste~s

IL.
1.

8. ;..ru t

of other

trib~s.

sh e L'l , the 'Er obr-Land view of human e xLs t.e nce

one of successlve reincarnations.

A man

;.·"" .....r-::,s to the land of the dead on.Ly to be reborn ag a f ns 04
>
The :'roorianders think it

~f

tLese re~eated cycles

al~~ys belongs to the saae clan.~5

O::.l2

great significance taat in

This has the effect of defining the clan as the basic social
unit.

Moreover, Trobriand ideas about the spirits are tied

up 'Ifi t h a form of ancestor worship.

The BaLcma , as these

spirits are known, are the souls of friends, relatives and
other Troorianders who have passed on to the o t..e r world/°6
~fuen

a man dies, his spirit leaves his body and

travels to another world where it leads another existence.
~pon

death, the spirit anparently splits into two parts.

One ,art, the Kosi, renains around the grave and the village

94

Br-on'LsLavr Malinowski. 1>;agic Science and Religion
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Com,any, Inc., 1954)
p. 215-228.

95ng.•

p,

220.
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for some time.
It
a

ml~ht
~ame,

The Kosi seem to delight in playing tricks.

throw stones at someone out of the night, callout
or roll someone out of bed, and in general, make a

general nuisance of itself. S7

These tricks are more play

ful than terrifying; never has a Kosi been

kno~m

to do any

real harm.
After a time, the Kosi, perhaps tiring of these
stunts, goes acfflY.

Sxactly

~:ere

it goes, or

~hat hap~ens

to it, 1s a matter of conjecture.

The important part of the soul, Balorne, goes to rune,
which 1s an island located
body of islands.?8

~

few

~11es

north of the main

On Tuma, the Baloma lead a 11fe very

similar to the one on earth.

The Baloma are not restricted

to Tuma, and often come back to visit old friends and rela
tives.

Almost every Trobriander has had one or more such

visitations from the Baloma, and many people are visited
quite regularly.

At lease once a year, all the Balooa leave

Tuma and go back to their original Villages.

The

pre6e~ce

of the Baloma at this time occasions a great celebration of
uhich we will say more.
tainly not strangers. 99

",

/ Ibid., p. 151

08
/ Ibid., p. 154.
99 Ibid., p. 152.

In any case, the spirits are cer
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Despite their

o~ipresence,

the Kosi inspire great terror a
do not look forward to
at midnight, but

w~en

meetln~

neither the Saloma nor

Certainly the Trobrlanders
them on a dark garden path

they do, they do not seem to experience

the deep paralyzing fear that people in our own culture feel

upon such an occasion.
The Trabrla.nd Islanders are not completely free from

fear however.
fear.
spirit.

The mUlukousl, or sorceresses,

These mulukuausl are supposedly part

instill great

~unan,

nart

They are real living women , whom one may know and

talk with, but who are able to change themselves into an
invisible form in which they are powerful and virulent.
They are especially dangerous to ships at sea and no one
goes on a voyage without taking the proper magical pre
ventatives.

Even on land anyone who is exposed to them i6

sure to be attacked unless he is able to ward them otf

~agical1y.lOO The mulukuausi are also known to have an
infinity for

carrion.

hu~an

After death, the mulukuausi

swarm around, and, if it were not for preventative magic,
would eat the body.

After a death has occurred, there is
a great increase of fear in the village. l OI However,
Mulukuaus1 is most definite stating that the fear is
Sourceresses and not of the ancestoral spirits.
100

Ibid., p , 153.

101 I b i d., o. 154.

-

-

o~

the

rI
I
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I
I

In other words it 1s other human beings that are to be
feared, and not the dead.
It 1s interesting to note that the MulukuBusl are
never in one's

O~~

village, but

everyo~e

knows

wo~en

in far

off villages who are Dosltlvely known to be Mulukuausl.
At any rate. when a

Balo~a

reaches Tuma, he 1s

greeted by his old friends and relatives who guide him to the
land of Baloma.
so~e

controversy.

The location of this land 1s the subject of

Prevailing opinion has it that this world

1s located somewhere deep in the ground under Tuma. 1 0 2
This view harmonizes well with the Trobrland myth which
tells that the world was originally populated by oeople who
emerged from holes in the ground on Tuma.
Very Boon after arriving in Tima, the Baloma must
pass Topileta's inspection.

Topileta, the head chief over

all Bsloma. lives exactly as every other man in Tuma, but he
does have big flappy ears.

Purportedly,

To~ileta

may re

fuse admission to Tums should he wish; soparently this
103
rarely happens, however.
Even so, the relatives of the
dead man adorn him with jewels and sing all the necessary
chants, etc.
After passing Topileta, the newly arrived Baloma
goes to the village where he is to live henceforth.
102 I b 1d., p. 154.
103Ib1d., p. 156.

For
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3

time the new arrival mourns leaving earth.

The other

Baloma, especially those of the opposite sex, try in every

way possible to make him comfortable.

According to the male

opinion, there are many more women than men on Turna, and
they are none too shy.

Consequently, a new arrival 1s

literally pestered by the advances of the opposite sex.
If he does not succnmb
use a love magic of the

lm~edlately,
sa~e

then these female Baloma

type found on earth, but of

such potency that no man caD possibly resist.

Needless to

say, the new arrival soon forgets his sorrow and begins to
104
take oart in the activities of his new 11£e.
Not an a1
torrether unpleasant picture of heaven.
Though the Trobrlandera might not exactly look
forward to

goln~

to Tuma, they certainly do not find it an

entirely unpalatable prosuect.

This is well in keeping with

their whole way of life with its easy going, fearless, ac
cepting philosophy.
In general, everything is exactly the same in Tuma
as it is in the upper world.

The food, activities, interests

acquanitances, etc., are not changed.
rank is still maintained.
chief on Turna. I OS

~ven

more important,

A chief on earth will still be a

;1hether he has much actual power is

really not know, but he is a chief in all essential respects.
104~.,
r'd
p.

159,

l05 Ibid., p. 150.
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This also holds true in a degree for other nobility.

In

other words, the spirits are arranged in exactly the sane
hierarchy as found on earth.
Though the spirits confine their activities to :Uma
in the main, they still have a great influence on hapnenings
in this world.
it.

Certainly they are not out of touch with

The Ealoma come to relatives in dreams, and many times

they are seen and heard by neople when
their daily tasks.

t~ey

are going about

There is no mistaking Baloma, for

are known to retain the Shape of the person they

t~ey

~eprese~t

and they speak the same language so they can be recognized
by voice as well. 106
During tr.e mdLama.La , the g r-e e t armuaL .re es t., c.
qreat many people are visited by ancestral spirits, due to
the fact taat the Baloma take a great interest in the event
and come back to visit en masse on this occasion,
this is the
~i~ht

Trobrian~

explanation.

At least

A more objective oeserver

possibly trace some of these visitations to the

alcoholic

jever~ges,

whiCh are consumed in great quantities

e t this time.
To Contunue, the Baloma carries on life as usual in
Tuma, marries again, Visits the upper world periodically,
and on the whole, leading a very satisfactory existence.
Now the Ealoma also age in Tuma.

If a man died

youn~,

then his BaLoma Hill be v oung , but ',.;111 a-te in t t c.e , so that

---- ~~------

106

Ibid., p. 16c.
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in the end, his life in Tur::a will cease.

If the man was old

at deatb, his Baloma will be old and will also age in Tuma
•
as usual, and after a comparatively short period of li~e in
Tuma, will also be reincarnated. 107
A very simple version of this reincarnation process
is as follows:
liAs the BaLoma grows old, his skin 'becomes
loose and wrinkled, his teeth fallout, at
which time he goes and bat _es in the sea.
This loosens his skin r ur-tue r : the n !"".e slides
out of his skin and becomes a small human
e~bryo-like creature called a wai~~ia.
Another Baloma, usually a woman, seeing the
wai'~ia on the beach, picks it up.
Then she
takes it to the upper world and places it in
the wonb of a young wo~an of the sa~e clan
as the waiwaia. After a time, the waiwaia
is reborn as a human bein~. The human then
goes through another life on earth, bec~58s
e. BaLona ega in and so on, ad infinitum."
The foregoing 1s a description of what I considered
to be Trobriand ideas on the nature of the spirits as

t~:ey

related to human existence.

the

result of a great deal of

It is a composite

readin~

and synthesis.

It is, however, pure description.

107~•• p. 215.
108~•• p. 216.

~iece,

It is no more
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than an outline of what the Trobrlanders think on one

particular subject.

This 1s not sociology.

s~all

It is good

history perhaps to be able to describe fairly accurately
'~hat

a particular people thought at a particular time, but

tfie sociological approach demands that one do something with

the material to relate it to factors of soclal significance.
Even if we were to regard the foregoing as thought, we should
first have to know more about it.

~fe

would be interested

in relating this particular thought to certain other SOCial
factors.

~e

would be interested in knowing of what signifi

cance this thought had for Trobrland society as a whole.

A

sociologist of knowledge 1s not merely interested in what

people think.

His problem 1s find!ng out why they think

tihat they do, of relating it to certain social patterns.
The strange part of it all was that I could do nothing
with it.

I could neither relate it to anything else, nor

could I predict anything about the sooial system from it.
To be sure t I hypothesized that Trobriand ideas of
spirits were connected with several other areas of social
life t but I could not prove that any such relationship ex
isted.

Moreover, the relationships which I did see seemed

peculiarly without substance.
Moreover t and this is the important point, I
recognized that another old problem had come back to plague
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me.

This was the problem of what I was calling thought ..

In this description, I was supposed to be giving the thought
of the Trobriand Islanders.

But I was really describing

their thought -- even their latent thought?
~ine?

thought or was it

~Tas

it their

Certainly no Trobriand Islander

gives such a description of their beliefs on the spirits.
~ven

Malinowski does not give such a composite picture.

reality, the picture is mihe.

In

I took many different clues

which were in Malinowski's writings and put them together in
a way that made senee to me.

I picked, chose, and selected

the material which I thought was significant, and then I
organized it into what I thought was the logical congruent
order.
thinks?
spirits?

But is this what a Trobriand Islander actually
Is this an accurate cross section of his

of

vie~

Or is it just my own invention, which at best,

only partially describes their point of view?
no way of knowing.

I really had

Could I with gny certainty say that this

is what the Trobriand Islanders think?

I was not certain.

There is a distinction to be made here between overt and
latent thought.

To be sure, no Trobriander would overtly

express such ideas.

BUt are these ideas even latent?

Are

these ideas he possesses, but which are inarticulated?
Thus the same problem remained.
about isolating pri.ttive thought?

How does one go

How does not get behind
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the cultural

facade of a primitive?

How does one rid one

self of cUltural bias in interpretation?

Lest the reeder think that these ara insoluble
proble~5,

by

us~ng

it should be pointed out that a few anthropologists,
a method which I have not even suggested bere, have

penetrated the thick veil of primitive thought and come up

with some amazing conclusions.

However, the task 1s Dot an

easy one, and even the most successful of these anthro
pologists have had only partial success.

But we shall in

vestigate these interesting conclusions in a later chaPter.
Although'
basic

proble~,

I was getting no nearer the solution of the

which of course 16 the question of the an?-

lysis of primitive thOUght, my efforts were not in vain
completely.

On several occasions I explored areas, which

were not really related to the prime problem at hand. but
which proved worthwhile.

I would like to report in some

detail one of these intellectual detours, for it resulted
in a theory which I think has some merit.
It was during my study of the Eskimo that I per
ceived the initial idea which was to lead to this hypothesis.
I was looking at Bome Eskimo myths, and instead of con
centrating on their thought content, I happened to notice
how terribly depressing these myths were.

In general,

3skimo myths are tales of terror, fear and evil.

They

have no happy tales, and the best they have to offer are
what seem to be rather neuter, innocuou3 myths dealing with
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animals.

Perhaps this is a false impression, but it

see~s

to me that the whole tone of these Eskimo myths 1s so ex
treme that there is no mistaking their basic character.
Several 3sklmo

~yths

I would like to quote a few

have been re12ted

~ore

e~rlier,

but

for further illustration.

The following three tales are reported by Dlailiond Jeness,
one of the most famous Eskimo

ethnogr2~hers.

There once lived a giant woman named
Nahaingalaq, the dau~hter of a ~an na~ed
Akulugyuk.

She carried an adze and a

ulo for killing pecple whom she used to
slip inside her coat and carry off.

Once

she found an Eskimo fishing on a lake.
but she ~ursued him and was on
the ~olnt of seizing hi~ when he turned
and shot her with his bow and arrow. He
left her lying where she fell, out other
~skimos found the bodY a~d laid it out
properly for burial. l D9
He fled,

2.
Near the country of the Netsiling~iut
a large ship was crushed in the ice lo~g
ago, and wany white men went down in her.
In the same locality a number of =ski~os
once died of starvation. 1 1 0

,- .
A brown bear once lived st Ki11ivid or
::agyuk.tok (in the south of Victoria
Island). One day it grew very gib,
bigger than any other livi~g ani~al.
Tt crossed over the strait to ~ilusikot
l09Diamond Jenness, Re'ort of the Canadia~ Arctic
oxped: tlon 1913-1918 (Otte.-,rc.; F. A. Ac1e.!ld pr-Ln t.e r- to
his Kings Most Sxcelle~t Magesty, 1926)1 Vol. 12, ~. ~3a.
110Ibid., p. 32A.

and ate all t~e :skimas there. This
region at that time was thickly inhabited,
~uc~ ~ore than it is now.
But all these
Eskimos were eaten by the bro1fn bear. and
the present dav inhabita~ts are imigrants
from surrounding places. l l l

4.
A young man named Ilornaq was once very ~ll
He
a~d his leg came off about the knee.
kept the severed limb near hi~ in his hut,
and whe~ever he lccked at it would sing a
song. For a time he appeared to be recover
ing, but then hi~ malady increased and in
the end ~e died. lIZ
These are very typical tales.

Their themes seem tc

revolve around destruction, illness, death and starvation.
Most Eskimo tales convey a feeling of ever present danger.
Thls pervading theme of pessimism is well summed up in
Hoebel's words that lithe margin 01' safety is small and life
is hard 11.

These stories are fatalistic to the last de gr e e ,

In them, an overwhelming nature, about which man can do
little,

~sses

snatch away a

in on all sides just walting its ctBnce to
hu~an

life.

This tragic sense of li1'e can be seen, not only in
their myths, but in other concepts as well.

Their

conce~t

of heaven is vague, but it is conceived as a ratr.er gloomy,
depressing place; certainly not a prospect to look forward
to with hope.

The Eskimos also believe that the world is

inhabited by a whole myriad of spirits upon whomrr?n is
lllIb1d., p. 32A.
112Ib1d., p. 98A.
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dependent for the important things of 11fe.

While these

spirits might be beneficent, they are usually capricious,
unpredictable, treacherous, malicious and just plain mean
113
most of the time.
There sense of horror and dread can also be seen in
their ideas about death.
~an

The Eskimos believe that when a

dies, he becomes a spirit.

The spirits of the dead,

however, are not friendly, helpful creatures, but are known
to be very dangerous to human beings.

Consequently, when a

man dies, the Eskimos pack up in haste, bury the body, and
get as far away as fast as possible, covering their tracks
114
as they go so that the spirit cannot follow.
Concerning the Eskimo's tragic sense of 11fe, his
state of mind 1s somewhat of an enigma to us.

To the Eskimo,

if his myths and stories are any indication, the world ap
pears tragic and gloomy.

He feels the dice are loaded

against man, and time can only bring tragedy.

The best

that one can accomplish in such a world is to avoid disaster.
This is the best, and usually the fates are not kind enough
to grant man even this solace.

The worst they would rather

not think about.
From this fear ridden state of mind emerges a whole
myriad of tabus designed to avoid danger and which encompass
113l£!i•• p. 171-172.
114 I b1d., p. 174.

literally every aspect of life.

Curiously, the Eskimos

react to this world by simply repressing thoughts of the
unpleasant past, and the morrow with its inevitable
troubles, and concentrate on being happy today.
large, they have succeeded in this attempt.

By and

To the casual

observer, they appear one of the happiest of peoples; people
who genuinely live by the philosophy of "eat, drink. and be
merry", and are perfectly capable of laughing at everything
and everyone -- even their spirit gods.

To the discerning

eye, the other side of their nature sometimes peers through
the comic mask.

To such an observer, they can be seen as

a people who, at the core, are filled with fear and fore
boding.

This feeling is reflected in their myths also.
Essentially, their myths give a pretty depressing

picture of the world.

It would seem to me that such a con

ception of the world would be espoused by a people who are
in trouble, or on the edge of it, most of the

ti~e.

They

are ideas which spring from minds which have experienced
hardship.

This much would see::n obvious.

Indeed, if we

look at the condition of the Bskimo, we find that they are
in difficulties most of the time.

Thus their myths, stories,

etc., reflect a very realistic image of
~ave

experienced it.

t~e

world

~s

they

They must struggle continually to at

tain even a sustinence level of existence, and in this
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struggle, they are all too often unsuccessful.

Their life

1s so hard, so risky and dangerous that the dire possibilities

presented every day cannot escape them.

It is little wonder

that when they think of the world they picture something
far less than a bright rosy Utopia.

Anything else would

be self delusion.

Let us stop for a moment to examine this thought.
It seems to me that there 1s one obvious, but quite profound,
interpretation.
Our discussion of the Eskimo would seem to suggest

80 far that the world outlook of the Eskimo may be con
ditioned by an adverse environment and this outlook 1s
really a very accurate description of their experiences.

It would seem that much of Eskimo thought 1s con
ditioned by this attitude.

In Some way their very rational

idea that the world is an evil place carries over into
other ideas.

Perhaps this can be seen most clearly in their

ideas about spirits.

They know the world is a bad place and

so when they think of the spirits which inhabit this world,
the latter become bad also.
Eskimo ideas about the spirits interested me con
siderably.

I began to ask myself if their conception of

the spirits was conditioned entirely by

environ~ental

factors, or do other factors enter in also.
I began to look at the information on their spirits
~ore

closely and I recalled again that they

,~re

not only

mean, but capricious, treacherous, and unpredictable as
we 11 •

115

Then the

thou~ht

were those of the Ssklmo

struck me that these characteristics
the~selves.

Like their spirits,

they too were unpredictable, treacherous, etc.

Their ideas

about the spirits seemed to reflect their own basic character
Co~ld

traits.

there possibly be some connection?

After thinking the

~roblem

over, I came to the con-

elusion that if we employed a more psychological approach
that the case for a reasonable connection between these two

::.ight be made.
Actually, I thought that this par-t.Lcu La.r conception

of the spirits might be regarded as an outward projection on
the universe of certain social situation and experiences.
In short, projection is an ego defense mechanism in
l1hich an attempt is made to relieve anxiety by attributing
its cause to the external world.

The

~sse~tial

ctaracter

is tic of projection is that the subject of the feeling is
reversed.

That is, the as s er t j on , for e xa-np Ie , "I hate y ou"

is converted to "you hate ae ";
view, projection relieves guilt.

From a freudian point of
One who feels

~~ilty

about

aggressive impulses, for exanple, may obtain relief by
t.h Lnk Lng that it is other pe op Le wee ar-e being aggressive

l15Diamond Jeness, Report of the Canadian Arc;;lc
:S.x;::ed~tion 1913-1918 (Otta~-;a:
F •.1.. .acLand Printer to h Ls
Zings Host Exce Lken t I·IaJj.esty. 1;;2-:) Vol. 12. p , 135-1215.

and not he. l l 6
The

funct~on

of this subject transformation is to

ctange the internal danger to the personality into an ex
ternal danger which seems to be easier for the ego to
handle.

Objecti Vi!. fears (2..Lice lithe spirits are dangerous"

in the case of the Eskimo) are easier to master than
neurotic fears.

ObJectively, there is much for the Zskimo

to fear in terms of his envirorillent, and social situati2ns,
and these fears

~ay

be easier to handle in this form

t~an

in any other.
Projection can take another form which would seem
to be

~ore

defensive in character.

the sharing of

t~oug~ts

Its salient feature is

and feelings with the world.

One

feels happy and thinks that the world is a happy place; one
feels

ua~ap'y

and thinks

tha~

others are unhappy also.

The

same is true for other traits like honesty, truthfulness,
aggressiveness, etc.
Such projection is defensivi!. in that, if one can
convince oneself that everyone is dishonest, for example,
it makes it easier to be dishonest without feeling guilty.
This type of projection does not involve elimination of the
real motive, but the anxiety or guilt is reduced by
116Calvin S. Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology
lrew York: The New American Library of World literature,
Inc •• 1954). p. !9. 91.
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projecting the Dotive onto others and making them seem

eQually involved. II?
This 1s a milder form of projection than the

?sychological

projection~

It involves the projecting on

(a) that which we are used to in situation, (b) which 1s

presumably a situation with which we are

al~eady fa~111ar.

The Eskimos are a very violent and un,redictable
people.

Bv projecting outward and endowing the spirits with

their own traits -- those of ficiousness, treacherousness,
unpredictability, etc., they might make these traits easier

to excuse in themselves.
Eskimo can feel that

If the spirits are eVil, then an

treac~ery

and violence are inherent in

the universe (as personified by the spirits) and therefore
when he acts violently, he is only conforming to a natural
law.
Among the Eskimo, one can make a clear cut case
for the existence of projection as far as ideas about spirits
are concerned.
other tribes.
re~ct

This cannot be done

~ulte

so easily with

In most cases, their gods do not so nearly

the characteristics of the ;eople of
In general, one can asy that

t~e

t~at

culture.

traits of the

people of a CUlture will also be the traits of their gods,
but this is by no means universally applicable.
117Ibld., p. 91

ll~ 7.

There is, however, one trait which is almost always
projected -- social structure.

Almost without exception,

if the social structure is organized into a well defined
hierarchy, the gods also will be organized into a hierarchy.
If the people of the culture are perceived as equals, their
gods will be equals es well.

This can be seen in at least

two tribes which we have discussed.

Among the Sak Lao ,

where social relationships are notably equalitarian, the
spirits are thought of as equals also. 1 1 8

Among the Aztec,

who are organized into a strictly delineated caste system,
the gods are thought of as organized into a strict hierarchy. 11°
There is evidence for this theory

fro~

a number of other tribes

as well.
However, there are two very important discoveries
which I made during this limited study of the projection of
social ideas.
1.

Environmental conditions have a

fluence on general outlook.
theory such as the following:
vironmental conditions, the
of the wbrld as a hard

~ight

This
the

~.lore

~lace.

~ore

~arked

in

be stated by a
adverse the en

Lfce Ly one will conceive

The opposite of this also

118 E• Adamson Hoebel, The ~~ of Primitive Man
Harvard University Press, 1954}, p. 69.

Ca~~ridge, Mass.:

1l9William H. Prescott, History of the Conguest of
Mexico (Boston, Mass.: Philips, Sampson and Company, 1957)
Vol. I, p , 59.
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seems to be true.

For example, among the Trobr1and Islanders,

who lead a relatively carefree eXistence compared to the
Bskimos, the world is thought of as a good place.

This 1s

reflected in their ideas about the spirits, who are taught
to be rather benefic1ent creatures.

Moreover, their con

cept of heaven is qUite pleasant.
2.

Certain experiences are projected outward on

the universe.
affected.

Ideas about spirits seem to be especially

Moreover, the one characteristic which seems to

be projected among the spirits more than any other is social
structure.
I felt that these were two very significant dis
coveries.
~ain

They were, however, somewhat removed from the

subject at hand, which was still the analysis of

thought.

At any rate, since this did not seem to fit in

well with the main problem at hand, I did not try to de
velop the idea any further.
Besides it looked as if there

1~re

notions with which I would have to deal.

~ore

i~portant

PART rHREE

Language and Thought
I don't recall exactly when I ran across the writ
ings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. out upon reading his book I
realized that he had come up with a whole new approach to
the problem of primitive thought.
·~orf's

Since

t~e

publication of

book. several other scholars have expanded upon bis

ideas and together they form a whole new school of thought.
For the sake of expediency. I would like to call Whorf and
his followers as the "new school".
In fact the

II

ne w school" approaches the study of

primitive thought through linguistics, and while its work
is neither perfect nor comprehensive, it has developed a
~ethod

of approach which has been the most fruitful of any

to date.

This, at least, is my opinion and I think it car.

be demonstrated.
In order to show just what this school has done and

how it has done it, I will have to give a great deal of
description.

However, I believe the effort will prove

»or-t.hvhf l.e , for the "new s chooL" has come up with some
revolutionary notions and some startling conclusions.
Let's take Wharf first ••
1ihorf, as I understand
1.

ih3t all

hi~her

hi~,

makes two major

hy~otheses:

levels of thinking are dependent en

~~d
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determined by language.

2.

The structure of the languate one habitually

uses influences the maIL~er in wnlch one understands his er.
vlronment. 120 (By envlrorrcent is Qeant not only physical,
but social as well.)
The first 1s p aych o Log Lc a L in nature, and therefore,
s omewha t aut of our province.

It should be pointed out tc a't

the first 1s well substantiated by a great deal of

ev~1ence

from a great variety of sources.
Our interest 1s in the second hypothesis, and this

one has been discussed by both {mori and a number of
anthropologists so

t~at

ODe ~ay be sure

that it too has

'Sreat validity.
Concentrating wn the second

its most important
cesses of
emp Loy ,

~eople

l~~:lca~~GL ~s

r~.othe61s

for a moment,

tLat the thinking pro

differ with the languages

~«cich

tLey

They t::ink not on Ly different t r.Lng s , 'cut in a dif

ferent way as ve Ll ,

If you will r e call back in Onap te r One,

Xar.nhe Lm used two words

"coutent ll and

,! oa tegory!l-
l?l

by which this notion might well be expressed.
120
jje v Yor-k :

It might lrell

Benjamin Lee ;fuorf, L~:nguage, Thought and Real 1ty
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956) p. vi

121 Kar1 Mannheim, IdeolO~) and Utopia (New '!ork:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 193 ,p. 55.

---'---..
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be said that not only the "conte n t " of thought differs,
bu tits

"categorie s ",

least two ways:

This is a very crucial idea in at

(1) In order to

nrocesses of a people one

~ust

~~~erstand

the thought

approach it linguistically.

This has me t.hodo Log Lca.L implications.

(2)

It is probably

impossible to translate an idea accurately from one language
spea~ing

to another, or for a person

baving one mode of thought) to

one language (and

~nderstand

~o

us

the thought systen

of another.
In other words,
depe~dent,

lan~uage

and thought are inter

and any attempt to understnd one without the

other will not succeed.

If this is the case,

easily seen why my attempt to analyze
fail.

myt~

The different languages involved

account.

t~en

it is

lias bound to
not taken into

~~re

This is an over-simplification, but one which is

largely accurate.
Wharf's most important cDntribution is that he prc
vides a keyhole through which one can see
ings of the primitive mind

witho~t

t~e

inner work

one's vision being

blurred by anels own cultural leaning,s and background.
This has been the ue jor problem all along.
of

~yth,

for example.

Take my anaj.vat s

I realized at the time that any at

tempt to understand a myth or story is always done from
onels own point of view

a~d

not from the point of view of

152.

the believer.

Thus the results reflect the thought of the

analyst more than the analyzed.

I realized that this was

true all along, but could not solve the problem.

Wharf,

however, provides a method by which we might throw off our
cultural bias and penetrate the workings of the primitive
mind with some degree of accuracy_

What this method 1s and

how it operates we shall come to presently.
These linguistically oriented anthropologists

~ake

some pretty broad claims for their way of approaching
thought through language.

It would be no exageratlon to say

that Wharf believes that it is through language, and language

alone, that thought can be approached.
In Language, Thought and Reality,

in no uncertain terms.

His

state~ent

~ihorf

states this

of the aims of his

particular approach is contained in the following state
ment:
"The ethnologist engaged in studying a living
primitive culture must have often wondered;
'What do these people think? How do they
think? Are their intellectual and rational
processes akin to ours or radically dif
ferent?' But thereupon he has probably
dismissed the ideas as a psychological
enigma and has sharply turned his attention
back to more readily observable matters.
And yet the problem of thought and think
ing in the native community is not pure
ly and simply a psybhological problem.
It is quite largely a cultural. It is
moreover largely a matter of one especially
cohesive aggre~ate of cultural phenomena
that we call language. It is approachable
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t.ar oug; linguistics, and, as I hope to
show, the approach requires a rather new
type of emphasis in linquistics, now be
ginning to emerge through the work of
Sapir, Leonard, Bloomfield, and others ••
This is a very clear
his approach.

state~ent

11122

as to the goals of

It is also a very patronizing and conde send

ing one, in that it implies that no ather anthropologist
has even tried to get at the problem of thought.
nat so.

~any

This is

other anthropologists have been greatly in

terested in the problem of thought, though few have had
Wharf's success.
3dward Sapir, who is perhaps the most eminent
anthropological linguist, makes equally broad claims for
his method, though in less blatant language.

Sapir's state

ment is more subdued and the implications of what he says
are less obvious.

Sapir's statement of interest is the

fa Howing:

IIThis common understanding constitutes
culture, which cannot be adequately
defined by a description of those more
colorful patterns of behavior i~ 30ciety
which lie open to cbser-ve t i on ;" 2
This, in and of itself, 1s a rather broad statement
when vou stop to think of it.

He is saying, if I understand

l22Benjamin Lee Wharf, Langua$e. Thought and Reality
(New ~ork: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 66.
l23Edward Sapir~ CUlture, LaUf;age and personalitt
(Berkeley and Lo. Angele., Calil.: Un~er.ity of Californ a
Pree., 1958), p. 7.

him c or-r e c t Ly, 'tha t. it is impossible to understand t.hough t
by an observation of activities or other aspects of the
social system.

In short, 'th ough t cannot be deduced from

e c t.tvt ties.
Yet it is interesting to note that some very
eminent sociologists have tried this and have succeeded to
a degree.
~eber,

Of these Max ;feber comes to mind most readily.

if you will recall, was interested in the effect of

occupational activity upon religious thought.

The groups

whose thought he is interested in he called artisans,
peasants, and

p~bletarians,

and he concludes that these

three groups, by virtue of their different occupations,
have different religious thoughts.
This is quite clearly an attempt to determine
thought from activity, which is precisely the type of study
which Sapir says is impossible.
is wrong?
inadequate?

Does this mean that Sapir

Does it mean that Weber's conclusions must be
I donlt think either conclusiJn is justified.

I an fairly sure that what Sapir says holds true
for the analysis of primitive tribes, but does not

nec

essarily hold true for the thought systems of our own
Western civilization.

They are two different problems and

the way the one approaches one should not be the method by
which one approaches the otter.

Had Weber ever

atte~pted

to analyze primitive

thought as related to occuvation, my guess is that he would
not have succeeded.
Sapir never

~akes

this distinction clear; namely

that there is a great difference in the way one must go
about

anal~zing

prlDitive thought system as compared to

the way in which we can discuss our own.

As far as

itive thought is concerned the big obstacle is to
differe~ces

the barrier of culture and the
of thought which it implies.

pri~-

~et

by

of categories

This is a problem which rieber

never encountered to a degree that would incapacitate

fli~.

3ut the cu l, ture barrier is the big obstacle that the an
ttrapologists must overcome in order to get at thought.
This is the problem which had me stymied :rom the beginning.
Also, it is the type of problem which Sapir and :lhorf over
come by using their linguistic approach.

This is one of

their most important ccntributions.
CC~7E~rs

AND

Cb~3GCRIES

There is still an c tb e rWil~ch t~ese

of t.r.ou gh t ,
t.houg h't ,

anthropolo~lcal

di~~ere~J.ce

linguists

in t.ae ..B y in

ap;ro8c~

the

~roblem

The b Lg change is that t;,ey have redefined

They have change d ti::.e whole otject of the ae a r ch.•
If you will recall, I

cega~

ny study of ?rimitive

th:""lU;ht by a t t.emp t.Lng to elicit from the data what Nannhe Lm
calls "contentsu124 of thought.
T,.;s3

Thought, in other words,

defined in t.errcs of "c ont e.n-;s ", or distinct from

"categories" of thcugh:'.

I'CC!1~e~t'!

hera refers to the

Lde a s themselves, w:""~ile "ceteg cr-t e s '

in ·.. . h I ch e xj.e.r t.e nce is ordered.
searet nas

bee~

1°~

-':' r e re r s to the

r,'O.y

The ob j e c t txcn of t;".is

to say that tL8se ,eaple think A,

~,

and C.

In this search an e xp Lor a t.Lon of the "categories II of t.hcug l';t
has fallen by the

~mysiGe.

to explore how these :people

In other

~ords,

I never

~tte~pted

thca~~t.

The "ne w school" an tr.r opo Log Ls t s are not Lnt c r es te d
in "o onterrt " at all.

I'hev concentrate almost e xc Lu s Lve Ly

on what could be called "categories".
Before

.~

go much further, it

~i5ht

be a good idea

to get a clear idea of the difference between "conten t " and
"categor t ea'",

The "categories" we shall come to shcrtly,

but for purposes of oontrast it might be a good idea to
3.

g~t

clear idea to what the term "c o nt.en t " refers.
The only way I know of doing this is by

an example.

Content refers to the ideas

:ittle article called,

~ords

to the

~ise

~ear..s

tLe~selves,

of

IL a

From Africa are

given many proverbs which could be a!1alyzed for both content
124Kar l Mannheim, Ide010~Y and Utopia (~ew York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 193 ), p. 82.

125Ibld., p. 57.
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sud categories.
content.

']he au t.ior , however, is interested only 1n

The way in which these proverbs depict reality

does not interest him in the slightest.
solely in

"nat

they have to say.

He is interested

It 1s interesting to note

that the African paint of view is so slml1sr to ours that
the meaning of these proverbs is self-evident.
ample:

For ex

"Ashes fly back in the face of him w?10 throws them."

11.0\ greatly worried person will even answer to the braying
of a jackass. 1I

"Bnr-r owt.ng is a wedding:

paying back is mourning."

"Pd pe a tune in zenat car , and the drums of the Gr-es t Lakes
ifill answer."

Iti(nen

tWD

bulls fight it 1s the grass that suffers.

u

uOne tree alone does not make a forest.,,126
Most sayings do not yield their accepted meaning to
the outsider as easily as these.

The physical, psychological,

and cultural differences are too great to be easily overcome.
For instance, take the following pr-ove r b s
that is passing finishes no grass. ,,127

ItA

"beast

"That is the Zulu I s

way of saying that strangers are to be treated with considera
tion.

We would never get this meaning rr-on the proverb, for

our experiences are much too different.
From this it should be quite clear that we mean by
the term "contents I'.

Perhaps the term accepted meaning, or

l26 The New York Times Magazine, January 28, 1962,
lIi'1ords to the Wise -- From Africa fi , Ge or ge 3:. T. Kimble,
p , 51-52.
127 r"bid., p. 52.
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message, confers the idea.
The new school is not
ing at all.

~nterested

in accepted

~ean

They concentrate instead on the presuppositions,

and the ways of categorizing experience.
t~3t

It is of passing interest to note

while the

"ne t.... school" has had great success in a np Ly Lng their
technique to some areas of thought, they do not exte:1d it
to include more than a few of the many different types of
thought.

They seem ,articularly interested in

analyzi~g

what could be called ideas concerning cosmology and the
categories of thought involving
m1~t

they do, they do well.

d J enough.
~lcul~r

The

co~cepts

of time and space.

proble~

is that they don't

They give excellent interpretations of par

areas of the thought of a cUlture, only to ignore

the rest.
Is this failing indicative of a lack of interest in
other aspects of thought, or is it perhaps
innate weakness of inadequacy in the
employ?
deal as

indica~ive

~ethod

of

a~

which they

This is a problem with which we shall have to

we go along.

Primitive Categories of Thought
As I have stated I
?ri~arily

the !'new school!' is interested

in the basic categories of thought

of time, space. and reality.

s~ch

as those

There is a reason for this
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particular type of emphasis.

As I became more

fa~illar

with the writings of the "nev s cho oL" I cane to realize

that before we can understand anything else about the
thought system of another people, we must know what their
categories of thought are, of which their way of analyzing
time and space are primary.

To get at such basic categories

1s fundamental to understanding a thought system.

Ideas

are made always to fit some framework and if one 1s not
aWdre of the way in which the tribe categorizes experience,

one tends to superimpose onels own weltanschauung or
of thought upon them.

categor~es

This produces all sorts

of inaccuracies and does not result in true understanding
of the thought system under study.

Thus, the first task

in understanding primitive thought is to discover the basic
categorie a ,
An example of what can happen when basic categories

are not recognized can be demonstrated.
that one of our basic categoriee of

It might be said

thoug~t

is religious

thought.

It is actually a separate field and recognized

as such.

We seek of religion, and have recognized theology

as the specialized study of religious issues.
our culture, it is not surprising that

~any

COQi~g

from

anthropologists

have assumed that primitives heve religious thought as well.
However. in the case of most primitives this assumption is
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not justified.

To be sure, all peoples have what could be

called religious thoughts, but that they would recognize
t~em

as a separate category of thought or even speak of

religion as such 1s to be doubted,

Religion 1s apparently

so well integrated and intermixed with their existence that
it may be difficult for them to see it as & separate entity.
I happen to believe that this 1s in fact the case, for I
nave yet to run into an account where a

religion as such.

prl~ltlve

spo~e

of

Moreover, I have come across several ac

counts of anthropologists trying to elicit information on
religious issues.

In these descriptions, a complete lack of

comnunlcatlon between the primitive and his interrogator 1s
I~

evident.

one case, I

a~

fairly sure the primitive had no

conception of the thought about which he was being Questioned.
This being the case, how do we get at the categories
of thought and what does language have to do with it al17
Basic to the " n e w school" approach is the
~embers

of a society categorize, codify

periences through a specific

assum~tion

~~d

that

classify life ex

cultur~l ~attern.

And in ad

dition, they actually understand or compretend life ex
periences only as they are
language.
rel~tivej

prese~ted

to them in their

The assumption is not that reality itself is
but rather that it is punctuated, or emphasized

jifferently by the participants of different cultures.
These various categories and

di~fer£nces

in

,u~ctuatio~

are
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re cor-de d in Languag e ,
'l'hu s , b:' worki!lg t.hr-ough Lang uage , it 1s possible
to discover these ce t.eg or-Le s cf t.ho ugh t ,

Language then be

comes the tool or 'the me t.ho d through which clues can be dis

t.ce vay in

covered as to
t~elr

life 9x?eriences.

~-:~11cb

d Lf'f e r-en t pe op Le comprehend

?lrst,

lan~uage

;lves us a clue as

an insight Lrrt o r..o·t1' t.he y r-er-ce Lve t r.Lng s ,
T~.L8.t

Larig uage r-e r i e c t s vha t 1s of t noc r t.ance and of

interest 1s Dot very difficult to see.

ice, for e xamp Le ,
~e

Take the concept of
~f..'1er..

je he.ve on Ly one basic word for ice.

wlsn to describe

3.

~artlcular

c~aracterlstlc

use one of many adjectives before the noun ice.

of ice,
Thls

~re

se~ves

all our purposes, but when one stops and thinks of it, this
1s really Quite inaccurate.
The Eskimo, however, have several hun dr-e d d Lff e r-e n t
vo r-d s for ice.

There is a separate word for 't La ck , S;:1Dy

ice, and another for chunky, cracked i09, ahd still another
for ripply lee.

The reason for the

in ice is not difficult to see.

~reat

stress and interest

Ice is ver,

i~~orta~t

to

their lives; in fact one nlght easilY say

t~at

lives depend upon their knowledge of it.

Thus the ability

to discuss ice and desoribe it with
~mportant;

hence their

develop~e~t

their very

~reat acc~racy

is very

of all these words by

IL a
~;-.e

5i~ilar

Xear- Sa s t are ver:,' d e per.de n t on camels and so camels

Lave g r-e a t Lmpo r t.ance for 'thetr ,

-La t

~Ld

vein, tLe peoples of Korth Africa

t.he y have over

0:;.8

Thus it is not surprising

t.hcu s and ver-de for c ame L, each of

',-iLich de s c r Lbe s a different kind, t.y-ie , c crid L't Lcn , or sort
of c ame L,
1~orf
i~port2~t,

~opi,

points out tLat

have at least

,
12"
cave on Ly one.

t~ree wo~ds

to

w~om

for

v~rv

water is

~ater,

wtere

~e

Hare ave!', wher-e ..te have only wor d s

"t-ougn" arid "smooth" tc d e s oz-Lbe 't.ae texture of physical
thi:Qgs, the
surprisin~
la~d

~opi

have three comparable words.

It is not

that a people who are forced to live by tee very

itself should have nore words to describe it.
~nile

primitives have oftentimes

~ore

words by which

to describe their surroundings and things of special interest
to them, so "Ire have more words than t aey ..rere t.h Lng s of t n
terest to us are concerr.ed.
tell

~::"'r

I once he3rd a Xarine

ser~eant

he tried to teach an Indian f r-om o ne of the ·,;est

ern r-e s e r-ve t.Lons the rudiments of driving a truck.

First

of all, he had to -te a ch "t ht s bird t!, as he referred to the
Indian, th&t there was a basic

differe~ce

control mechanisms and that the steering
different from 't he fender.

in the different

wh~el

was very

As far as I could find out the

l28Benjamin Lee Wharf, Language, Thought and Reality
York:
John ~iley and Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 210.
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Indian did not differentiate between the various parts of
the truck.

The truck appeared to him as one unified whole

and it was impossible for him to understand the basic oper
ating principles until he could differentiate between the
various parts of a truck.
geant failed in

~is

Incidentally, the Marine ser

gedagogical

atte~pt.

This is none too

since his only heuristic device was swearing,

surprisi~G,

apparently.

The important point is that where ..-e have marry

words with which to describe various parts of a truck, this
Indian had one phrase only.
~roblem
t~e

o~

translation, his

~eanlngs

This was mor-e than just a
:~fll

language

~ust

did not have

inherent in the English words.

Another

exa~ple.

¥e have

t~~ee

words to discuss

different flying objects, where the Hopi have only one word.
To us it 1s important to distinguish bet1reen an

airp~ane,

a

pilot, and a flying insect; to the Hope, these are all
classified together and called one +cer-m , 129
The importance of this is not that different peoples
have a greater or lesser number of vor-d s by whLch to describe
thines, but that different peoples classify experiences
differently and that these classifications are e$bedded in
language.

In other words, both the Hopi and we perceive

physically the same thing when we look at water.

Yet ve

think all water is the same, whereas to them, water in a oup
is

8.

vastly d Lf f'e r-errt thine; rr-on water in a lake.
1 29Ib1d .•

p,

210.

They are
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two different substances entirely.
To us there 1s quite a difference between an insect
and an airplane; to the Hopi, they seem the same, and yet the

people of both cultures perceive exactly the same thing from

a physical point of view.
Seme things are elaborated upon and differentiated,

while others are lumpted together.

I would like to

su~gest

that whether a particular thing 1s differentiated such that
its many different aspects are covered by different words,
or whether it 1s an aspect of experience that
amorphous so that it

~~ll

re~alns

be covered by only a generic term,

will depend entirely upon its importance.

To

t~e

3skl~os,

ice 1s important; in Arab circles, it 15 the camel; and to
us, automobiles.
Moreover, if Wharf is correct. these words reflect
not only greater or lesser emphasis, but a different way of
looking at them -- a different conception of reality.
This difference in categorizing reality is signifi
cant not only linguistically,

b~t

sociologically as well.

How people perceive the world and the things around them
should have some bearing on their cultural thought pat
terns.

Thus, by analyzing language can one approach these

categories and modes of thought.
This being the case. then 1t ~. rou Ld ae era that the
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"new ac hco L" approach involves the following four steps:
1.

Analysis of the language.

2.

Discovery of categories of thought.

3.

Characterize the thought of a particular culture.

4.

Df ecover-y of the part which the thought pLaya in the
social system as a whole.
Now it is one of the interesting traits nf the l'new

school" anthropologists t.ha t there have been several
~nthropologists

who

hav~

done eitter one or more of these

various steps, but no one has
a systeQatio and complete

atte~pted

fas~lon

to use all of t&em

i~

for a tribe so that a total

explanation of the thought pattern of this tribe becomes
clear.

Both 'r'li:lorf and Sapir tend to concern t hert ae Lve s with

outliniil~

the problem in a broad way, and Wharf does attempt

to realize some of the time and space categories of Hopi
thought.

Kluckhohn discusses some Navaho categories of

thought but does not expand on them to include

t~e

culture.

~e

Two other anthropologists

~~03e

cuss are 3dmund Carpenter and Dorothy Lee.
both have done

outsta~ding

work.

3ven

work
I~

whole
shall dis

my e s t a-na t Lon

C8.rpe~ter, ho~~ver,

';.rho is interested in 3skiQO art, r-ema i na on 'th e level of
discovering categories of
most

co~plete

a~e.lysis,

thou~ht.

job is Dorothy Lee.

she not only discovers

The one rmo does the
Tnrough a linguistic

50m3

c~t2gories

of Trobri8.nd

thought, but tries to show the implications of these

16( •

cate~~ries

of thought in the society as a whale.

tinues to expand this idea to

ex~lain

3ne con

some of their

custo~s

in terms of these categories.

All in all, she does a

brilliant and very imaginative

job~

discusses only

of Trotrisnd

cert~iTI as~ects

One of the

majo~

~ven

Lee, however,
thcug~t~

~2de

critieisffis thst eaL be

c~ ~ll

of the "ne o e ch oo L" an tbr-opo Iug Ls t s is t.La t they sc l p ar-ound

sY6tem~

Nevertheless,

implications.

t~eir

wcrk has tremendous

theoretic~l

Cer-t.aLn'l y , it has cb ang e d t::e who Le scope and

outlook of the s o c LoLagy 0:' t.now'Ledge and perhaps 3.11 of
sociology as well.

But before

~~

get into tte 2roader

plications, it is necessary that we cave

i~

sp8cific ir.

~ore

formation concerning the e co t evcme nt s of the "ne w s ch o o L'",

Just what bas been done in the field?
s o-eca ILed "new school" been

u~

to a c tua L'Ly ?

s,ecifically, how dces Oll2 -0

~fe

f'J.nctilr~

-:,he "ne . .-; s choo L" regards thought as a
~ut

'Khat has the

3b:~t

t~9

:-:r.01~- t.h a t

of La ngu s.c e ,

~rocess

cf dis

covering the cat.e ccr i e s of tr_'JI.l.,::;l-,~ t::.rou.Sh Lan gu age ?
~orothy

Lee gives several

Freedom and Culture.

exa~ples

of how this is done in

Ir. this book,

different segmentation of experience
basis of elassiciatlon
La ngu ag e ,

w~ich,

in

s~e

demonstrates how a

res~lts

~ur~,

is

in a different

re~lected

in

1
-.....,:::'''''
,
~

She begins by aLalyzing the Wintu verb
ste~ is~.

such

Ttis

ste~

is

e~bodiea

ste~s.

.

ene

in the word

mukeda, which means "t-rr-ne d ove r b a ske t.": :'llukubara, which
means "t ur-t.Le uo vt ng alOIls't

j

and a Ls o

:::'UkU.rUT8.S,

meana autoruoJile'I.~30 Es ch of t.ne s e vor-d s
root.

The::l

s~e

9ut in the saDe

the S&!TI.e

asks by what principle ca.n 3r. autonotile be
classific~tion wit~

There 1s aucb a pr-Lnc Lp Le , but i t
med La tely obvious t.c us.
sa~e

Li20S

...,hich

a turtle

~r.1 ~ t~s~et?

cer t e.Lnl v 1s not im

Le tis take an ot.he r- e xa-ip Le ~

principle is operating in the case of

th~

stem

~uk

I'ue
cr

"puke d a :

I just pu ahe d 8. pe g into the gr-o und ,
he is sitting on one D8unch.
poqorahara: Birds are hoppin~ along.
olpoqoyabe: There are musruooms growing~
Tunpoqoypoq,oya: ~ou walk short skirted stiff
legged ahead of me. 1113 i
olp~qal:

'~at

is the common principle here.

It is again Lot obvious,

though O:1ce we know it, the classification of these words
together became understandable.
Basic to these classifications is
~{1litu
iLO

~~e

~act

that tr.e

apparently thinks of himself ;Jrirtarily as an observer

stays outside the event.

It is the observation itself

;fnich is important to him and upon this basis are
var!ing things.

class~fi2d

In other words things are classified by the

130 Dorothy Lee, Freedom and Culture ( 3nglewood Cliffs,
Hew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Lnc , , A spectrum Bock ) , I'. 108.
131 I bi d., p. 108.
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va.' t!:.ey look -- by outward form.
to our

o~rn

way of

-rhis is in sharp contrast

objects, which is from a more par

na~i~

ticipatory or "kinesthetic" point of view.
on the essence of an object and

~~e

~"e

pass judgment

it according to its

function or action &s seen by the one involved.
it is the outward
i~portant

ior~,

-- shapes have

To the Wintu

the recurrent shapes which are all
meanin~.

and form the basis for a

classification.
This oeing the case, it is rather obvious why
turtle

a~d

automobile are classified together.

t~e

Again oy this

principle, the fist on the peg, the stiff leg under a
"sh:::;rtskirtltt132 or a bird hopping on one leg, or a man
sitting on a haunch, obviously belong in the same category.
Again, outward form, and not action is important.

In con

trast, we, who see things kinesthetically, see the jumping
of a boy similar to the jumping of a grasshopper.
that they are jumping is common to both.

rhe fact

Eut the Wintu, to

whom shape is all important, see no similarity and so name
the two with entirely different stems.
With this principle in mind, it is not difficult to
see why, when beer was introduced to the Wintu, it was named
laundry.133
Unfortunately, Lee does not carry this idea any
132 I bi d., p. 108.
133 Ibid., P. 108.
-

-

further and show how this particular

~ethod

of codifying

observable reality links, up with other ideas, or what it
causes the Wintu to do in terms of a social system.
however, would be the next logical step.

This,

She is simply in

terested, at this stage, in showing that reality is cod
ified differently by different cultures and that the dis
covery of the way in which it 1s codified may be approached
through lansuage.

By examining words conoerning Ontong Javanese kin
ship arrangements, Lee gives still another example of a
different codification of reality.

The Ontong Javanese have

exactly the sace kinship arrangement as we do, but they have
c~osen

a different emphasis of meaning.

~e

name relatives

according to formal definitions and biological relationships,
~nd

we think that this represents reality.

Yet when we ap

ply our categories to the Ontonganese, -se become confused,
and cannot proceed to figure out the principle behind their
kinship system.

Let1s take a look at some of these words.

The Ontong word for relative istlkaingall.134
least it is translated as relative.
this word refer?

At

Row just to what does

Does it refer to a blood relationship?

The answer is "n o" be ca.uae a wife 1 s sisters and a husband IS
brothers are called kainga.

This also includes a sexual

134Ib1d., p. 106 , 107 •
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classification.

Then it must refer to a formal definition.

This 1s not true either, for the term applies to a number
of individuals, some of whom are not related ceremonially

or formally in any way.
Then neither sex nor blood, nor formal definitions
are basic to the term, nor almost any other form of class
ification which we would normally

assu~e.

Their term

"Ka.t.nga" 1s designed according to every day behavior and
experience.

"Ka i.nga" a.r e people with whom one works and

with whom one spends a large part of onels time.

Thus the

people with whom one works and lives are called "Ka.Lng a" ..

The term, tnen, denotes face to face informal relationships.
"Kainga" refers to an emo t.Lona L tone. a mode of behavior,

characteristic of a group of people. l 35
fhe antithesis of a "KaLnga " relationship 1s "xve ";
originally reffered to relative sex of siblings, but now,
evidently, has come to include a whole var-Le ty of people
',.:i th whom one is not familiar..

Thus the term "Ka Lnga ", as

meaning relative, is somermat of a misnomer from our point
of view, for it does not refer to a relative as we generally
~nderstand

~er~s

the term.

The important point is that these

are indicative of a

people.

differe~t

classification of

In our own terms, I would like to suggest that

135 Ibid., p. 106, 1C7.
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the word "Kall1>!,a" 'night oe s t be translated as insider and

ava as outsider.
What

~rlncl~le

c La s s Lf Lc a't f.on?

of

t~o~ght

does Lee draw from

t~is

She hvpo t.ce s Lae s veirr tenatively that

"names among tl:e entang Javanese de3cribe e:rrotlv'3 exFe

pe r-Lence s , not forms or functions." ..I~'

She does not seem

sure that this 1s the case, however, for she says t.ha t
"we

c auno

t

accept

ttls

as

fact,

unless

further

tion shows it to oe imnlicit 1!1 the rest of
behavior, in

Lnve s

t

Lg a-.

t~eir patter~ed

t~elr voc~bulary ~nd ~orphology

of t2eir
, 77

language, in t.he a.r- ritual and other organized a c t.Lva t ae s " .... .J.

she does not extend her study to include these other

At any rate, her

import~nt

~reas.

point is that through a

s t.udv of words designating relationship, it can be ahov..n
that

t~e

Ontong dissect the universe differently than

~·re

de.

I would like to stop here for a moment to discuss
what I consider one important point which is
this last statement.

Lee insinuates that a

thought is not only located in one
b~t

ar~a

of a

works throughout a whole social system.

statement of goals first of all.

i~plicit

in

~rinci~le

of

s~cial
Thi~

1s

syste~.

2

Lee is looking for

princi)les which are universal in that they can be found
136Ib1d., p. 107.

lL

., '7?

~r_·

nany areas of the social

s~stem.

Moreover, this

contains a 3ethodology.

If these

princi~les

is

l~terested

are

then to check the

co~taiued
vs.lidit:~

in

~ore

syste~.

in which she

than just language,

of any su s pe c te d pr Lnc LpLe , one
i~

should be able to find its iLflaences
social

state~2r.t

L~eas

many

~rinciple

Thus a discussion of a

of the

will in-

valve a d t scus aLcn of the total social sv e t em ,
In an- case, 'the s e are 'two ver,\" excellent discoveries
of different oategories of thought.

~either t~e

principle

behind Orrt ong kinship, nor tile one behind Wintu c La s s Lf'Lca
tio~
b~t

see~

of ;wrds, may

particularly profound to the reader,

~orked

to one who nas

«

in thi2 field,

tDe~ ~re

examples

of the test l,:,ork so far ac c ompLd ahe d ,
I

~ould

like to digress for the present, and will

~ive furt~er ~entio~

of Lee's work at another time.

Edmund Carpenter is another anthropologist who has
done an excellent job of discovering categories of
thought.

I am in-erested in only

and that is a

s~all

lationship between

o~e

of Carpenter's works

book entitled Eskimo, in
3s~imo

dd sounsed in co nne c t Lon

prl~itive

~~ich

the re

concepts of tine and space are

-~ith

art forms.

I tf,ink that

Carpenter has dane an extre2ely good job in detecting
3skimo reBsuppositlons on space and time.

What is more

important, I think that what he has to say armLd e s not oEl;-'
to art, but

mi~ht

also apply to, and underlie, many other
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as~ects

Regrettaoly~

of the Eskimo sooial system as well.

Carpenter emphasizes Eskimo categories of thOUgLt only in
oonnection with art, and ignores all other implications of
what he has to say.

Without furtner introduction, let us get down to the
specifics of Carpenter's tneory of Eskimo art.
It 1s Imgedlately obvious that what Carpenter has to
say, that the Eskimo

hav~

srace than we in the

~estern

gible

n~YS

a vastly different concept of

world.

There are certain tan

in which this different outlook 1s evidenced.

It 1s one, for example, which allows them to utilize their
powers of observation to a greater degree than we, and thus
allows them to &ccompllsh much that would be impossible for
us.

One of

t~elr

most

6trl~lng

to draw maps very accurately.

achievements is the ability

~nen

George Sutton visited

Southhampton Island in 1929, a land mass of nearly 20,000
square miles, no accurate mapa of the island had yet been
made.

Therefore, he commissioned two Klvilik

draw some maps for him.

Eski~os

to

'ihen compared witn modern maps

made afterward by aerial photographs, they are seen to be
amazingly accurate, especially in the details of the shore
line with which they are most

fa~iliar.

According to Carpenter, congruent with their ability
to pr-oduce such maps, is their ability to navigate over both
land and sea, the two
2.8

bein~

equally undifferentiated as far

points of reference are concerned.

T~"e_·r

don't conceive
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of the land in the same manner as we who orient ourselves in
relationship to certain landmarks.

Indeed, they could not

take note of landmarks even if they were inclined, for

there are none.

Their land, the Tundra, 15 featureless and

undifferentiated.

Yet the Ssklmo find their way with great

accuracy, for to them, the land is filled }nth meaningful

reference points.

On the whole, these reference points are

not locations or objects, out relationships.

"Relationships

he tween, say, contour, type of snow, wind, salt air, ice
crack. ,,138

The most important of these reference points are the
winds.

This 1s

l~dlcated

by

the fact that they have at

least twelve different words for winds; where we see one
139
phenomena, they recognize twelve.
Surprisingly enough J
the words for the different winds do not refer to direction.
but to types of winds.

llWhen ooangniktook carries out the

flow. seal hunting will be good; when kongciktook brir.gs the
flow back. walrus can be taken. The source of it is in
140
cidental."
Yet their emphasis on the wind is so great
that they seem alcost unconsciously to notice its direction
3~d

every little variation in change of direction.

understandable how one
l·~inds

Sa

a tuned can orient himself by the

and thus find his way ,

Ontario:

It is

The important point is that

138 Sd :nund Carpenter, "Eak Lmo II, :::xplora tions ('i'oronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1959.)
139 Ib1d•
140 Ib 1d•
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the Eek Lmo do not regard the universe in terms of fixed
static points of reference. but rather in terms of

dyna~ic

processes; not in terms of geographical features with names,
but

~inesthetically,

by the very changing winds and shifting

beds of sncte,
A;ain in
~skimo

do

~ot

cong~~ence

navigate by

with this view of nature, the

t~e

stars.

various constellations, and their

T~ey

~ights

know about the

are often very clear,

so obscurity does not yreclude celestial navigp-tion,
stars are relatively fixed
great interest to the

t~lngs

and as

s~ch

bu~

the

are not of

~ski~o.

T.!1eir a co t.cne s s of cb se r va t.Lon , which is tied up flit!":
their k i.ne s-th e t.Lc way of empha s Lz Lng and d Lv Id t ag reality,
ra~ifications

also nas
art

far~s

as well.

in their ability to mimic or create

Of this, Carpenter says:

"as observers in both detail and precision, t.he
Aivilik contunually amazed me. Again and
again, they saw what I did not. A seal or.
the ice was known to them long before I
could see it, even when the direction ~~s
indicated. Ye t my eyes are 20-20. S't an d-.
ing at t.!1e flow edge, t~ey could tell at
a glance ~~et~er it was a bird or seal, seal
or square-flipper. The shout 'tingrnisut~ I
(plane) usually went up long before I could
see anything and the children would con
tinue to watCD long after it had disap~eare~41
from my view.
The same was 'tr-ue of boats. n
Carpenter then goes on to say that their acuteness
of observation is related to their ability to

beco~e

one

'76.

'",itl: the t.h Lng they are ob s e r-vLng ,

In his own words:

"J am not suggesting that their eyes are
optically eupe r-Lcr to cine, merely 't ha t
such observatisllS are meaningful to them

and that ye a r s 0: unc r-ns c Lcu s training have
made t.hem na s tc r-s at 1-:. l.lor-e ove r , they

enter into t~: ex~~~i~~ce Lot as a~ o13erv2T,
but as a participant. 1h18 is t'te cn Ly ·.'~a~~
I ca~ descrlce O~ rather acco~nt fer, the

wanderful naturalism of thel~ carvings and
of anl~als. Here t~e artist or
hunter pa.r t Lc Lpa t.e s in seal-:Q8ss, t.e c ome s
one with the se e L, and thus finds it e s.av
ml~lcry

to per-tr-ay J for he 1s now, c Lmae Lf' , S82.1'. l!1.'+2
The

out5ta~dlng ~echanlcal

a;titude of the

3skl~o

also appa r'e rrt Ly tied up with his '\-;3.:: of categorizing the
uni verse a
Car?enter describ23
t':18 Eo LLowf.ng vo r-da r

"If arctic Lt t.er-a tu r-e rarely ce nt.t cns the
it is siC'lrly
because it is so often silent about those
thi~gs which are taken for granted about
"lak.Lmo life. Yet all observers t c lr-:CIIl I
h ave s poke n agr-e e there is sO:lethL~g here
not easily explained. I 1J£78 haard stories
'about 3skimo mechanics, 30~e difficult to
credit were it not for the f3.ct that 3ucn
e cr.Le venent.s can be observed du l Ly , a a
=s~i~o's ~ec~anicEl ~ptit~de,

Part of this ability 1s obvd cu s Ly riand
dexterity, particularly in Danufact~ring
snaIl objects a 3ut tr.er~ is ~or~ involv~da
~ne day I was asked by a missiona~y to look
~t a complex 3achine of his t~s.t had
stopped working a I re~oved the t~, plate
~~d realized at a glance it was far too
intricate for me to re~air o~ even to
understand a As I hesitated, sn Avilik,

:8
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~een ~atching, slipped a hand
~zde 2 few qUick adjust~ents,

who bad
~~

~ro,

under
and it

wa e fixed. "143
~tis

Carpenter goes on to explain
rather vague

ter~s.

aptitude, t.ne t

phenomena in

He says, while speaking of

~echanical

tithe explanation for this phenonenoa lies Ln

t.he over-all p i c tur e of Aivilik t Irae spe ce orie:=.tati'Jn. I ,1 4 4
e

At least :hree factors are involved:

"i ,

The Aivilik do

not conceptually separate S)2Ce and time, but
dyna~ic

or machine as a
o~

details, 3.

e~closure

;Jrocess; 2.

their

se~

a

sit~~tion

~cute ocserv~t~on

their CGLCept of space, not as a

sta~1c

such as a room with sides or boundaries, but as

direction, in operatlon. I / 1 4 5
J~st

exactly

~~at

not completely clear in my

he means by these three factors 1s
O~~

mind, and I wonder if he

wholly understands them himself.
through, however.

One idea does

~ilter

Their conception of space is So

differeL~

from ours that it illay be difficult for us to conceive of
at all.

i~

Howe ve r , I will try to clarify wt: t he me an s here.
The first, the welding of tine and srace, is rE

ilected in the Eskimo language.

of

~ords

which

ex~ress

The

both conce0ts

~s~i~o

bave a

n~nber

si~ultaneously.

Cue

such word is ti-me which means here-now. (3cth concepts
together.)

Another such word is tat pam whica is usually

translated on top, bUt which really means on top of s one tj.Lng
1 43 Ib ld ••
144 r"o1d.
145I1id.
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in past tims.l~6 Many other such words, together with pre
fixes and suffixes, are used to indicate time-space orienta

tion.

Oompounded words ot this type sre the only way in

which their l _ g s enables them to indicate tlllle.
have

DO

!hey

tense syatem, tor apparently time as such does not

interest them.

Whether something happened in the past or

will happen in the 1'uture, is ot no great llIIportance to them.
They sre apparsntly satistied with only an inaccurate in
dication ot time.
jnalysis ot the Eskllllo language reveals a great
concern with position.
system, which 1s

us.

&8

this is retlected in their case

important tor the Eskimo as tense 1s tor

B7 piercing words together with the proper particles

they sre able to describe special relationships in purely
Tlrbal terms.

they can communicate in words what we are re

duced to using our handl to describe.

In Bhort, the streas

we accord time, the Eskimo lavish•• on space.
!heir concepts of Ipae. WI shall cover more tully
in a moment.
Regarding the second factor meutioned by Oarpenter,

that ot acuteness ot observation, this is retlected again in
their language.
1~6

!he Bskimo does revel in great abstractions

Diamond Jsnness, Report ot the Oanadian Arctic
EI;edition 191}-1916 (Ottawa: P. A. lcland Printer to his
K ngs Most Excillent Ma,esty, 1926), Vol. 12., p.
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like we in the West, but chooses words designed to torce oDe

to sp.ak only of things which on. can touch and •••• 1 47
Concepti, as such, have no grlat attraction, but the Eskimo

is mast.r ov.r the definit•• the d.tail.d. the particular.
Hi.s1onar1.a, who have tried to teach the Bskimo our vastly

abstract th.ological doctrines find th.ms.lv.s confront.d by
a plople who find thisl concepts incomprehensible.

Jesus, a

man who liv.d long ago and who i. cr.dit.d with various
specific actl can be communicated, but notions of the
M7stlrles do not find a receptive audience among the Eskimo.

The Eskimo do not b.li.v. in a whole myriad of inVisible
spirits upon whom aan 1s dependent, but thlse spirits are
conceived 1n very concrlt. teras, in that they are credited

with d.finit. act•• and thOUght of a. particular .ntiti.s.
Spirits sr. not thOUght of as a cla.s. but as indiViduals,
with quit. tongibl. charact.ri.tic••
Of the third, the fact that tho Eskimos do not con
Clive ot Mspace &s a .tatlc Incloaure with sidls or bound
ari•• , but as direction, in operatlon",148 I can only repeat

what I .aid .arli.r about th.ir ability to naVigate b.ing
d.pendent upon their perceiving nature a. primarily a pro
cess, or as relationships between dynamic Illmlnts such .a

147Edmund Carpent.r, "ESkimo", Explorations tToronto,

Ontario:" University of Toronto Pr•••• I959J,
148I bi d •
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winds, rather than in terms ot fixed

g.ogr~phlcal

points.

Kareover t this principle can be BeeD also in the architecture

of an igloo.
As Carpenter himself describes it:

"The familiar Western notion of enclosed
space is foreign to the Aivilik. Both
winter SDOW igloos and Bummer sealskin
tents are dome-shaped. Both lack vertica],
walls and horizontal ceilings; no planes
parallel each other and none intersect at

90 degre.. There are not straight lines,
at least none of any length • • • •
visually and acoustically the igloo is
an open lab:rrinth alive with movement of
crowded people. No flat statio valls
arrest the ear or ey., voices and laughter
come from several directions and the eye
can glance through here, past there, catch
ing glimps.s of the activities of nearly
everyone. • • • -149
To say that Eskimo ideas of space operate ie relation to

their mschanical abilit1. the ability to 6rient themselves,
and their powwra of observation, 1. not-to say what these
spatial concepts are.

It 1s to say

8omethln~

about them,

but it is not a definition by aD1 means.
Behind all Eskimo concepts of apace, Carpenter says.
1s one basic core of emphasia:
are auditory.

the Eskimo notions of space

The concept of "auditory space- is so foreign

to our categories of thought. that it is only with great
difficulty that it can be oommunicated to a Western audience.
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I believe I know what he

118111111

by thlo tOl'll, but understand

ing has como only after haT1llg read extons1ve17 1.D regard to
arctic litorature.

Carpentor bogino by contra.ting the

Eskimo idea of"audltory space" with our own concept which we

might call

~sual

spaco:

for in our world, space i. defined

in terms of that which .operatos objocts.

We conceive of

outer space as empty whon in aotuality the physicist tells
us that it is fillod with all sorts of things.
this hard to accept.

Yet we find

Ve cannot see anything and BO our first

instinct 1s to call space empty.

~

this same token. we

call a barrel or the Grlat Plains empty because there 1s
nothing to Bee in either case.

To be real, a thing must be Visible, and preferably
constant, according to our way of thinking.

little aphorisms to the po1.Dt.

We have several

Among them are:

"seeing 10

believing", "belisve only half of what you see and nothing
of what you hear", etc.

Much

terms of visual models.

A favorite heuristic device 1s the

diagram.

of our thinl:ing is done in

Where would teachers be without their lines and

circles'
!he important point is that the Eskimo just don't
think in this mannor.

Oarpentor explains their way of

categorizing experiences of time and space so well that I
can do little more than rlpeat what he has to Bay on the

subject:

182.

"With thom the binding power or the oral
tradition is so atrong as to make the ey.:
sublervlent to the ear. 'lhey dertne space
more by sound than by 8ight. Where we
might say. "atts 8ee what we can hear,
they would say. "at's hear what we can
see.
"To tbe Aivi11k, truth is given through
oral tradition, mysticism, intuition,
and cognition, not simply by observation
and measurement or physical phenomena.
To the~, the ocularly visible apparatlon
is not nearly as important as the purely
auditory one."150
or the nature or "auditory space" Carpenter says:
"Auditory space has no ravored focus.
It's sphere without fixed boundaries,
space made by the thing itse1r, not
space containing the thing. It is not
pictorial space, boxed-in, but dynamic,
always flUX, creating its own dimensions
moment by moment. It has no fIxed
boundarlesi it is indifferent to back
ground. 'lb.eey. focuses, pinpoints,
abstracts, locating each ob~eot in
physical space, against a background;
the ear, ho"ver, favors aound trom. any
direction. "151
In this last paragraph is contained the background for
everything we have said about the Eskimo so far, and more.
Pirst, that -aUditory space" is "dynamic and alvays
in flux" certainly underlies much of what has already been
said about ESkimo notions about space as it related to
meohanics; their ability to orient th••selves by conceiving
150 I bi d•
151 Ibi d•

- - - - - - - - - _ ...

of the world in dynamic terms.

"Auditory spaee-, in other

words, lands itself nlcely to a kinesthetic approach toward
na ture and. the world.

"judltory space" 1s also tied up with a de
emphaals on time.

Of this, Carpenter says, "They don't re

gard space as static, and therefore measurable; hence they
have no formal units of spatial measurement, just as they
have no uniform divisions of time."
That "auditory

space~

most important characteristic.

1s focusless 1s perhaps its
Lack of focus lends an air

of formlessness to much of what they do.
80

We rely on focus

much that we would regard many Eskimo activities

"sloPpy", at best.

But the Eskimo see no reason why all

should be clearly definable.
little to them.

BS

A .harply ordered shape mean.

Where we are interested in seeing a patternm

they are conoerned with the dynamic, many-sided and unfixed.
I realize that this is vague and uncertain in
meaning and much of it must unfortunately remain so, but I
will try to give a few examples to try to demonstrate the
principle.
Carpenter is most interested in the concept of
"au~itory

space" as it affects art forms.

Carpenter says:

"The Eskimo arti.t i. indifferent to the
demands of the optical eye; he lets each
piece fill its own space, create its own
world, without reference to background or

anything erternal to it. Size and shape,
proportions and seieet1oD, these are set
br the objoct itselt, not torced tram
Y1thout. Like sound, each carving creates
1ts own space, its own identity; It im
poses Its own assumptlons."152
'.I!b.e1r art has no best or favored focus.

!urnsd one

WRy, Dna sees one aspect; turned another, 80mething e1sl.
Congruently, Eskimo carvings are not made to be looked at

from any one angle.

Whon held in the hand, ther roll around;

they were meant to be handled, tv1sted, and turned; not set

on a shelf and seen in one statIc position.

Likewise, their drawings are remarkable in their
laok of focus.

Figure s run raapant over a draving in all

dIfferent sizes and angles.

Some are turned on their sides

and some are standing on their heads; others seen rrom a
side view, and stl11 others fro. a top Ylew.

The notion

that the object should be depicted in soma constant and
consistent manner, and fro. the sa.. angle, doesnlt occur

to the Eskimo, nor doos this wierd art torm inhibit their
understanding.

fher can look at a picture tram any anglo

and tell juot oxactlr what it is.
As Oarpontor sars

at their art:

"Noither artist

nor obser.-r is the centre at focus; the work of art can

be seen or heard equoll1 veIl tram aDT direction."153
152 Ibi d•

-

153I bi d•
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Their whole attitude towart art 18 one of respect,

and this also is determined by their auditory conception
or space.

!here the eye imposes form from without, accord

ing to preconceived notions of what should be, the ear, in
Carpenter's words Mfavors Bound from any direction and this

or

attitude

open receptivity seems to carry over into their

attitude towards art.

They don't try to carve aomething

out of a pi.c,. but rather regard art a8 bringing out what
1s already in the plece. n154

Carpenter describes the act

of creation as follows:
·~B

the carver holds the uDworked iVOry

lightly in his hand, turning it this vay
he whispers, 'Mho are rou?
there?' And then: lAb, S.al~t
sets out, at least consclollsl1.

and that,
Who hides
He rar.If
to carve,

S&1. a seal, but picks up the

ivory, ezamines it to rind its hidden rorm
and, if that is not immediately apparent,
carves aialessly URtil he see it, humming
or chanting as he works. Then Ile brings
it out:

Seal, bidden, emerges.

It was

al~s

there: he didn't creat it; he
released it; he helped it step rorth."155
This attitude
language.

!he

or

~v111k.

respect is reflected again in their
according to Carpenter, have DO word

"ror make which presupposes imposition

or

the self on matter. "156

Their closeat approximation is to work on whioh indicates
only a passive respect.

154Ibid •
155 Ib id•
156~.
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Again the Eskimo distaste for definite outline and
form can be seen 1n their tales and myths.

Eskimo ideas

and stories do not folloY in, what 1s to us, a natural
sequence.

Instead, they may begin with the middle of a

story, go on to the conclusion, and then end with the be
ginning.

Moreover, they do DOt have themes or morals, Dor

do they build up to a conclusion or resolution of the
problem.

They begin and end with

DO

scheme in .1nd, and

thus their stories seem rather indeterminate and inconclusive.
to those accustomed to the crises and resolutions of our own
stories.

In an Eskimo tale, there 1s no slngl;e focus, nor

any central feature.
Carpenter calls attention to this feature of Eskimo
myths but does not give any examples, and unless one sees a

direct translation of an Eskimo

~th

the full impact of this

is not evident.
Diamond Jen.as provides several such direct trans
lations.

~he

following is oDe:

"A man, it is related/ a raven/ asked it/
what are thou goy: off to dol grandfather/
his piece of neck I am going to take back
to him/ where to patitaq/ on the windward
side/ who pray/ they grandfather/ the
thinker/ who pra7/ they mother/ the dog
trace/ who pray/ thy grandmother/ old big
ice/
what pray/ thee/ do they Il/lllle
these ,., the name poor 11 ttle thi""/ they
name me also/ its song! eXists/."I57

Y

157Diamond Jenness, Report of the canadian Arctio
Expedition 1913-1918 (Ottawa: P. I. leland Printsr to hiB
Kings Most Excellent Majesty, 1926) Vol. 12, p.
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this 1s a very typical direct translation.

The

thing that holds our immediate attention, the thing upon
which we concentrate, is trying to piece these different
parts

tog~ther;

to make some sense of them; to Bee how one

tollows the other.

The Eskimo don't follow this process.

They Bee nothing out of the way it one part does not follow
the other and 1f one aspect 1s not congruent with another.
Sequence and cause and effect are not the rules by which
their minds work.

!his seems very strange and almost in

comprehensible to us, Who are always Bsking why and what
are the antecedents of this and what 1s the logical con
clusion of this?

It 1s hard tor us to imagine that Bome

peoples think without these rules, and yet, such 1s the
case.
As mentioned in previous instances, Carpenter 1s in
terested in the notions underlying art.

He does an excellent

job of showing how their categories of thought (of which the
most important is that of -acoustic space" with its dynamism t
formlessness t concreteness and lack of limits and focus)
affect art.
However t Carpenter stops too soon t for I believe
that there are implications in what he says that extend
far beyond the range of art.
One of the Characteristics of Eskimo art is its
formlsssnes.

This is also the most characteristic thing
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about Eskimo soclal structure as a whole.

connection?

Is there any

I think there might well be, yet Oarpenter

does not pentlon the taot.

What Is meant by lack of form?

A description or cartain aspects ot the Eskimo Boclal
structure will convey the idea.

The E.kimo live in little band. which are wid.ly
.eparated and among which there i. little contact of any
kind.

Though the.e bands are related by the bond. of a

common CUlture, there 1s no political structure encompassing

two or more ot these grOUps.158

Within these local groups there i • •gain a lack of
political torm.

There Is no socIal structure or hierarchy

bf any kind, and no organiz.d political leader.hip.
Periodically, a temporary leader does arise, but his powers
are informal and the control he exerts Is really quite

.l1ght. 159
There Is no extended kinship system and even the
nuclear family Ie not strongly welded together.

Marriages,

in tact, are made and broken at random, by either partner,
in almo.t the .pirit of a game.

Th.re i. ab.olutely no differentiation due to
158 E• Adam.on Boebel. The Law of Pr1mi tive lien
Oambridge, lIa••• : Harvard Univer.ity Pr.... 1954), p. 67.
159lJlll., p. ri,

189.

specialization of occupation because no specialists exist.
There is only slight differentiation dua to aga and sax.
One might be lsd to say that their lack of social
distinctions and political structure is only a reflection
of their general underdevelopment in all areas, for there is
some truth in the statement that the Eskimo are among the

world's most backward and primitive people.

This 1s un

doubtedly true in part, but there 1s more to it than this.

The Aranda of Australia, who are also very backward, have
oDe of the most elaborate soclal and kinship systems yet
devised by man.

Clearly then, economic and technological

retardation does not necessarily preclude the possibility
of complex soclal relationships.

Certainly other factors

are at work.

I wonder whether or Dot the concept of "aUditory
space", which plays such an important role in Eskimo,

mechanics, art, navigation,

etc~,

is not also a determining

feature of the Eskimo SOCial system.

"Auditory space" is

marked by focus1essnesB and boundlessness, and if it were
to carryover into the social realm, it mlght have a certain
loosening and leveling effect.
There are other aspects of the Eskimo social system
which might be rs1ated to some of Carpenter's observations
concerning art.

Eskimo society is in constant flux, for
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e:mmple.

This is evidenced in a number ot ways, perhaps

mo.t c1.arly 1n the way the headman 18 chosen.

In the true

sense ot the term, the headman 1s not chosen by a oonscious,
demourat1c proceSB.

It would be aore accurate to say that

he arises spontaneously.

He 1s headman only as long &s

other Bskimos do what he says, when they no longer obey him,
he 1s DO longer headman.

There is no process of selection,

no .pec1f1c dut1e. attached to the job, nor 1. there any
increase in statue.

Moreover, there ls no obligation to

follow the d1rect1one of the headman. 160
rhUB the headman's powers are more dependent upon
his personality than any other factor.

He may have great

influence at one time and almost none at another time; in
one situation, he may command, in another situation he mey

be ju.t ona of the ......

!bus the po.1t10n of 1e"er.h1p

1s far trom statiC, but rather"

changes and fluctuates

with t1me, .1tuat10n and per8onal1ty.

Leaderall1p 1. v1ewed

1n k1n••thet1c term., ju.t a. B.t1mo art.

Doe. the B.t1mo

emphasize on the dynamic and kinesthetic rule in both

.1tuat1on.7
~Bsum1ng

that the Eskimo do streBe change and tend

to perce1va the world 1n dynam1c t1ne.thet1c term., then 1t
might throw .ome 11ght on st111 another very puzsl1ng event.

160~. p. 74.
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It occurs to me that their viev or lire might be the ex
planation ror the relative eaae with llhich the:r have ac
cepted and adopted the oivilization or the llhite man.

Ir

the:r viewed lire aa conatantl:r changing. then change vould
seem only natural, and the vast changes which the white man

brought to the north vould perhaps not be suoh a great
shock to them.

One might sa:r tbat the:r have been happ:r to accept
the ways

o~

the white man in order to escape trom the

povert:r in which the:r lived.
it.

This might bave some truth in

Yet it 1s Dot the whole story. because other peoples

who have lived in very similar circumstances have resisted
nercely ths llhite man and his va:rs.
a case in point.

The Alaskan Indians are

Their situation 1s much the same as that

or the Eskimo, and :ret the:r have not adopted the va:rs or
the llh1 te man with an;yvhere near the alacrit:r or the Eskimos.
Again, other ractors are at vork.

I think that perhaps

the Eskimo conception and emphasis on the dynamic,

~lux,

and change, might be part of the answer, and yet I cannot
find any corroborating evidence.
fa change the sUbjects again for a moment, take the
matter of concreteness.

!he Eskimo emphasizes hearing and

the ear does not abstract, says Carpenter.

Instead. it ac

cepts even the most detailed sounds on the same level of

192.

concreteness.

Eskimo language and thought are consequently

concrete, and this has an effect on art.
some effect on the soclal situation.

It might also have

It occurred to .e that

an emphasis on concreteness might partially explain the

Eskimo's lack of political offices, kinship relationships,
and law &s we know it.

fair17 high order.

An office is an abstraction of a

The office of President of the United

States, for example. exists irrespective of the actual man

who is filling the role at the time.

The duties, rights,

privileges, and obligations which the President BeSU.es are
not attached to his person; they are his only so long as he
retains the office.
The idea of an office 1s a very obvious idea to uS

in the Western world who are used to thinking in abstractions.
To a folklike the Eskimo, who like to think concrete17, the
idea of an office might not suggest itself so readi17.

The7

have a headman, but the headman is not filling an office as

we think of the term, for what he does depends upon his own
abilities and personality and is not defined in terms of an
office.
Law is also an abstraction.

It is abstracted trom

specific cases and it may be applied to specific cases, but
there is nothing concrete about the law itself.

Thus it is

not surprising that the ESkimo, who have no love of the
abstract, have no law.

They will decide a case one way in

193.

one situation, and a similar css. 1n an entirely different

way at some other time.

How a case 1s decided depends

UpOD

the circumstances and, more important, the personalities in
volved.

Whether a murderer 1s punished will depend upon

whether he vas an "Angekok" or an unpopular person.

In

other words, it would seem as if abstract, consistent
principles of law are Dot as important as the particular
personalities involved.

Whether all of this is true or not is debatable.

I

have a feeling that what Carpenter says may be applioable to
other areas such as the political and the social features,
but Carpenter mentions only the implication upon art.

How

ever, I have tried to extend his ideas to the social sphere.
Hov accurate my attempt has been can only be a matter of
speculation.

With this, let us leave Carpenter's analysis

of the Eskimo.
The next person I would like to take up is Whorf.

BenJamin Lee Whorf, along with Edward Sapir, were two of the
first anthropologiets to work ertensiTely in the field of
linguistics.

Both he and Sapir concentrate mainly on out

lining the field in general, and do not do many speoifio
studies.

Whorf wa. interested mainly in showing how lenguage

determines patterns and ways of thinking.

Bot only i. the

logio different but faots and reality itself differ
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according to language.

In his own terms, "lacta are unlike

to speaker whose language background provides for unlike
formUlation of them. n16 1 p. 135 LTR.
In other words, what one thinks depended on the

language used.

What determines the ideas implicit in the

morphology ot a language?
answer to this question.

¥bort never does give an adequate
What he does say 1s that the ideas

in a la.nguage depend upon the "soclal needs II of a people.

"He viII assert certain ideas as plain, hard
headed common sense; which means that they
satisfy him beoause they are completely
adequate as a system of communication

betnen him and his fellow man.

That

la, they are lingUistically adequate to
his social needs. and will remain so

until an additional group of needs i.

felt and 1s worked out in language.H1 6 2

According to Wharf, language reflects the n••ds of a people,
Also, a language is Bot only a vay of seeing the world, o:t

seeing reality, but as an expression of deep.st need and
aspirations of these Plople as well.

~orf

himself do.s

not develop this idoa, but ooncerns himself primarily with
proving that reality appsars differently to people speaking
different

1anguages~

Dorothy Lee enlarges upon this idea,

as we shall soon see.

All this aside, what does Wharf do Specifically?
1fb.at contribution does he make to the anal.yale of prim1tlve

161
Ben~amln Lee Wharf, Ls.Dguafje
Thought and :Realltz.
(Nell' York: John Wiley and Bans, fnc., t956l, p.235.
162!bid., P. 251.
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thought?

Most of his work was directly in the field of

linguistics itself.

He did a great deal of work in de

ciphering Maya hieroglyphics and much work
stems. and grammatical categories, etCa

OD

Shawnee verb

The only work he

did directly in the field of primitive thought, that I can
find, iB a little article entitled An American Indian Model
of the Universe,- in which be discusses Hopi concepts of time

and space.

The ideaB hebringB out in this article might be

interesting to explain.
·The Hopi

th~

of· time and apace in an entirely

different way than we do.

It Beems eelf-evident to UB that

time flows at a smooth rate out of the future, through the
present and into the past.
to

UB,

Although it seems inconceivable

Hopi Idea8 of time are vastly different.

Whorf diacovered after an analysia of the Hopi
language, that they have "no words, grammatical torms,
constructions, or expressions that refer directly to what

we call ttme or to past, present, or future, or to enduring
or lasting, or to motion &s kinematic rather than dynamic ••. "163
He concludes that the "Hopi language contains no reference to

"time" either explicit or implicit.,,164
Yet the Hopi are able to describe and account for
all experiences and observable phenomena.

163 Ibi d., p. 57.
164 I bi d., p. 58.
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the Hopi have a conception of time and space, but

it is so different from ours that it is difficult for us
to comprehend.

P1rst of all, the Hopi do not have the

"homegenoua and instantaneous timeless space of our sup
posed intuition or classical 'Newtonian mechanics,".165
Taking the places of these concepts are completely new con

cepts which allow the Hopi to describe their activities
without reference to either time or space.

Wharf says

that:
"These notions will undoubtedly appear to
us as psychological or even mystical in
character • • • • They are ideas which we
are accustomed to oonsider as part and
parcel either of so-called animistic or
vitalistic beliefs, or of those transcendental
unifications of exerience and intuitions of
thinge unseen that are felt by t~g con
sciousness of the mystic • • • • " 6 p. 58.

!hen Whorf goes on to say that the Hopi categorize
reality into two great "cosmic forms"~67 •• which might be
called "manifested or unman1feat"168 or "objective or sub

junctive • 0169
lfhorf defines these terms so exactly and aptly
that I can do little more than quote him.
165 Ib id •• p.

58.

166 1lbi d •• p. 58.
167~•• p. 58.

1158 I bi d •• p. 58
169~ •• p. 57.
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WThe objective or manl~e8t comprises
all that 1s or bas been accessible to
the sense -- the historical physical
universe -- ~th no attempt to dis

tinguish bstween present and past,
but excluding everything we call
future. The SUbJective or unmanirest
comprises all that we call future, but
not merely thiS; it includes equally
and indistinguishably all that we call
mental -- every thi~7Ohat appears 6r
exists in the m1D.d. It

The manirest which i. a lumping together

or

all we

would call past and present 1s easy enough for us to under
stand.

The subjective needs some explanation, however.

The SUbjective includes all events which we would Bay werl
to happen in the future and also all mentality, emotion

and feeling.

To the Hopi. all that will happ*n in the

future 1s just speCUlation or thought
DOt

make the distinction.

a~y,

so they do

The subjective 1s in the realm

of e%pectana,y, of desire, in which no distinction 1s made
between hopes and thoughtsi between ideas snd emotions.
Emotion. hoping, and thinking are all considered as one. 17 1
The future is olassified as SUbjective beoauBe to
the Hopi there is no future -- the future ie here with us
already in mental form.

There is a relationship between

subjective and ob3ective, however, for they see the sub
jective as moving toward, and becoming,

Understanding

or

170 I bi d •• p. 60.
171Ibid •• p. 60.

ob~ective.

the objective gives great insight
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into Hopi magic and the supernatural.

The Hopi have many

ceremoni.s in which they are trying to propitiate the gods.
In our minds. we think of the Hopi as begging for something
in the future, or trying to manipulate the gods for favors
which are to be bestowed in the near future.

The Hopi, however, don't convelve of their own

actions in quite this way.

The Hopi think that what is
being prayed for is already with us in mental form. 172 The

vital asplct of the cosmos -- the subjective -- 1s present

and moving always toward fruition and objectivity.

The

ceremony 1s not prayed in order to get something else, but

to actualize what already is.
The subjective state -- of prime importance -- the
Hopi sle as a state of becoming and
cerned

~th

it.

t~.y

are greatly con

Here lles their concentration and most of

their ceremonials are designed to hllp along these natural
processes.

Of this Wharf says:
"as anyone acquainted with Hopi society
knows, the Hopi see this burgeoning
activity in the growing of plants, the
forming of clouds and their condensation
in rain, and the carerul planning out of
communal activities of agriculture and
architecture and in all human hoping,
wishing, striving, and thought; and as
most especially concentrated in prayer.· 173

171Ibid. , p. 60.
172ng., p. 61, 62.
173Ibid •• p. 62.
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This discussion of the objective and subjective is
connscted with motivation and espsciallT with ritualistic
activities.

In Hopi eyes, because subjective becomes ob

jective. it is possible bT thinking and hoping (forming
subjectiv1tT). to de terming what will be.
Hopi ceremonials are.

This is what

It 1s an attempt to conjure up

thoughts which will become real.
ADd here we have it; this 1s all that Wharf says

about the Hopi vaT of categorizing the un1verse.
Atter all has been said and done, it 1s Dorothy Lee

who does the best job of reallT determining the thought
systems of primitives.

She has concentrated her attention

on two tribes; the Wintu, on which she 1s the foremost expert,
and the frobrland Islanders.

Her analysis of trobrland con

cepts of reality Is, in my opinion, the best article I have
seen in the field.

Lee does not attempt to cover all

o~

Trobrland thought, but concentrates on their apprehension
of reality which she maintains 1s "nonllneal n174 in con
trast to our own "11neal n175 phrasing. ,Not only does she
state their conceptions of reality, but she also relates it
to other aspects of their social system through a discussion

174DorothT Lee. ~eedom and Culture (Englewood
Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc •• 1959). p. 105.
175I2!i., p. 105.
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of their source of .otlvatlon and their goals.

In short,

she gives all of Trobrland socletT J and our own, a whole

new perspective.

Initially, Dorothy Lee admits that she usss languags
as an analytical tool, but it 1s apparant that she does not

depend upon language ent1rsly.

It is in language that she

gets her clues which then can be Been in other areas of a
cu~ture.

In her own words, "My own study was begun nth an

analysis of linguistic formUlations, only because it is in
language that I happen to be best able to discover my
cIUBs.,,176

Sbe insinuates that the same results could be

obtained by other methods.

She never uaBS any of these

other methods, however, nor does ehe mention them by name

specifically.

It vas through a linguistic analysis that she

came to the conclusion that the !robr1and Islanders thought
"non-11aally- •
Let-. go through some of Leels observations on the

naturs of the Trobr1and language.
no ob3ectlTes.

The Trobr1and language has

1here we would have to say

~lt

1s a beautiful

garden" or 80me thing of this sort, the Trobrlanders have

one word which includes both the idea of beauty and garden.

If it is an ugly garden that is being discussed, then a
single Trobriand word 1s then a self contained concept in
which both 8ubject, adjective, and sometimes eyen predicate,
are fused and indistinguishable.

176~., p. 106.

One cannot remove one part,
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replace it with something else, and come up with a slightly
different concept.
type of garden.

A beautifUl garden is not only one

If it is not a beautifUl gardon, then it

becomes something elae Intirely_

One of the examples of

this type of language fora that Lee describes concerns a
specie of yam.
roundness,

At a certain degree of ripeness, firmness,

~lgne88,

etc., the yam 1s called a

taytu-;

and if it 10S8S 80.' of these ingredients, then it is
something elsl, a different thing, perhaps bowawata.

When

it 1s overripe, then the taytu 1s a zowana which contains
oVlrrlpenesa.

And a lOvana does net put forth shoots, does

not become a sprouting yowana.

Whln sprouts appear, it

ceases to be itselt; in its place appears silosata. 177
It would be my gue .. that difterent types at y....
would be more clearly differentiated than perhaps many other
things because at ita importanCe in Trobriand society.
taztu for

.~p18.

has great ceremonial importance.

A

It 18

the only type ot yam which can rightfully be given to one's
chief for a tax payment, or to one's slster's family in

order to fUlfull one's obligation at support.

One keeps

the bwanaya178 tor one r B own use; and 1 t 1s the yonna

which is planted, ot oouree.
But what tnterested Lee ""s that thero vere no
connectioD8 between events.

177 I bi d., p. 109.

-

178 I b i d., p. 109.

The notion that the same yam
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could go through various different stages did not occur to
the Trobrianders, instead they perceive of many different
distinct items, where we see the same form only slightly
modified.

There is a series of being, but no becomigg

In general, this is true of all Trobriand thinking.
In Lee's own lFOrds.
-there is no arrangement of activities and
evants into aeans and ends. no casual or
teleologic relations • • • • There is no
automatic relating of anJ kind in the
l&ngU8ge. Except for the rarely used
verbal it-differs and it-same, the~, are
no terms of comparison whatever.- 179
Moreover, the concept of time seems to be missing
completely.

There are no tenses, no linguistic distinctions

between past or present,180 and there is no temporal re

lationship made between events.

The notion that a thing

changes with time to becoae something else is coapletely
absent.

What ths !robrianders do perceive are patterned

wholes, which we shall explore later.

we

think in terms of lines, and without the lines

we are lost.

fhs line is present in the philosophers'

phrasing of means and ends.

A favorite heuristic device is

the diagram. which is a whole series of lines.

We perceive

of both history and evolution as following a lineal path.
The line is even imbedded in our language.

-

179 Ibi d . , p. 118.
180 I bi d . , p. 117.

We speak of a
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pattern as a "web of relationships", we "draw conclusions",
and we trace the "relationship between facts".

We assume

the line metaphorically when we speak of "following a line
o! thought", a ·course of action" or "the direotion of an
argument~

One example that Lee uses ls,
"if I make a picture of an apple on the
board, and want to show that one side 1s
green and the other red, I connect these

attributes with the pictured apple by
means of lines, as a matter of course;

how else woud I do it."181
Where there 19 no line, we make one.

We assume

the presence of a line when we desoribe a circle of stones
or a line of trees.

Even in ancient times a favorite

nooturnal pasttlme was to oonneot the stars by lines such

that an outline was formed.
More important, the line underlies the meaning which

we give life itself.

It is connected to the emotional

climax which has so much meaning for us.

OUr very lives

are ordered lineally, and when the line is broken, we are

disturbed.

Bvery~hing

we do must lead to something.

know a young man in my own city who

recen~ly

I

quit his job

at the local paper mill because "it wasn't getting me
anywhere".

What he meant was that it wasn't leading to

181........
I b i d., p. 110•
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wealth, or power, or prestige, or any other thing he valued.
This 1s a very common attitude and oDe to which we are ac

customsd.
sake.

Very little of what we do is done for its own

W. need a reason to get a hlgh-r education; a better

job is usually the desired end.

Our atheletic programs are

undertaken as a means to better health, and in some circles
an endless round of soclal engagements 1s suffered through,

not for the

run

of it, but because it will lead to a wider

circle of acquaintances, resulting in a position of status.

The lin. is present in, literally, the way we think
and practically everything we do.
The Trobriand Islanders most emphatically do not
think this way.

Take the matter of gardening, for example.

Trobriand gardening is quite comple:r and has many specialized
aotiT1tiea connected with it.

I t we were to think in our

own terms we would see all their planning and magical
activities as conceived in terms of leading to a rich

harveet; further, that their kula, involving the cutting
dOWD of trees, the communal dragging of the tree to the
beach, the rebuilding of the large sea-worthy canoes, and

all the magical actiT1ties involved, could only b. carried
out if conceived lineally -- as lesding to some goal.

This

is what one would think who simply tried to superimpose our
own categories of thought on the Trobrlanders and their
actlT1tles.

Yet Lee shows rather conclusively through a
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linguistic analysis that this probably is not so.
Prom our point of view, it would be possible to
describe much of Trobriand activity lineally. yet the
Trobrlanders themselves do Dot see it that way

Thie is indicated first of all through their
language.

Linguistioally, nothing they do, or speak of, is

ever the cause ot, or the reeult ot, any other thing.

Each

act is a separate activity and their language accordingly is
jerky and co.posed of points rather than connected patterns.
The whole notion of cause 1s apparently foreign to

their wey of thinking.

When Kalinowski pressed tha

Trobrlanders to think in terms of cause and effect, they did
so, but their answers were "confused and

cODtrad1cto~;

their

prafarred answer was 'It was ordainad of old' -- pointing to
an ingredient valua of the act instead of giving an ex
planation based on lineal conneotion.· 182
When asked for evidence to verify the validity of
their magical spells. they were completely stumped.
was not important to them.

Evidence

The validity of the magical

spell lay. not in its evidence, but in its being; in the
fact that it was performed by the appropriate person, that

it had ths proper mythical basis, and that it wes within
the patterned activity.
There 1s coherence and organization in Trobrland
society, not because it 1s organized toward some lineal end,

182 I bi d., p. 112.
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but because it is patterned.

Oue act of this pattern

brings into existence a whole order of acta.

there 1s a

distinction to be .ada between a patterned activity as the

TTobrianders think of it, and an act which is caused.

A

parallel from our own culture might be in the bUilding of
a house.

In bul1dlngJ house certain skills are necessary

and a certaln pattern must prevail.
plumbing or work on the

roo~

ODe cannot put in the

until the basement 1s finished.

The plumbing follows the bUilding of the basement, and yet
ODe cannot say that the building of the basement caused the

plumbing.

They are both part of the pattern and the pattern

itself sets the sequence.

Moet TTobriand activities sre comparable to building
a house in that one part of the activity does not caus.
anOther, but rather the existence of

being.

ODe

calls another into

It is the psttern as a whole which determinee their

bsing.
the line, in our culture, not only connecte, but it
moves.

We speak of a road running from po1nt to point.

A

Trobrlander does not speak of a road as running, but as

....

A road is not to onB locality from another, but it

....

is at a certain place •

Perhaps it might be said that whsre we smphasize the
line, ths !robrianders emphasize the point.

This can be
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demonstrated by an analysis of their language.

There is a

myth where a fudava (medicine man) goes -- fro. our point of

view -- from village to village.

His soJourn is described

as "Kitava it-shine village alroady he-is-over.

I-sail

I-go Iva; lwa he-anchor he-go ashore • • • • they drive him

off • • • • he go KWRywata."183

In this story the points

are mentioned, but sailing to and from 18 submerged 80 as to

be almQst absent.

!he first thing thst would interest us

1s where he had gone trom, and to, and we would be very In

tereeted to know tbst in this Journey he followed a south
easterly course.

This has meaning for us.

It doesn't for

the Trobrlander. for directions are never mentioned.

Points

are important, but lines and th.ir directions are not.

Non-lineal phrasing can be seon in many trobriand
descriptions.

One of these 1s a description of a canoe

which goes as follows:

"Mist • • • surround me my mast.

..

the nose of my canoe • • • my sal1 • • • my steering oar • • •
my canoe gunwale • • • my canoe bottom • • • my prow• • •my
rib • • •my threading stick • • • my prow-board • • • my trans
verse stick • • •my canoe side."184

One will notice that no

particular order 1e being followed.
This can also be Been in another story told to
Malinowski.

The Trobriand story is:

"T.bey-eat-taro, they

l83DorOth1 Leo, Preed~m and CUlturo (Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1 59) p. 114.
184 Ibid., p. 114.
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spewptary, they disgustod_taro.- 185

To people who think

lineelly. the disgust would naturally come before the
vomiting if time is lineal.
We think lineally for two reaSono:
1.

Our sense of Time demands it.

With timo per

ceived and moving !rom the future through the present into
the past. it seems only right that in telling s story or
writing history that we should begin with the oldest snd
relate things in sequence in order to explain the present.
The

~obrianders.

who do not distinguish between psst snd

present. do not f1ad it important to give things in sequence.
2.

!he line, or arranging ot things in a sequence,

18 important to us

tor another reason.

and objects in a sequence which is
and intensity.
Importanoe tor

the

We arrange things

clim~ic

in both si.e

The emotional climax has great meaning and
UBi

and it apparently has almost none tor

~obriander.

Literally. practically everything we do is arranged
in a climactic way.

At graduation. our college faCUlties

are arranged according to raDkl the stUdents are arranged
alphabetically, according to surnames.

When we eat a meal,

we begin with the small appeti.er and end with the climax
ot the meal, the dessert.
Our notions of history are climactic with the

W5 Ibid., p. 116.
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present as the cl1ma%.
All of our stories, etc., also must lead up to a
climax, or a resolution. to be considered acceptable.

It

is a rule at expository writing that one begins with the
most obvious point and ooncludes with the strongest.

If

this rule is Tlolated. . . are conscious of the error, and

are disturbed by it.
this cardinal rule.

lor example, The Caine Hutigr Violates
!he author, Herman "auk. begins by

bUilding up to On. olimax and one morality. only to re
pudiat. it at the last mo.ent and end with its antithesis.
!his builds up a tr••endous amoUAt at tension in the reader
because things don't end as they should have.

at consist.ncr was violated.

The principle

The story did not build up

lineally by a logical set of events to a resolution and
does Dot leave us with a feeling of satisfaction.

Host iaportant at all, the emotional climax has
great meaning for

U8

because it acts as an emotional goal;

a means by which we are motivated to achieve the proper
Bnds.

Much of what we do and the actiVities we undertake

are n«t pleagurable in the.selves.

We undertake them be

cause they lead to some Bort of reward at the end.
school marking system is nothlng more than this.

OUr
Only a

handful of students work for the love of learning, but the
others keep plugging our of fear of recelv1ng a bad mark,
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or to gain the reward of a good one.

of most laborers.

The same can be said

!her don't find fulfillment in thelr

work, but simply put in their hours in order to get to the
climax of the week -- 7ridar night -- and the par check.
,
Our BBDse of freedom is also related to the line.
To be free means to be allowed to move along a given course.
Any interruption or interference with our course of action

1s perceived as a restriction of our
is

e~v1Blon.4

f~eedom.

Fulfillment

by a means of a line -- as the completion of

a course or a career.

Our whole notion of success and

failure ia postulated on the principle of linealitr.
One 1s Bucoes8tul to the ertent that one completes a par
ticular course of action, and a failure to the extent that

one is blocked in thia attempt.
It 1s not only a particular course of action that

is perceived lineally, but our whole personalitr develipment
is thought of in the Isme war.

Perhaps this is vhr failure

ia of such signifioance in our own culture.

Failure to

complete a lineally conceived course of action means not

only failure of the enterprise but failure for the lineallr
conceived self.
!gain, the Trobrland Islanders do not share our
attitude. and as a result the goals they set for themselves.

the ways in which ther are motiveted, and their whole
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perception of what is good and bsd. is clsar17 changed be
cause of this difference.
To reiterate, the Trobrland Islanders do not think
in lineal patterns.

Cause and effect have no value for

them, and more eignificant17. neither doee the idea of an
emotional cliaax.

!hie lack of climax can be seen in their literature
and magical chants.

As an instance, the chant which I re

peated earlier:
The
!he
!he
The
The
The
The
!he
The

bel17
bsl17
bel17
bel17
bel17
bel17
bel17
bel17
bsl17

of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of

mT
mT
mT
mT
mT
mT
mT

garden
garden
garden
garden
garden
garden
garden
~ gafden
mT garden

lifte
rises
reclines
is-a-bushhen's-neet-in-lifting
is-an-anthill
lifts-bends
ie-an-ironwood-tree-in-lifting
lies-do~86

burgeons.

This is neither climactic nor anticlimactic.
us it is merely slopp'y and repetitious.
all Trobrland ceremonials.

To

This caD be seen in

In the KUla procession the bead

chiefs come neither firet nor last, but are scattered some

where in the middle.
Lee also points out that, in our culture, child

birth ie the cl1aax of a long pregnanc7'
Trobrland sooiety.

It is not so in

There, pregnancy for its own sake 1s

the cause of a series of festive occasions.

These ceremonies

186DorothT Lee, Freedom and CUlture (Englewood Cliff.,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 19591, p. 116.
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have no purpose or end.

They neither ensure the health of

mother or baby, nor make the birth more comfortable.

They

_imply celebrate the pregnancy snd that i_ all.
I would like to _tre_s that no Trobriand activity
is fittsd into a climactic line.

Alllabor find_ its satis

faction of reward inhersnt in the sctivity itself.
What we call monotony and repetition might be the
key to the whole Trobriand outlook.

The Trobriand Islanders,

linguistically recognize no distinction between past,
present and future.

Where we use references to time they

rerer to events in the lives of their ancestors.

Where we

might say "a few years ago", they might Bay "in the days of
my father".

!hus the event 1s placed situational1y and not

temporally.

!o the f.robrlanders, what happened in the

mythical paet determined what will happen in the pressnt
and future.

Lee e%J)resses it very well when she says,

"Past, present, and future are presented linguistically as
the same, are present in his existence, and sameness

~th

what we call the past and with myth, represent value to the
Trobrlander. H187

In other words, where we strive for change,

they strive ror sameness.

Where we see e developmental line,

they see at the most only a repetition
ordained.
value.

o~

what was pre

Where we see climax, they see only an increase.in

"Where we f1nd pleasure and satisraction in moving

187I:2!!., p. 111.
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from the point, in change a8 variety or progress, the

in the repetition ot the known, in
maintaining the point. o188 I.e., what ~ call repetition.
Trobriander tinds

~s

i~

a further illustration, certainly their Kula ex

peditions are not lineal17 arranged.

The Kula is certain17

not economically profitable, so one cannot say that a Kula

expedition leads to anrthing like wealth, etc.

One always

trades with the same partner, and the more one trades with

him the more Taluable the partnership becomes.

Tha object

is neither economic nor does the desire for adventure or

change enter into the picture.

The Kula is valuable be

cause it is a repetition ot a time-honored traditional
custom which 1s maintained 1ft the same manner as was sup

posed17 ordained in the beginning ot time.
indulged, the more valuable it becomes.

The more it is

The Kula does not

lead to SU1thing; ite Talue lias in its maintenance.
I wonder 1.t this same principle 1s not connected

also with Trobriand politics.

Ostensibly in the beginning

ot time the original ancestors emerged from a hole in the
ground, and their order of emergence determined their

social p08ition which i8 maintained to the present day.
Thoee who emerged first yere the chiefs, &s are their de
cendants today, and those who came last were the commonere,

188.!Ell., p ; 117.

as are their descendents.

The people of different classes

are considered as almost different species or human beings.
The leaders recognize that their duty is to lead and they
take to leadership naturally.

The commoner recognizes that

it is his position to tollow.

Any attempt at social mobility

is not allowed.

The trobrianders go to great trouble to

preserve this system.
its purpose.

They never

as~

why it is or what is

It simply is, and that seems to be reason

enough tor its e%istence and maintenance.

The principle

ot nonlinsality holds here also in that political validity
stems trom a traditionally established pattern, and living
up to the pattern is or utmost importance to the extent

that the political system is maintained and perpeduated on
the same principles which have existed always, increa8ing
its value.

It is not that the Trobrianders are incapable ot
perceiving lineality.
don't like it.

They cah, but when they see it, they

JOr e%&mple, a boy who wishes to make love

to a girl must give her a present.

ot old.

this has been ordained

But should he give the present with a purpose in

mind, of giving to win her favors, he is considered des

picable.

GiVing the present is valuable only as part ot a

long established pattern, and not as a means to an and.
In summary. it can be said that the Trobriand
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I.landers think non-linsally.

Time i. not percsived a.

flowing in a line, and experience 1s Dot presented as

flowing lineally from nadir to climax. and this i. re
fleoted in their storie • •e well ae their activitiee.
There is

DO

own reward.

external motivation; each activity conta1na its

!her.fore , the whole notion of success and

failure are absent, because BUch a concept presupposes a
line.

Success means reaching the goal which is at the end

of a lineal sequence, and failure 1s frustration of that at
tempt.

&11 that is of value 1s conceived not in termB of

chenge or moving toward something, but in maintaining the
e••e point. of ewelling a traditional point. by repstition
of that point.
Dorothy Lee's article on non-l1neal1ty in Trobriand
culture is by far the best article that I have read.

In it.

ehe etarts with ths idea of the ab.ence of the line and
then relates this absence to Trobrland culture, especially

the basis of their 8yet•• of value and motivation.
a short article. and

no~

It is

complete by any means. and yet

far better than anything elee I have eeen.

Unfortunato17.

there are few such artioles, and even fewer anthropologists

inter.eted in continuing what she hae begun.
Kluckhohn hae eome ideas which might
if carri8d to their logical conclueion.

pro~e

fruitful

In diecuesing the

Navaho. he pointe out that the Bavaho do not think of the
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universe as a

c~osed

or completed entity.

This conception

of the universe CBn be discovered in their myths, which,
from what Kluckhohn says, are never complete, and never

offer &n7 rssolutions or solutions which are true absolutely.
Kluckhohn also points out that this can be seen in Navaho
weaving.

Every Navaho rug, for example, hal!i a corner

which 18 incomplete; and every pot has a break in the
design.
The same thing can be seen in their traditions -
they always leave something out.
of their view toward the world.
1s in the process of becoming.
toward completion.

these acts are indicative
The world, they believe,
It is a world always moving

Once it reaches cODsum8tlon, there 1s

nothing of nlue in it &n1lD0rs.

J. complete thing is value

less and, therefere, the NaTaho are careful never to finish
anything.
Unfortuuats1T, this is as far as he carriss the
discussion.

He

Da~r B&78

what effect this attitude has

upon the political or religious ideas.

He does not mention

what the oonnections of this idea are with behavior.
does he indioate how

~is

Bor

notion influences goals and

motives.
Ths first thought that oomss to my mind, is that
psrhaps this idsa is indicative of a defersntial attitude
toward the universe; as an indication that the Navaho do
not feel all-powerful or all-knowing, but recognize that

217.

there 18 much that they do not know and perhaps never will
knov.

I expect that this would have

behavior.

BO••

connection with

Perhaps it could be connected with an

UD

authoritarian, rather light-hearted approach to life.

Certainly I would not expect one who admittedly did not know
all the answers to be the type given to ordering others
around, and behav1ng in an authoritarian manner.
If this 1s

BO,

then one would expect some connection

with the political structure.

I would think that a people

who are not authoritarian would not have a veIl organized
political hierarchy.

This, of course, seems to be the case;

the Navaho ars not given to a strong centralized political
system.

But whether there 11 a connection between this

political system and their perception af the universe as
incomplete 1s debatable.

At anJ rate, these are the types of questions that
must be answered, and this 1s the type of study that must be
done before any real conception ot the idea system comes

into focus.

This i8 the type of study that must be done in

order to get at primitive thought, and this is the type of
work that seems to have been avoided.
The problem. and what it entails. bas been recognized
by a good many writers. but apparently. the problem is more
easily recognized than solved.
James P8ibleman is one who certainly recognizee the
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scope of the problem and ita importance, but seemB to avoid

the problem of uncovering conc.ete thoughts.

Yet. he is well

avere that the ideas systems, the way of looking at the world,
is imbedded in language.
One quote demonstrating the point is the folloving:
"Language touches oulture at every point
through other institutions. ~t the bottom,
transportatioD could alBost dispense vith
it and at the tip, theology finds it in
adequate for th.ezpreBslon of the re
ligiouB experieDce. But between these
extremes, it per.eateB everywhere. ror
instance, in Bcience, language 1s required
for e%pra.sion and record and even for
thought. In addition to being necessary
to these prooedures, language itself con
tains hilos. hies. rhe accepted dominent
onto
0
c ture is to be found !m
8 ~!S8, and ts myt s are
almost ID•• para~rrOB it. Unfortunately,
it is too often the highest expressions
of a culture lIhich pron the most per
ishable. ~bstract ideas and esthetic
feelings .~t oease to exist unless thsy
can perpetua-M the_Ins in so_ way or

e.

other .. ad this they do not always suc

ceed in do1Dg.·l~9 P. 107.

Prom this one can 888 that relbleman recognizes that thought

end language are inextricably bound up together, yet recog
nizing this, he still makes no attsmpt to rsach thought
through language.
When he snalyzes Hopi culture he begins by attempt
ing to comprehend culture through lIhat is observsble,190
189J ...... Peibleman, The Theory of Human OUlture
(Hew York: Sloan and Pearce, 1946), P. 107.

-

190 Ib i d .• p. 203.

which is the wrong approach according tg Sapir.
contention seems to be illustrated in

Sapir's

~iblemanrs

work be

cause Feibleman does a very poor job of analyzing Hopi
culture.

In fact, in his description, there is not one

mention of an idea.

In other words,

~ibleman

tries to

descr1be Hop1 culture wh11e overlook1ng what 1s perhaps the
most important part of a culture -- its idea system.

Small

wonder that his description is inadequate.

Though h1s analys1s of Hop1 culture 1s superf1c1al
and unrevealing, he uees the linquistio approach in analyz
ing Mayan thought, and his results, I think, are much
better.

At least, he is able to characterize their thought.

A sample of what he does 1s conta1ned 1n the following para
graph:
"The most significant preperty of the Mayan
language 1s the sharp d1stinct10n 1t makes
betwesn universal and part1oular, 1n both
nouns and verbs. !he distinction is so
clear 1n MaTon, that 1t can onlT 1nd1cata
the presence of a mental attitude as
Ga~es Ba¥S, or, we shOUld say, the out
11ne of an imp11c1t ontology. In ~ayan
the root stands for poss1b111ty, for a
word 1n the log1cal ordsr of be1ng. The
tl end1ng g1ves the root syntact1cal con
nections, that is to say, placee it in
actua11ty, connscts 1t with other 1tems
in the flowing process of existence. In
process, the word stands for an actual
thing and characterizes a particular;
otherwise, outside use, the word is a
universal and is clearly intended as Buch.
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To be and to function are not the same
thing; all being is capableaf function
ing, and all functioning things have
their being. But there is more to being
at any time than there ie to functioning.
Mayan recognizes this fact. What 1s true
for DOunS is also true for adjectives.
In the ad~ective. the -il ending denotes
abstract quality. As Gates puts it,
'every word 1s conceived of as standing
in its own potential only, until it
comes forth into the world of activity
to be connected with and affecting some
object, by its nse or operation. '
Gates notes that for the Mayan language,
words are Ideas, in the realistic sense
in which Plato understood them; real
possibilities. The Mayan evidently was
a metaphysical realist, in that he be
lievsd in the being of a realm of
universals, powers capable ot acting
ans suttering action but real when
only possible.

The emphasis quite logically led Kayan
away from subJectivism, for the realist
must obJectitT everything. "191 p. 196.
Whether allot what Peibleman has to say

i~

this

regard is true or not I cannot ver1tt. but it 1s amazing,

nevertheless, that by utilizing a linguistic approach he
can make some Bort ot an attempt to determine what the1

thought, or it not specifically what they thought, at least
QOw they thought about it.
The Maya, we should remember, are an extinct tribe

of which only a tew articles ot archeological significance
remain, and also a few terts.

19lIbid., P. 196.

That someone could even
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attempt to discover what the Mayan thought attest in my

opinion to the power and possibilities which the 1inguiatic
method offers if only it can be utilized properly_

It

would seem that oDe can do much more with this than by any
observation of the facts alone.
the work of Dorothy lee.

This is brought forth in

Lee never saw the Trobrland

Islands, as far as I know, although sbe did talk to several
ethnographers.

Her information was taken mainly from the

work of Malinowski, and with thia information, in addition
to some knowledge of Trobrland grammar, she throws a whole
new light onto Trobrland thought.

Perhaps she knows more

about this one area of their thought than J!aninowski himself;
At any rate, Lee's type of study is the type that
needs to be done and the type which has not been done.

one except one who is an expert in the field.
To attempt such a study presupposes a knowledge of

a primitive language, and as one might imagine, this is
A primitive language is

ODe which 1s mastered only after several years of intensive

study, for the difficulties involved in such a study are
tremendous; the most paramount being the lack of any study
aids and organized texts, and also tremendous difference in
syntax, grammar, and vocabUlary.

Moreover, the linguistic

technique involves an.ve Lemezrt of intuition.

I

It

is the type of study which can hardly be attempted by any

relatively difficult to obtain.

:I
I

As Lee e xpz-e see s

. I
,

.

ii I
I

I

,
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it, language glvea only a clue but 1n order to benefit from

these clues offered 1n language one must use some insight
as well ..

To attempt to apply such a techoique is almost im
possible for one in my position, and yet I attempted to,
and, if I might say, with some success.

I was severely

handicapped in this attempt by not knowing the language and
so my source of material was limited to those linguistic
references which the anthropologist threw in, often aa not,

purely by accident.
Por the sake of expediency, I will not give a de
tailed report covering all the time I epent looking through
dictionaries and descriptions of primitive languages, nor

will I give a resume of all the ideas I had which did not
prove worthwhile.
There are only two ideas of all those I "played

around with" that are worth mentioning at all.

A few of the

others may have had something to them, but I could not get
enough information to substantiate them.

The best idea I

had, which concerned the linguistic approach, involves
lan1 ideas concerning Totemlsm.

Basically, I think it can

be demonstrated that Zuni Totemic ideas involve a different
classification of experience.
have

th1~teen

Bunzel states that the Zuni

matrilineal clans which vary in size;

"from

the Yellowwuod, consisting of two male members to the large

,
d,
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so-called Dogwood clan, which compDls8s several hundreds

of individuals.

All but two of theae clan. are named for

plants, but two. the Antelope and the Bear, are named for
anlmals."192
In order to make my next point clearer, let me state
that we place animals and plants and men in different
categories, and this system of classification might be
represented in the following way:

Men

/ Animals

/ Planta

/ Inanimate Objects/
primarily stones, etc.

Of course, we are capable of classifying these things
in other ways, but in a general sort of way, this 1s the

type of classification to which we are prone.
classifications bear witnesB to this.

our stientific

OUr science separates,

first of all, animate objects from inanimate objects; the
science of the former 1s geology and the latter, biology.

Biology is further broken down into the study of botany,
and zoology.

And zoology further divided into vertebrate,

and invertebrate zoology, and BO on down the line.
Noll' the Zuni I am Bure would recognize this class

ification; they would recognize that a bear i. different
trom a man, but they would superimuose another classifica
tion over this one in which some men would be classified
with bears, and others with antelopes, etc.
Like a good many other Borth American CUltures, the

192seventeenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American
Ethnology, 1929-1930., ·(VaBUngton, D. C.: United States
Printing Officel, p. 647.
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Zuni origin myths state that in the beginning everything
was composed of the lame undifferentiated stu!!.

Through

various incidents, which are recounted in great detail
mythically, the various animals, trees, plants, etc., be
came differentiated trom this amorphous mass.

Though they

differed in form, different classes ot men remained closely
attached 1n eBsence to different animals and objects.

This

ot course, 1s the basis upon which the present day clans are
constructed.

In other word", the Zuni have another way of

classifying men such that

..ati~d

is ssparated into

divisions and each segment claseified with eome totemic
animal.

Perhape their way of claesifying human beings might

be represented as follows:
Animals

Man

Plants

1

--------t------I-----AnteIOpe
Deer
------- Sagebush

J,morphous

Turtle

Mass
-------,~-

---,

---

-----f-i--------- t - - - +i- - - - - i _ _ _ Tillie

•

- -

Yellowtree

- etc.
etc.
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This chart represents two different classifications.
The verticle 11nee divide living thinge

88

we would, which

1s a manner of classifioation the Zuni 81so aust recognize.
The horizoDtal lines represent tbe classification of certain
men with specific plants or animals to fora the totemic
clans.

Rere again 1s another case where common experience

is brcken up differently by different peoples.

Where

yO

see only animals, the Zuni Bee some animals as the brothers
Where we classlfT men according to soc1a1 status,

of men.

the Zuni do it according to the man's mythical relation to

a

cer~aln

animal.

It 1s a different way of looking at the

universe; it throws a whole different emphasis on human
society.
versa.

Those things we emphasize, they do not, Bnd vice
To us such things

8S

power, prestige, and wealth

are of ultimate ooncern and we Bee human beings accordingly
in terms of these factors.

OUr anthropologists living among

a primitive society are always on the lookout for these
things Which are of significance to us.

We overlook those

things which are of significance to the primitive himself.
To understand the Zuni, one would have to reoognize that he
distinguishes between realities differently than we and then
works from there.

Let us leave the Zuni.

I also devoted some study to the Dakota Sioux which
proved valuable.

In looking over material on the Sioux of

Borth America, I discovered What I think is a more acourate
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description of W&bka Takan. or the S10ua God b1 looking at
the way the Dakota themselves describe him Wanka Takan 1s
usually translated simply as God or Great Spirit by most

ethAographers. and from this translation the reader conjures
up in his mind something closely resembling bis own con
cept10n of God.

Waken Tanka 1a aometh1ng va.t11 different,

B1 gathering up all the defin1t1ona of Waken

howevsr.

Tanka as the Dakota themselves refer to him, I vas able to
piece together the following descrlptiol:U

The great myatar1aus Wakan Tanka 1s a unity, a one,
but composed of four different personalities -- the Head
God, the Great Spirit, the creator, and the ldmlnlstrator,
and each of these is further divided into four different
segments.
The Head God 1s one, but composed of the sun, the

moon, the bUffalo and the .p1rlt.

The Great Spirit 1s one also, but composed of the
follow1ngfour individuals -- the ek1. the wind. the bear,
and the ghost11 spirit.
The creator also consists of four personalities to
be considered as a unit -- the earth, the female-like, the
four w1D.d&l, and the spirit.
!he

~1n18trator

1s one again, but composed of

ths rock. the YiDged. the vh1rl~d. and the potenc1.19'
193orh1e deecript10n of Wakan Panka was S1Uthes1zed
by the scholar, from a variety of sources too numerous to
mantion.

1:
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The mo.t important thing about waten Tanka i. that
he 1s conceived of in personal terms, rather than group
terms.

Wakan Tanka did not think in terms of tribes, but

rather in teras of an individual.

Each individual, and

particularly each man, must tap this universal force if his
undertakings were to be Buccessful.

W1thout this pover a

man could not achieve succesS in the valued activities.
Thus the Sioux were not given to many group religious
,

actiVities, where one man, a priest, or whoever, spoke for
the Tribe or group as a whole, each man had to approaCh his

God in hi. own way.
This conception of God is very congruent with the
Sioux emphasis on individuality, independence, self as
sertiveness, and

autono~

which they prized 80 much.

Though

this idoa of lRkan !anta may not be exactly accurate, I
think thi. is a closer definition than the usual translation.
presented.

If this 1s correct, it is additional evidence

that through tho linguistic approach one can arrive at a
closer approxiaatioa of primitive thought.
The real significance of

my

study of the Sioux doity

is that it led to an insight into the Sioux view of the self.
Oft several occasions I Botlced that in prayers de
livered to I8kan Tanka, the plea was not for power, or
wealth, but tor oneness with the universe.
tion rite they brewed grass to

II

In the purifica

make the tour-legged, the
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wingeds, the star people of the heaven and 811 things as

relatiYes.·

194

ind during the psssing of the sacred pipe.

the hol.,. man cried. 110 Wakan Ta.nk.a, grant that this young

man may have relatives; that he may be oDe with the four
winds, the four powers of the world. and the light of the

dawn.

May he understand his relationship with all the
winged peoples of the air.· 195 ind still another time,
during an 1nitiation rite, wOur grandmother and mother:

This young man wishes to become one with all things.196
ind Black Elk also expressed a similar theme when he said of
praying to Yanken Tanka, "It helps us realize our oneness

with all things, to know that all things are our relatives;
end then on behalf of all things we pray to lIakan Tanka. ,,197
Prom these quotes, we can see that the Sioux individual
wanted to feel intensely related to the universe in all its

aspects.

Again, there is a different classificstion of the

universe in this respect, I believe.

Where we stress the

difference between ourselves aDd others, the Sioux stressed
the relatedness.
they saW' It

!a

Where we wall ourselves off trom nature,

themselves.

While we lUte to stress our

4
the
19 J ohn G. Nerbardt, Black~Eilk?-iaf;.;ak~s~~~~C7~
L fe ato
f a Ho
an of the
1a a a oux
ark:
111am MOllY and Oompany, 1932 ,p.
195 Ib1d., p.

19 6 Ibi d., p.
~

197 B• Joseph Epes Brown, The Sacred Pipe, Black
Elk's Account or Seven Rites of the Oglala sIoux, ed.

Joseph Epes Brown (Norman, Okla.:
Press, 1953), P.

University of Oklahoma
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differences, trom the rest of the animal kingdom which is
refleoted in such egocentric ideas that we are superior
and somehow different from the other animals, the Sioux

thought of himself as related to and not at all different
from other forms of life.
idea about God.

This 1s indicated by the Sioux

Their god shows no more preference for

humans than for other forms of life.

Their god was truly

a god over the whole universe and not just the God of men.

The difference is reflscted in the attitude toward
the use of physical resources.

The Sioux killed only what

was absolutely necessary and no more, and even then they

felt rather guilty, so they had to propitiate the spirits
of the dead animals.

After all, they were brothersl

The white man thinks of every other form of life as put here
tor his own use, and acts accordingly.

One of hie ac

complishments in this country is the wild and wanton
slaughter of the trees.
in the state of Maine.

This is very noticeable right here
Jnother such achievement was the

stripping of the Great Plain. of over 300 million head of
Buffalo in le •• than thirty years.

No Sioux would have

acted so.

What is the offect of this idea in term. of human
relations?

The first thing that comes to mihd i. that if

the Sioux wi.hed to be a part of every thing in the universe
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would not this idea extend

itsel~

to human groups as wel11

Would he not perhaps attempt to feel closely related to

!

human associations?
There is much evidence for this idea.

Danoe"

o~

In the "&host

the 1860's the medioine man oould .a1 in pra1ing

to Yanka Takan, "Behold me, for I represent the people"
and III am the psoPle".198

Moreover, when a hunter brought

in game, he sharsd it Y1111ngl1 Y1th ever10ne in oamp.
There va. no rule about thia, he .imp11 did it.
co~celve

To u., who

of ourselves as primarily separate units, the

~ealing o~

relatedna •• implioit in .uoh an aot is

to imagine and our

~1r.t

reaotion i. to tr1 to

ulterior aotive tor such openhandedness.
find out there 1s no motive.

di~~ioult

~ind

.ome

As tar as I caD

Such altruism neither merited

graa ter prestige or pOll8r or even thaBll:s

~or

i t was .imp11

part of one's natural 1nol1natlon.
This feeling af relatedness vas also expressed in

initiation oeremonie., in whioh a b01 i. told to develop
him.el~ ~or

is

ve~

the good

o~

hi. people.

Prom the time a ohild

small he i. urged to give to others.
With bond. this olo.e it is intere.ting to note that

the Sioux were al.o high11 individualistio.

~ppar.nt11,

to

them, relatedness did Dot entail servltu4e or deference to
another.

Unlike ourselves, to whom relatedness in a group

198 I b i d., p.
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and taking on the ideas and attitudes of the group to which
I

we belong, the Sioux vere encouraged to be hightly in
dividualistic.

To them, belonging to a group did not en

tail being under the thumb of that group.

No man would ever

speak for another, nor was he entitled to command others.
If oDe felt like hunting in a certain area, no one vas to

tell him differently.
The individual, almost without

exceptio~,

did what

was required of him and more, but the incentive 'for this WEI

not threat of punishment or exterior force.

One did what

was right because it vas the "Wakan Wayll or the holy way.

And the "Wakan Way" did not entail obeying the orders of
others.

Upon this basis rested Sioux democracy.

had chiefs, but their power vas immunized.

The Sioux

Oertainly they

did not have the power to coerce others against their viII.
These chiefs were generally chosen by popular vote of the
council, in which every man had his QaY

Perhaps in this individualistic feeling were the
seeds of destruction for the Sioux tribe.

When the white

man came and encroached upon their land, the Sioux, in
general, could not organize effectively against them.

Only

once was a chief able to get any large group of warriors
to obey h1s every command, and in that instance, Sitting
Bull, with the aid of

Cra~

Horse, soundly beat the wb1te

man, but such instances were rare.
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I tried unsuccessfully to extend this idea to include all
areas of Sioux thought.

In this attsmpt I was hindsred to

a great extent by a lack of material.

There are few good

discussions of primitive language in existence, as you might
well believe.
available.

Dictionaries are the most common material

There are fev books around which give any in

dication of patterns of thought, such that the ontology or
weltanschauung of a people is 1mmediately evidsnt.

Even if

1f were available, it would take an expert to interpret it
properly.
To conclude this 1s an example of the type of
thing I attempted; and while these two ideas only have come
to some fruition, there were several others which bad to be
dismissed.

THE NEW SCHOOL
Though the members of the Hew School have not con
tributed any complete analysis of ant one tribe, they cer
tainly have left their mark.

They have made a very eignifi

cant contribution to the history of thought.

My only

criticism 1s that they tend to "jump around" too much.
rhey give only a partial analysis of a tribe trom one

~oint

of view and then enter into a discussion of another tribe.
As a result they have not produoed a single complete
analysis of any one tribe. though they have done an
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excellent job of partiallY analyzing several.

This I have

tried to indicate during the course of this work.
Pirst of all, the people who I included in the IIBew

School II do not recognize themee} ve B as a "school".

Wharf

and Sapir do make periodic mention of each other, es
pecially Wharf, who mentions Sapir in several places, but
this 1s the exception.

In Carpenter's whole essay on Eskimo

art, there 1s only one other anthropologist mentioned, Franz
BOBs, and he 1s mentioned only in passing.
In other words, they are a "school" only in my own
mind and in no other.

Yet I am certain that they should be

classified together because their approach 1s a common one,
and the problems, objectives, and goals they hold in common
also.

They, however, do not recognize the similarity, and

as a result, do not work together at all.

One does not build

on the work of another in the way they should, but rather,
they all go off on their oYn little tangent., inventing their
own symbols, terminology, and problems, as they go along.
Por example, Lee does not study what Whorf has done and
then add to it, nor does Carpenter make use of what Lee has
done as a basis for his own work.

There is no growth; each

one starts from scratch without benefit of the experience of
the others.
know it.

Their problems are similar yet one would never

They could use a similar terminology, and yet

234.

they do Dati in each case one must struggle with a whole
Dew vocabulary.

In other words, these people do not recog

nize the common bonds which unite them, and I ahall enlarge
upon this theme presently.
FUrthermore, there 1s another oversight which they
make and this one may be eveD more dangerous.

TheBe

sociologists of the "Helf School"; Kalinowski, Lee, Kluckhohn,

Carpenter, Sapir, etc., Bee themselves as anthropologists
and do not see the connections which their study has to
philosophy or semantics.

To determine the categories of

thought of a primitive tribe is, to me, fairly obviously as
much of a philosophical endeavor as a sociological one.
is perhaps one of the primary concerns

or

·semantics.

It

Certain

ly semanticists recognize the tyranny which Words hold over

mental functions.

~hey

also know that imbedded in language

is a metaphysics.

~his

is indicatad in'th.·,rollowing state

ment by Korzybski who wrote:
w• • • • 8 language, any language, has at its
bottom certain metaphysics, which ascribe
consciously or unconsciously, some sort ot
structure to this world. • • •

We do not realize What tremendous pover the
structure of an habitual language has. It
1s not an exaggeration to say that it en
slaves us through the mechanism of semantic
reactions and that the structure 1fhlch a
language e:z:hlblts and impressed upon us
consciously, 1s automatioally projected
upon the world around us. "199
199A1fred Korzbski, Science and sanit (New York:
The International Non-Aristote11an LIbrary Pu 1ishing
Company, 1933), p. 90, 91.

t
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In this paragraph, Korzybskl almost paraphrases what
~ihorf

has said in Language. Thought and Reality,

As far as

goals and approach are concerned, I would Bay that the "New

School" 1s closer to a semantic point of view than the
tradltlonan anthropollg1cal outlook.

Semanticists Beem to

recognize this and use some of the material which

ths~e

".New School" people have presented, yet the s1.m.l1arlty Is

apparently unrecognized by the "New School".

In this

regard it Is interesting to note that one of Wharf's articles
on language was reprinted in Hayakaws.'s book, Language in

Action, but no "New School" anthropologist even so much as
refers to Hayakawa.

this Is significant, I believe, and

indicative of a general feeling among anthropologists.
I noticed that these anthropologists did not inclUde
anything but anthropological material in their discussions,

and taking my clue from them, I did the sams thing.
This, I believe, was a mistake.

Were I to do the

whole thing over again I would begin by rsading anthropology
and philosophy

~

semantios in equal amounts.

I think I

would concentrate especially on the work of the logical

positivists, for I have the feeling that what they are doing
might be very significant as far as primitive thought is
concerned.

Such questions as "the meaning of meaning" are

of prime concern, I believe.
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This oversight on the part of the "Bew School
anthropologists may account for their not being able to
penetrate still desper into primitive thought systems.
One reason ror lack of extension in ".ew School" to
other areas Is in the nature of study.
in language is one thing.

To uAcover ontology

The language itself may be able

......

to give information concerning how one thinks, 80 that Ideae
concerning reality, time, space, and other things in which
the IIBew School" shows special interest could be determined.

But how would one go about the task of revealing socIal
ideas, or ideas about man?
eacy.

Obviously, it would not be so

These ideas are not eo apt to be in the structure of

a language, although structure would influence them.

This

1s quite obvioUS.
However, if these "Bew School" people have done
nothing else, they oertainly have ohanged the outlook of
the sociology of knowledge.
Whatever one may think to the contrary, they have
really not discovered any

~

method in that their results

are as much dependent upon insight and intuition as the
former sociologists of knowledge.

They have not discovered

any new key to the discovery of primitive thought unless
their linguistic approach be considered as such.

To apply

their approach, a knowledge of the language involved Is
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required, but even then a certain amount of guess work 1s
necessary.

What they. have changed is the whole object or the
search.

Very basically, where the older sociologists of

knowledge were interested in the contents of thought, the
"Rew School" 18 interested in the categories of thought.

Perhaps a list would serTe as well as &n1th1ng to bring out
the contrast.
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OLD SOHOOL

l/lllf SCHOOL

1.

emphasis on aotivities

emphasis on language

2.

interest 1n d1reot ideas

interest in ideas inherent
in language

3.

e%pUott ideas

1mpllc1t ideas

4.

speoH10 ideas

categories of thought

5.

though t in part10ular in

premises upon which
thought is based

6.

what the;r sa;r

how the;r sa;r 1 t

7.

ideas of scholars

ideas of whole group

8.

ma1nl;r pol1t1oal ideas

percepts wh10h underlie
sU thoughts

9.

ideas in terms of socla1
experience

ideas as part ot
ps;roholog1oal pattern

stances
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Prom ideology to ontolog7, thie i8 the 8tOry of the
80ciology of knowledge.
There 1s still another destruction between the

older 8ociologi8t8 of knowledge and the "Bew School".

It was

pointed out in Chapter I that the older 80ciologi8ts of
knowledge attempted to superimpose their own frame of
reference upon the material -- the cultures studied.

The

"Rew School" 1s not-so inclined, but instead concentrates on

eliciting the philosoph7 or weltauschauung of the tribes
the7 stud7.
This does not mean that the "Bew School" simp17
translates ideas of these prlmltlTes into English.
involved than this.

articulated.

Hore 1s

Por the most part these ideas are in

Primitives have ideas of courae, but the7 are

not necessarily stated as such.

Moreover -- and this 1s a

point demonstrated in this Iaat chapter -- ideas depend

OD

the language used; therefore it 1s impossible to directly
translate ideas from one language to another.
Perhaps even more important. people are often times

unaware of what the7 raal17 think.

fhis can be demonstrsted

in a number of ways, but perhaps a reference to the Whole

field of pS7choana17sis would be most usefUl.

When a patient

tells an ana17ist something, the ana17ist does not accept it
st face value, but interprets it in the light of what he
knows.

Removed from a theoretical context, it means nothing.

The stud7 of thought s7stems is similar to pS7choana17sis
in this respect.

Like the psychoanalyist, the anthropologist must
not

upl,.

accept face value statements, but must pass them

through the priem of his own mind if the whole spectrum of
primitive ideas, 1s to coae clearly into fucus.

Clearly,

some Interprelatlon 18 necessary in order to understand

primitive thought.
Interpretation Is T8r,. necessary, but the type of
interpretation 1s most significant.

!he"Hew School" does

not simply fit pr1aitive ideas to our own categories of
thought.

Instesd it interpreta such that the Weltanschauung

of the pr1aitives inTOlved comes most clearly into focus.
To do this, the invention of DeW categories Is sometimes
necessary.

These categories are such that the primitives

themselves would not recognize them as their own; never

theless, they best express the primitive point of view.

It

1s with the dlscoTery of such new categories that the "Wew
School" concerns itself.
Another difference between the older sociologists
of knowledge and the ·Wew School" Is their conception of

the relationship bstwoen thought and behav1or.

~s

Bociologists ot-knowledge were unanimous in their support

of the idea that behav10r was primary and thought systems
stemmed trom them.

just this.

~ll

!heir whole concern with ideology was

of these sociologists from Marx onward

thought that an ideology only rsinforcsd, or justified, an
already existing behav10r pat tarn
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'l'he "Hew School" turns the whole scheme around, In

sisting that the thought system 8S conceived through
language 18 prtmary and from this stems a pattern of be

havior.

Take the Hopi, for ezample.

Whorf says their

language lumps wiahing and becoming together, such that i f
one wishes something, it will come into being.
the basis

o~

a whole clremonial complex --

B

This forms

pattern of

behavior.

Just recently several Dew socla1 scientists have
taken up this idea and attempted to expand it.

One such

author 1s Kenneth Bouldlng, who in his book, The Image,
states the idea in no uRcertaln teras.

He says:

"the

first proposition of this work, therefor., 1s that behavior

depends on the image. n200

To Boulding, idea and 1lDBge are

almost the same.
The same emphasis can be slen in all of the "New
School" anthropologists.
there 18 stlll another difference between the older
sociologists of knowledge and the "Iew School".

Where the

sociologists of knowledge ware interested in specific thought
systems, the "Bew School II 1s concerned with the larger, more

inclusive presuppositiomwhich lie behind whole cultural
syetems.

To use an example, the current ideological

ri~t

between the Communist bloc countries and the Bo-called free
world would have been of great interest to
Mannheim.

8

Marx or a

Yet to the "New School" there i6 no real

dif~erence

200Kenneth E. Boulding, The Ima~e (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
University of Michigan Press, 1956) p. •

since both Oapitalist and Communist share the same pre
suppositions.

Seen from this view they are just variations

on the same theme.
In a sense this more inclusive approach is not re
stricted to only anthropology, for other fields have been
broadening as well,

as Laura Thompson points out in

Toward a Science of Mankind.

Such fields as ecology.

psychosematic medicine, social anthropology "are in

B

transi tion period from old ways of thinking to newll.20l
Along with this change is a change in view of reality.
The "new view of reality :und to be holistic",
in that relatedness, connections, and a view of the whole
are emphasized rather than unrelated details.
Thompson states that the cause of these changes is
to be found in their relationship with modern science, and
although I don't really wish to delve into the subJect at
this time, it must be admitted that there may be something
in the idea.
The sociologist of knowledge would go one step
further and look at these new developments in the history
of thought as products of social forces.

He would aSk, are

these new views of reality really more accurate objectively,
or do they stem from a more subjective need?

What is it,

he would aSk, in our culture that makes a more inclusive
approach necessary?

Can we really be objective about anything?

20lLaura Thompson, !oward a Science of Mankind
(Hew York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Inc., 1961), p. 75
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ABSTRACT
The object of this paper was to explore the re
lationships that exist between ideas and other elements
of the social systems of primitive peoples.

Taking a

clue from sociologists of knowledge, who are especially
concerned with the problem of ideology, I began my ex
ploration of primitive thought by ssarching for primitive
ideology.

An ideology might be defined as a conscious

deliberate attempt by one group of people to take ad
vantage of another group by the manipulation of ideas.
It soon became apparent that primitives had nothing com
parable to ideology in this sense, save for perhaps the
4ztece.
The question then was what did primitives have?
What kinds of idoas did they ontertain?

I then attempted

to get at these idoas through an analysis of myth.
attempt was doomed to failure.

This

The interpretation of myth

could be a very important and fruitful endeavor for an
expert, or one very familiar with the cultures involved.
Unfortunately it proved impossible for one in my position.

iii.

After surveying the work of anthropologists in
terested in thought, I discovered that the most success
ful were those that approached the problem linguistically.
Basic to this approach is the axiom that all higher
thought is ultimately dependent on language.

Thus through

an analysis of language the basic presuppositions of a
culture can be discovered.

I applied this method to the

Zuni and Sioux with some success, which resulted in a new
view of their conception of the world.

However, much of my

work 1n anthropological linguistics did not work out.

In

these activities I was hindered by both unfamiliarity with
the field and lack of material as much as anything else.

r was, however. able to come to the following con
clusions:
1.

Behavior is dependent upon ideas.

2.

Discovery of underlying presuppositions is

more significant and will lead to a better understanding of
the whole social system than concern with the specific con
tent or the overtly expressed ideas.
3.

It is impossible to comprehend the thought

system irresyective of the language involved.
4.

Understanding of a primitive thought system

will not be facilitated by superimposition of onels own
categories of thought upon primitive ideas.
5.

Ideas are an expression of social conditions.

